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ABSTRACT 
On several occasions during the last eighty years, states have attempted 
to either prohibit the teaching of evolution in public school science classes or 
counter the teaching of evolution with mandatory references to the religious 
doctrine of creationism. The Supreme Court struck down examples of the 
first two generations of these statutes, holding that they violated the 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. A third generation of 
creationist legislation is now being proposed. Under this new generation of 
creationism legislation, science teachers would present so-called “intelligent 
design” theory as an alternative to evolution. Intelligent design theory 
asserts that a supernatural intelligence intervened in the natural world to 
dictate the nature and ordering of all biological species, which do not evolve 
from lower-to higher-order beings. This article considers whether these 
intelligent design creationism proposals can survive constitutional scrutiny. 
The authors analyze the religious, philosophical, and scientific details of 
intelligent design theory, and assess these details in light of the constitutional 
doctrine developed by the Court in its previous creationism decisions. The 
Article discusses several factors that pose problems for intelligent design 
theory, including the absence of objective scientific support for intelligent 
design, evidence of strong links between intelligent design and religious 
doctrine, the use of intelligent design to limit the dissemination of scientific 
theories that are perceived as contradicting religious teachings, and the fact 
that the irreducible core of intelligent design theory is what the Court has 
called the “manifestly religious” concept of a God or Supreme Being. Based 
on these details, the authors conclude that intelligent design theory cannot 
survive scrutiny under the constitutional framework used by the Court to 
invalidate earlier creationism mandates. 
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For much of the last century, certain religious groups have resisted the 
exclusion of biblical theories of creation from public school science 
curricula. This resistance generated one of the more colorful and well-known 
constitutional battles in the Tennessee “monkey trial” of John Scopes. Scopes 
was a public school teacher in a small Tennessee town who was convicted of 
violating the Tennessee anti-evolution statute by teaching the theory of 
evolution in his high school science class.1 The Scopes trial brought the 
dispute between science and religion to center stage, complete with 
appearances by larger-than-life characters such as Clarence Darrow and 
William Jennings Bryan, and a running commentary by a third outsized 
figure in the form of H. L. Mencken. The popular memory of this battle, as 
memorialized on celluloid by Spencer Tracy, Fredric March, and Gene 
Kelly,2 is that science and sophisticated rationalism defeated ignorance and 
parochial sophistry.3 To the chagrin of modern opponents of evolution, 
Mencken’s harsh judgment about Darrow’s humiliation of Bryan probably 
sums up much of the country’s common understanding of the battle between 
evolution and creationism: “On the one side was bigotry, ignorance, hatred, 
superstition, every sort of blackness that the human mind is capable of. On 
the other side was sense. And sense achieved a great victory.”4  
And yet the battle still rages. The United States Supreme Court did not 
get around to holding Scopes-style anti-evolution statutes unconstitutional 
until its 1968 decision in Epperson v. Arkansas.5 In Epperson, the Court held 
that the first-generation anti-evolution statutes were unconstitutional because 
they constituted an impermissible attempt to impose religious criteria on the 
public school curriculum in violation of the Establishment Clause.6 Epperson 
 1. The Tennessee statute made it “unlawful for any teacher in any of the Universitis [sic], 
Normals and all other public schools of the State which are supported in whole or in part by the public 
school funds of the State, to teach any theory that denies the story of the Divine Creation of man as 
taught in the Bible, and to teach instead that man has descended from a lower order of animals.” Act of 
Mar. 13, 1925, ch. 27, 1925 Tenn. Pub. Acts 50. 
 2. See INHERIT THE WIND (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1960). 
 3. Much of this popular understanding is attributable to the Jerome Lawrence and Robert E. Lee 
play on which the movie version was based. See JEROME LAWRENCE & ROBERT E. LEE, INHERIT THE 
WIND (1955). For the background to the actual trial and the story of how the trial gradually achieved 
near mythical status, see EDWARD J. LARSON, SUMMER FOR THE GODS: THE SCOPES TRIAL AND 
AMERICA’S CONTINUING DEBATE OVER SCIENCE AND RELIGION (1997). 
 4. H. L. Mencken, Aftermath, in THE IMPOSSIBLE H.L. MENCKEN: A SELECTION OF HIS BEST 
NEWSPAPER STORIES 611 (Marion Elizabeth Rodgers ed., 1991). 
 5. 393 U.S. 97 (1968). 
 6. Id. at 107 (“In the present case, there can be no doubt that Arkansas has sought to prevent its 
teachers from discussing the theory of evolution because it is contrary to the belief of some that the 
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set in motion a series of efforts by anti-evolution forces to recast their theory 
in a form that would survive judicial scrutiny. Nearly two decades after 
Epperson, for example, the Louisiana legislature reformulated its anti-
evolution position by requiring public schools to offer the creationist position 
as an optional approach to the theory of evolution, rather than as the sole, 
state-mandated perspective. Louisiana injected creationism into the public 
school science curriculum ostensibly as part of an effort to guarantee 
academic freedom and “balanced treatment” for competing theories of 
origins.7 This effort to craft a second-generation, sanitized anti-evolution 
statute also failed to satisfy the Supreme Court, seven members of which 
voted to hold the statute unconstitutional.8
Against this background of unsuccessful attempts to exclude or diminish 
the teaching of evolution in public school classrooms, a third generation of 
anti-evolution measures is now being discussed (and sometimes enacted) in 
various states. These measures are oriented around the teaching of so-called 
“intelligent design” theory. Intelligent design theory differs from the early 
generation models of creationism by abandoning the William Jennings 
Bryan-style biblical literalism that was common during the Scopes era. 
Intelligent design proponents do not leave themselves open, as Bryan did, to 
withering cross-examination about the precise contours of the day on which 
God created the earth.9 But two central claims of earlier creationist theories 
remain at the core of intelligent design: First, the claim that biological entities 
 
 
Book of Genesis must be the exclusive source of doctrine as to the origin of man.”). 
 7. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 580–81 (1987). 
 8. Id. at 597. 
 9. One of the more famous portions of Clarence Darrow’s cross-examination of William 
Jennings Bryan pertained to the length of the “day” described in Genesis. After having described 
himself as a biblical literalist, who believed that the Bible contained factually precise evidence of 
everything, including the age of the earth, Bryan admitted under Darrow’s insistent questioning that 
the “day” described in Genesis may not have been an actual, twenty-four hour period: 
[Darrow]: Then when the Bible said, for instance, “and God called the firmament heaven. And the 
evening and the morning were the second day,” that does not necessarily mean twenty-four hours? 
[Bryan]: I do not think it necessarily does. 
D: Do you think it does or does not? 
B: I know a great many think so. 
D: What do you think? 
B: I do not think it does. 
D: You think those were not literal days? 
 B: I do not think they were twenty-four-hour days . . . .  
D: . . . Now, if you call these periods, they may have been a very long time. 
B: They might have been. 
D: The creation might have been going on for a very long time. 
B: It might have continued for millions of years. 
ATTORNEY FOR THE DAMNED 224, 226 (Arthur Weinberg ed., 1957). 
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in the physical world have not evolved naturally from lower-order to higher-
order beings, and second, the claim that a supernatural intelligence 
intervened in the natural world to dictate the nature and ordering of all 
biological species.10 The constitutional question is whether this rearticulation 
of creationist theory renders that theory sufficiently non-religious to satisfy 
the requirements of the First Amendment. 
This article considers intelligent design theories from three perspectives: 
the philosophical and religious, the scientific, and the constitutional. A brief 
introductory section will review the legal details of the courts’ previous 
encounters with creationism. The second section will describe the religious 
and philosophical underpinnings of intelligent design. Although intelligent 
design proponents assiduously avoid this conclusion, the simple fact is that 
intelligent design remains a quintessentially religious doctrine. The sine qua 
non of intelligent design is an intelligent designer, and an intelligent designer 
is simply a subtle reference to God. Much of the philosophical framework 
within which intelligent design theory operates reinforces this conclusion. 
The third section will focus on the scientific aspects of intelligent design 
theory. Unfortunately for the theory’s advocates, the scientific merits of 
intelligent design theory are as weak as the religious elements of the theory 
are strong. Intelligent design theory relies on a series of misunderstandings 
and misrepresentations of evolutionary theory, and the multiple flaws in the 
structure and details of intelligent design theory render it irredeemably 
flawed as science. The fourth section will consider the various legal 
arguments for incorporating intelligent design theory into public school 
curricula. These arguments range from suggestions that Establishment 
Clause theory has evolved (so to speak) away from the Court’s strong rulings 
in Epperson and Edwards, to arguments that denying teachers the right to 
teach intelligent design violates their First Amendment free speech rights. In 
short, none of these arguments can withstand scrutiny. From a constitutional 
perspective, the most recent reinvention of biblical creation theory fares no 
better than the versions that preceded it.  
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF CREATION THEORY AND THE CONSTITUTION 
In contrast to the conflicts and inconsistencies characterizing 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence generally,11 the constitutional history of 
 10. The precise details of these scientific claims are discussed below. See infra notes 272–389 
and accompanying text. 
 11. Foremost among the conflicts characterizing contemporary Establishment Clause theory is 
the Court’s failure to settle on and consistently apply one standard for determining when a state action 
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creationism in the United States Supreme Court is remarkably simple and 
consistent. Contrary to popular perception, the constitutional history of 
creationism does not begin with Scopes. No federal court ever ruled on the 
constitutionality of the Scopes conviction. As noted above,12 Scopes was 
convicted and fined 100 dollars in state court for violating a Tennessee 
statute prohibiting “any teacher in any of the Universities, normals and all 
other public schools of the State . . . [from] teach[ing] any theory that denies 
the story of the Divine Creation of man as taught in the Bible and teach[ing] 
instead that man has descended from a lower order of animals.”13 The 
Tennessee Supreme Court overturned this verdict on the ground that the jury, 
rather than the judge, had imposed the fine. Although the Tennessee 
Supreme Court reversed the verdict, it also expressed the view that the 
Tennessee statute did not constitute an establishment of religion in violation 
of either the federal or state constitutions.14 But having asserted the 
constitutionality of the Tennessee statute, the court avoided further 
embarrassment to the state by noting that “[w]e see nothing to be gained by 
prolonging the life of this bizarre case” and “suggested” that the Attorney 
General enter a nolle prosequi in the case.15 Thus the constitutional issues 
were addressed only in dicta in the state court, and never even reached the 
United States Supreme Court. 
A. The Supreme Court and Creationism 
It would be another forty years before the Supreme Court would finally 
review a Scopes-style creationism statute and announce its determination 
that, contrary to the Tennessee court’s dicta, the Establishment Clause of the 
United States Constitution does not permit states to prohibit the teaching of 
evolution in public schools. Epperson v. Arkansas16 involved a challenge to 
Arkansas’ version of the Scopes-era anti-evolution statutes. The operative 
language of the Arkansas statute reviewed in Epperson was virtually 
identical to that of the Tennessee statute that was enforced against John 
 
 
violates the Constitution. Some proponents of intelligent design argue that the Court’s conflicting 
statements about the standard applicable to Establishment Clause violations have undermined the 
doctrinal basis for Epperson and Edwards. This argument is discussed in Section IV, infra.  
 12. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
 13. Act of Mar. 13, 1925, supra note 1 (spelling corrected). 
 14. See Scopes v. State, 289 S.W. 363, 367 (Tenn. 1927) (“We are not able to see how the 
prohibition of teaching the theory that man has descended from a lower order of animals gives 
preference to any religious establishment or mode of worship. So far as we know, there is no religious 
establishment or organized body that has in its creed or confession of faith any article denying or 
affirming such a theory.”). 
 15. Id. 
 16. 393 U.S. 97 (1968). 
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Scopes.17 Both statutes prohibited public school teachers and public 
university professors from teaching the theory that humans evolved from 
other species, or from using textbooks that contained material on 
evolutionary theory. A tenth-grade biology teacher at a public school in Little 
Rock, Arkansas challenged the statute on the ground that the statute made it 
technically illegal for her to use a new biology textbook that contained 
material on evolutionary theory.18 The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the 
teacher, holding that the Arkansas statute violated the Establishment Clause.  
The details of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Epperson are important, 
because Epperson continues to provide the basic constitutional framework 
for analyzing creationism mandates. The Court would later elaborate on this 
framework in Edwards v. Aguillard,19 and these two cases present what 
appears to be an insurmountable legal hurdle to introducing the intelligent 
design version of creationism into public school curricula and state science 
standards. The actual holding of Epperson gives little comfort to proponents 
of intelligent design. The actual holding of Epperson is that the Arkansas 
anti-evolution statute violated the Establishment Clause because the statute 
was motivated by the impermissible purpose of protecting the essential 
dogma of one dominant religious sect from scientific theories with which 
members of the sect disagreed. As the Supreme Court majority summarized 
its conclusion, “It is clear that fundamentalist sectarian conviction was and is 
the law’s reason for existence.”20 After reviewing the original Tennessee 
law’s religious background, the Court noted that “there is no doubt that the 
motivation for the [Arkansas] law was the same: to suppress the teaching of a 
theory which, it was thought, ‘denied’ the divine creation of man.”21  
There are two significant things about the Court’s Epperson decision that 
make the decision just as relevant to intelligent design proposals as to earlier-
generation creationism statutes. The first is the particular nature and breadth 
of the Court’s secular purpose holding in Epperson. Epperson was decided 
three years before the Court formalized the three-part standard for 
Establishment Clause analysis in Lemon v. Kurtzman.22 Under the Lemon 
 17. Compare supra text accompanying note 1 with Epperson, 393 U.S. at 99 n.3 (“It shall be 
unlawful for any teacher or other instructor in any University, College, Normal, Public School, or 
other institution of the State, which is supported in whole or in part from public funds derived by State 
and local taxation to teach the theory or doctrine that mankind ascended or descended from a lower 
order of animals . . . .”) (quoting Ark. Stat. Ann. § 80-1627 (1960)). 
 18. Epperson, 393 U.S. at 100. 
 19. 482 U.S. 578 (1987). 
 20. Epperson, 393 U.S. at 107–08. 
 21. Id. at 109. 
 22. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
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analysis, “First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, 
its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits 
religion; finally, the statute must not foster ‘an excessive government 
entanglement with religion.’”23 Although Epperson was decided before the 
Court’s formal adoption of the Lemon standard, the first two parts of what 
would become the Lemon analysis had been part of Establishment Clause 
analysis for at least five years prior to Epperson.24  
Although the secular purpose and secular effect requirements are 
ostensibly distinct analyses, the Epperson majority opinion does not 
distinguish very carefully between purpose and effect. One reason for this is 
that the Arkansas statute at issue in Epperson was adopted by popular 
initiative rather than legislative action.25 Thus, the Court had little direct 
evidence of the government’s impermissible religious purpose. Unlike a 
legislature, which usually generates some official record of its purpose, the 
electorate voting in favor of a referendum proposition may keep its reasoning 
to itself—if indeed it even can be said that a diverse electorate shares a 
particular perspective on the proposition to begin with.26 For this reason, the 
 23. Id. at 612–13 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)) (internal citations 
omitted). 
 24. See Sch. Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963) (“[T]o withstand 
the strictures of the Establishment Clause there must be a secular legislative purpose and a primary 
effect [for the state action] that neither advances nor inhibits religion.”). 
 25. See Epperson, 393 U.S. at 109 n.17. 
 26. The Supreme Court has recently suggested that the opinions of individual electors in a 
referendum election are insufficient in themselves to establish constitutionally impermissible 
governmental intent. In City of Cuyahoga Falls v. Buckeye Community Hope Foundation, 538 U.S. 
188 (2003), the Court rejected a constitutional challenge to a referendum barring the construction of a 
low-income housing project. The challenge was brought under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal 
Protection Clause, based on an allegation that the referendum constituted unconstitutional racial 
discrimination. The Court noted that such a challenge depended on a finding that the government had 
intentionally discriminated against the plaintiffs on the basis of race. The Court then rejected the 
plaintiff’s challenge to the referendum on the ground that there was no evidence of the relevant 
impermissible intent. The Court held that evidence of allegedly discriminatory voter sentiment was 
insufficient to justify a finding of discriminatory intent. “[S]tatements made by private individuals in 
the course of a citizen-driven petition drive, while sometimes relevant to equal protection analysis . . . 
do not, in and of themselves, constitute state action for the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment.” 
Id. at 196. 
 Outside the referendum context, the courts often ascribe to government actions the religious 
motives of private groups supporting those actions. In Edwards v. Aguillard, for example, Justice 
Powell discussed the religious background and perspective of two private groups—the Institute for 
Creation Research and the Creation Research Society—that had expressed support for the “balanced 
treatment” creationism statute adopted by the Louisiana legislature. “Information on both of these 
organizations is part of the legislative history, and a review of their goals and activities sheds light on 
the nature of creation science as it was presented to, and understood by, the Louisiana Legislature.” 
Edwards, 482 U.S. at 601–02 (Powell, J., concurring). For a more recent example of this phenomenon, 
consider ACLU v. City of Plattsmouth, 358 F.3d 1020 (8th Cir. 2004), where a city accepted a Ten 
Commandments monument from a private group, the Fraternal Order of Eagles. Id. at 1025. In 
Pattsmouth, there was no direct evidence of the city’s intent, but the court noted the explicitly religious 
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application of the secular purpose analysis to the Arkansas anti-evolution 
statute at issue in Epperson was not linked as directly to specific statements 
of governmental policy as the similar secular purpose analysis in cases that 
the Court would later encounter involving more explicit attempts by state 
legislatures to incorporate religious doctrine into law.27  
Ironically, the absence of specific statements expressing the Arkansas 
government’s purpose in adopting the anti-evolution policy actually 
strengthens the Court’s holding in Epperson. The Court’s determination that 
state mandates to teach creationism are unconstitutional cannot be limited to 
situations in which a few public officials make ill-considered public 
statements about religion. In reaching its conclusion that the amorphous 
group of voters who voted in favor of the Arkansas initiative did so on the 
basis of constitutionally impermissible motives, the Epperson majority was 
forced to rely on evidence such as the religious nature of a “typical” political 
advertisement supporting the initiative,28 a few letters to local newspapers,29 
and secondary sources such as academic articles about the nature of the 
Arkansas statute.30 The major support for the Court’s conclusion that the 
Arkansas initiative had an impermissible religious purpose, however, was the 
Court’s analysis of the referendum’s religious effect. In the absence of direct 
evidence of the state’s impermissible religious purpose, the Court inferred 
the purpose from the referendum’s inherently religious nature. 
The Court found the religious nature of the statute inescapable. The Court 
noted that the law singled out only one subject for exclusion from Arkansas 
classrooms: the theory of evolution. The law was not, therefore, an attempt 
 
 
purpose of the private group, and held the city accountable for adopting the same religious objectives: 
“The Eagles donated this monument as a part of its nationwide campaign to spread its version of the 
Ten Commandments; Plattsmouth’s purpose in erecting it was nothing more complex than the 
adoption of that goal.” Id. at 1037. 
 27. An excellent example of overtly expressed state intent to adopt religious legislation can be 
found in the Alabama silent prayer decision. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985). In this case 
the state of Alabama enacted a statute authorizing a period of silence for “meditation or voluntary 
prayer.” Id. at 41 (quoting Ala. Code § 16-1-20.1 (1984)). The Court held that this statute failed the 
Lemon secular purpose requirement. Id. at 56. The Court focused much of its attention on statements 
made by the sponsor of the legislation in the state senate:  
Senator Donald Holmes, inserted into the legislative record—apparently without dissent—a 
statement indicating that the legislation was an “effort to return voluntary prayer” to the public 
schools. Later Senator Holmes confirmed this purpose before the District Court. In response to the 
question whether he had any purpose for the legislation other than returning voluntary prayer to 
public schools, he stated: “No, I did not have no other purpose in mind.” The State did not present 
evidence of any secular purpose. 
Id. at 56–57 (footnotes omitted). 
 28. Epperson, 393 U.S. at 107 n.16. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 107 n.15. 
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by Arkansas to avoid all sensitive discussions of the origins of humanity. 
Rather, the “law’s effort was confined to an attempt to blot out a particular 
theory because of its supposed conflict with the biblical account, literally 
read.”31 Nothing in the referendum actually said that the law was intended to 
protect a particular set of religious dogmas; the Court simply concluded that 
it could conceive of only one possible explanation for the referendum’s 
specific focus—i.e., “the belief of some that the Book of Genesis must be the 
exclusive source of doctrine as to the origin of man.”32 Thus, although the 
Epperson Court ostensibly focused on the issue of religious intent, in fact the 
religious effect of the referendum determined the case. The effect of the 
statute—that is, to omit from public school curricula any references to 
evolution—was so permeated with religion that the Court felt it could only 
have been motivated by an impermissible religious purpose: to protect the 
dominant religious dogma from other theories that proponents of the 
dominant religion viewed as sacrilegious.  
In one sense, the very fact that the religious majority deemed the 
referendum necessary was itself evidence of an impermissible purpose. By 
enacting a legal mandate to exclude from the state’s classrooms scientific 
evidence of evolution, the Arkansas religious majority implicitly 
acknowledged that in an unregulated intellectual marketplace the majority's 
religious conception of biological change could not survive on its merits as 
science. The central holding of Epperson is that the representatives of a 
politically powerful group have no constitutional authority to skew the 
intellectual marketplace in favor of that group’s religion. Under Epperson, no 
group may use the law to artificially bolster the intellectual merits of its own 
faith’s perspective on scientific issues at the expense of an open intellectual 
inquiry into those issues—even if the conclusions generated by the open 
intellectual inquiry inevitably will create doubts among the faithful about the 
veracity of the dominant faith. As the Court summed up this aspect of 
Establishment Clause doctrine, “the state has no legitimate interest in 
protecting any or all religions from views distasteful to them.”33  
The prohibition of religious protectionism is key to understanding how 
the Court’s holding in Epperson will apply to later, subtler versions of 
creationism, such as the theory of intelligent design. The application of the 
Epperson anti-protectionism principle does not depend on the particular 
nature of the religious ideas being fostered by the government. Any political 
attempt to skew the process of scientific investigation in favor of a particular 
 31. Id. at 109. 
 32. Id. at 107. 
 33. Id. at 107 (quoting Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 505 (1952)) (internal 
quotations omitted). 
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set of religious ideas is invalid—regardless of the mechanism used by the 
government to advance its sectarian agenda. The Constitution therefore 
prohibits statutes that bar the inclusion of evolution in public school curricula 
(as in Epperson), but it also prohibits statutes that mandate the inclusion of 
particular ideas (as in Edwards v. Aguillard34) as well as statutes that 
disparage or disclaim the conclusions of scientific inquiry (as in a recent 
local school board policy struck down by the federal courts in Louisiana35). 
Each type of statute is unconstitutional because it conflicts with the Court’s 
basic understanding that if creationism has secular merit as science, the 
scientific community will recognize these merits without being forced to do 
so by legal decree.  
When the courts strike down legal mandates protecting creationism from 
the challenges posed by evolutionary theory, they are not protecting 
evolutionary theory per se, nor are they attacking the merits of creationism. 
Rather, the courts are merely protecting the system of open intellectual 
inquiry from political manipulation directed toward protecting the interests of 
powerful religious groups outside the academic community. In this analysis, 
applying the secular purpose and secular effect tests is simpler than it 
otherwise might seem because the Constitution presumptively prohibits any 
legal mandate to incorporate certain perspectives in a public school 
educational curriculum if those perspectives have been rejected by 
overwhelming numbers of scientists in the academic community. It does not 
matter whether the religious perspective is obvious on the face of the legal 
mandate; the existence of the mandate itself is the problem. Thus, statutes 
incorporating the increasingly generalized and indefinite later versions of 
creationism cannot survive constitutional scrutiny any more easily than the 
earlier versions of that doctrine, which expressly incorporated large and 
detailed portions of the Book of Genesis. The Court made this clear when it 
struck down Louisiana’s version of the second generation of creationism 
statutes in Edwards v. Aguillard.  
 34. 482 U.S. 578 (1987). 
 35. Freiler v. Tangipahoa Parish Bd. of Educ., 185 F.3d 337 (5th Cir. 1999). 
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B. The Evolution of Creationism 
In Edwards v. Aguillard the Supreme Court confronted a Louisiana 
statute that took a less confrontational route toward introducing creationism 
into the public school curriculum than the Scopes-style statute struck down in 
Epperson. In Epperson the state had attempted to exclude evolution from 
public schools altogether. In Edwards the state conceded that evolution 
would be taught in most schools, but required schools teaching evolution to 
also give equal time to creationism.36 The Louisiana legislature entitled its 
statute the “Balanced Treatment for Creation-Science and Evolution-Science 
in Public School Instruction.”37 As the title indicates, the legislature 
attempted to position its effort as intended to protect the balanced 
presentation of scientific evidence. The legislature argued that it really 
intended to protect academic freedom, not advance the religious cause 
represented by creationism.38
The Court did not accept the legislature’s explanation. Instead, the Court 
rejected the second-generation “balanced treatment” creationism statute on 
the same ground as it had rejected the first-generation Arkansas statute in 
Epperson. That is, the Court held that the Louisiana statute also lacked the 
secular purpose required by the Establishment Clause.39 The Court’s 
conclusion on this matter was not a close call; the Court seems to have not 
even taken the legislature’s proffered rationale seriously. As Justice Brennan 
noted for the majority, “While the Court is normally deferential to a State’s 
articulation of a secular purpose, it is required that the statement of such 
purpose be sincere and not a sham.”40  
The significant thing about the Court’s holding in Edwards is that it 
reached its conclusion that the Louisiana legislature’s stated reasons were a 
“sham” largely in the absence of direct evidence that the legislature had 
passed the statute with an impermissible religious purpose. In this respect 
Edwards was again similar to Epperson. If anything, the record in the 
Louisiana case was weaker than the record in Arkansas. As Justice Scalia’s 
dissent points out, the Louisiana legislature vehemently disavowed any 
religious purpose.41 Although the Edwards majority did cite certain 
statements indicating a religious purpose by the sponsor of the “balanced 
treatment” statute,42 the significance of these statements were strongly 
 36. Edwards, 482 U.S. at 580–81. 
 37. Id. at 580. 
 38. Id. at 586. 
 39. Id. at 585. 
 40. Id. at 586–87. 
 41. Id. at 621 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 42. Id. at 591–93 (citing several comments indicating the religious motives of Senator Bill Keith 
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disputed by Justice Scalia,43 and few other legislators contributed similarly 
sectarian comments to the legislative record.  
The significance of the relative dearth of unambiguous evidence 
regarding the Louisiana legislature’s purpose is that the Edwards majority 
did not base its constitutional conclusion primarily on direct evidence of 
legislative intent. Instead, the Court decided that the Louisiana legislature’s 
stated purpose was a sham based on three factors relating to the nature of the 
creationist doctrine advanced by the statute. These three factors are described 
in the next three subsections. The unifying theme of these three factors is that 
the inherently religious nature of creationism—not the legislature’s 
perceptions about why it was advancing creationism—rendered the statute 
unconstitutional. The Court deemed the legislature’s proffered secular 
reasons a “sham” because the Court could find no plausible secular reason 
for intentionally slipping an inherently religious doctrine into science classes. 
The clear message from Edwards is that government action mandating the 
teaching of a theory containing the central religious precepts of creationism 
will violate the Establishment Clause—no matter how carefully lawmakers 
try to cloak the religious basis of their decision. Adoption of the theory itself 
demonstrates the religious intent. The factors relied upon by the Edwards 
majority to determine that creationism is inherently religious are, therefore, 
directly relevant to the courts’ future consideration of any purportedly 
nonreligious legal mandates incorporating the tenets of intelligent design.  
1. The First Edwards Factor: The Conflict Between “Creation 
Science” and Mainstream Science  
The first factor the Edwards Court cited in rejecting the Louisiana 
creationism mandate was the deep conflict between creationism theory and 
the accepted understandings of the academic scientific community. The 
Louisiana legislature claimed that the “balanced treatment” statute was 
necessary to protect the academic freedom of science teachers in the public 
schools.44 The Court rejected this assertion based on its conclusion that 
academic freedom already existed without the statute. The Court found that 
“no law prohibited Louisiana public school teachers from teaching any 
scientific theory,”45 and noted favorably the testimony of the President of the 
 
 
in supporting the balanced treatment statute). 
 43. Id. at 621–26 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that Senator Keith insisted that he was not 
attempting to advance religion, and summarizing evidence introduced by Keith and witnesses before 
the legislature supporting their contention that creationism is a scientific doctrine). 
 44. Id. at 586. 
 45. Id. at 587. 
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Louisiana Science Teachers Association to the effect that “[a]ny scientific 
concept that’s based on established fact can be included in our curriculum 
already, and no legislation allowing this is necessary.”46 Thus, the statute in 
no way advanced the cause of adding to the science curriculum legitimate 
scientific data that teachers had somehow been prohibited from teaching.  
In essence, the Court recognized not only that the Louisiana statute failed 
to advance the cause of academic freedom, but that in fact the supporters of 
creationism in the Louisiana legislature were undermining academic 
freedom. True academic freedom—that is, the freedom to consider, test, 
assess objectively, and ultimately reject scientific hypotheses that have no 
merit—was the very thing that led to the exclusion of creationism from the 
science textbooks and curriculum. Operating under the normal standards of 
academic inquiry, the scientific community had already appraised the merits 
of creationism and found the theory wanting. The “balanced treatment” 
statute was not necessary to protect academic freedom; rather, it was 
necessary to protect a set of scientifically invalid religious doctrines from the 
withering scrutiny of objective analysis that took place in circumstances 
defined by the undistorted conditions of academic freedom. “[W]e agree with 
the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that the Act does not serve to protect 
academic freedom, but has the distinctly different purpose of discrediting 
‘evolution by counterbalancing its teaching at every turn with the teaching of 
creationism . . . .’”47
2. The Second Edwards Factor: The Historical Linkage Between 
Creationism and Religion 
The second factor the Court relied upon in identifying the improper intent 
of the Louisiana legislature was the historical linkage between creationism 
and certain religious groups. “There is a historic and contemporaneous link 
between the teachings of certain religious denominations and the teaching of 
evolution.”48 During its discussion of this point, the Court referred to the 
district court decision in a second-generation creationism case from 
Arkansas, McLean v. Arkansas Board of Education.49  
The district court opinion in McLean remains the most comprehensive 
judicial consideration of the history and theory of creationism. In that 
opinion, the McLean district court details a long history of hostility between 
certain fundamentalist Protestant sects and the scientific theory of 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 589 (quoting Aguillard v. Edwards, 765 F.2d 1251, 1257 (5th Cir. 1985)).  
 48. Id. at 590. 
 49. 529 F. Supp. 1255 (E.D. Ark. 1982). 
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evolution.50 The court based its opinion on extensive testimony concerning 
the history and theory of creationism. The court first noted the religious 
background of the first-generation creationism movement that produced the 
Scopes trial and the statute struck down in Epperson. The anti-evolutionary 
sentiment that produced these statutes was the outgrowth of the evangelical 
Protestant religious movement that began in the United States during the 
nineteenth century.51  
After World War I, members of this religious movement turned their 
attention to a perceived decline in traditional social morality, which they 
believed was caused by Darwin’s theory of evolution.52 The influence of this 
religious movement was pervasive, if sometimes more subtle than the overt 
legal attempts to suppress the theory of evolution through state legislation. 
Because of the widespread influence of this movement, science textbooks 
“[g]enerally . . . avoided the topic of evolution and did not mention . . . 
Darwin.”53 Legal proscriptions were unnecessary because the textbook 
publishers and school boards chose voluntarily to avoid the controversial 
subject altogether. After the Soviet Union’s launch of the Sputnik satellite, 
however, the nation responded by comprehensively strengthening the science 
curriculum in public schools. One aspect of this effort was the curriculum 
reform proposals of the Biological Sciences Curriculum Study (“BSCS”) 
organization. BSCS “developed a series of biology texts which, although 
emphasizing different aspects of biology, incorporated the theory of 
evolution as a major theme.”54 The BSCS-proposed texts and curriculum 
soon came to dominate education in the biological sciences in the United 
States.  
The second generation of anti-evolution statutes was a response to the 
growth of the BSCS-style biology curriculum. During the 1960s and 1970s, 
“several Fundamentalist organizations were formed to promote the idea that 
the Book of Genesis was supported by scientific data.”55 This led to the 
formation of institutions intended to advance the cause of “scientific” 
creationism. These institutions included the Institute for Creation Research, 
the Creation Science Research Center, and the Creation Research Society.56 
 50. For an even more comprehensive description of the background of the creationist movement, 
see RONALD L. NUMBERS, THE CREATIONISTS (1993). 
 51. McLean, 529 F. Supp. at 1258. 
 52. Id. at 1259. 
 53. Id.  
 54. Id.  
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 1259–60. 
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The credos of these groups were often explicitly religious,57 and the 
mechanisms for advancing their religious agenda were statutes—such as 
those struck down in McLean and Edwards—advocating the allocation of 
equal time in biology classes to evolution and theories of so-called “creation 
science” and “scientific creationism.”58  
Although lacking the extensive detail of the McLean district court’s 
examination of the religious and historical background of creationism 
statutes, the Supreme Court’s holdings in both Epperson and Edwards took 
note of the obvious relation between certain religious sects and creationism. 
Thus, even if legislatures enacting statutes mandating the inclusion of 
creationism in science classes fail to mention the religious background of 
creationism, the statutory mandate will nevertheless be viewed in light of the 
undeniable fact that creationism is still permeated with a specifically 
religious perspective. In light of the theory’s background, such statutes 
inevitably involve the manipulation of the educational curriculum for 
religious reasons, and therefore violate the Establishment Clause to the same 
extent as a legal mandate for public schools to include religious 
indoctrination in the form of mandatory prayer59 or the reading of sacred 
texts.60  
 57. See, for example, the statement of principles for admission to the Creation Research Society, 
which among other things required applicants to subscribe to the belief that: 
(1) The Bible is the written Word of God, and because we believe it to be inspired thruout (sic), all 
of its assertions are historically and scientifically true in all of the original autographs. To the 
student of nature, this means that the account of origins in Genesis is a factual presentation of 
simple historical truths. (2) All basic types of living things, including man, were made by direct 
creative acts of God during Creation Week as described in Genesis. Whatever biological changes 
have occurred since Creation have accomplished only changes within the original created kinds. 
(3) The great Flood described in Genesis, commonly referred to as the Noachian Deluge, was an 
historical event, world-wide in its extent and effect. (4) Finally, we are an organization of 
Christian men of science, who accept Jesus Christ as our Lord and Savior. The account of the 
special creation of Adam and Eve as one man and one woman, and their subsequent Fall into sin, 
is the basis for our belief in the necessity of a Savior for all mankind. Therefore, salvation can 
come only thru (sic) accepting Jesus Christ as our Savior. 
Id. at 1260 n.7. 
 58. Id. at 1261. 
 59. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (striking down New York statute requiring the daily 
recitation of the Regents’ Prayer in public school classrooms). 
 60. See Sch. Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (striking down 
statutes requiring the daily reading of religious texts in public school classrooms). 
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3. The Third Edwards Factor: The Inherently Religious Nature of a 
Supreme Being 
The third factor cited by the Edwards Court in support of its holding goes 
to the very heart of creationism and variations of creationism such as the 
theory of intelligent design. According to the Court, the Louisiana legislature 
did not have a secular purpose in passing the “balanced treatment” statute 
because the very theory of creationism “embodies the religious belief that a 
supernatural creator was responsible for the creation of humankind.”61 This 
central characteristic of creationist theory rendered the statutory mandate to 
teach creationism in public schools incompatible with the Establishment 
Clause. “The preeminent purpose of the Louisiana Legislature was clearly to 
advance the religious viewpoint that a supernatural being created 
humankind.”62 Justice Powell’s concurring opinion drove this point home 
forcefully: 
Although the Act requires the teaching of the scientific evidences of 
both creation and evolution whenever either is taught, it does not 
define either term. . . . The “doctrine or theory of creation” is 
commonly defined as “holding that matter, the various forms of life, 
and the world were created by a transcendent God out of nothing.” 
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 532 (unabridged 
1981). . . . Thus, the Balanced Treatment Act mandates that public 
schools present the scientific evidence to support a theory of divine 
creation whenever they present the scientific evidence to support the 
theory of evolution. “[C]oncepts concerning God or a supreme being 
of some sort are manifestly religious . . . . These concepts do not shed 
that religiosity merely because they are presented as a philosophy or as 
a science.” From the face of the statute, a purpose to advance a 
religious belief is apparent.63  
The Court’s singular emphasis on the inherently religious nature of the 
central element of creationism—i.e., the notion of creation by a transcendent 
being—is crucial to understanding the breadth of the Edwards and Epperson 
holdings. These are not cases whose holdings rest on a record of unguarded 
religious comments by zealous government officials. Instead, in Edwards 
and Epperson the Court held that the Establishment Clause prohibits any 
 61. Edwards, 482 U.S. at 592. 
 62. Id. at 591. 
 63. Id. at 598–99 (Powell, J., concurring) (citing Malnak v. Yogi, 440 F. Supp. 1284, 1322 
(D.N.J. 1977), aff’d per curiam, 592 F.2d 197 (3d Cir. 1979)). 
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attempt to mandate the inclusion of the quintessentially religious theory of 
supernatural creation in a public school curriculum—regardless of the fact 
that the legislature gives ostensibly secular reasons for adopting the mandate. 
Religion is religion, and at least since the early 1960s,64 the public school 
curriculum cannot be used to indoctrinate students in any particular religious 
faith. Creationism violates this central precept of the First Amendment 
because creationism is premised on the existence and active intervention of a 
creator—that is, of God—in the biological processes of life. It does not 
matter that a theory does not actually use the term “God.” The Edwards 
majority clearly indicated that the concept of a transcendent being of any sort 
is inherently religious. Viewed in this light, Edwards and Epperson apply 
equally strongly to any legal mandate to teach that a supreme being 
intervenes in natural processes. Old-fashioned Scopes-era young-earth 
creationism is not intrinsically more constitutionally problematic than the 
more subtle varieties of creation theory. As long as a theory depends on the 
existence of a transcendent being, that theory is, for constitutional purposes, a 
religious theory. Therefore, the Constitution prohibits the government from 
incorporating any version of such a theory in the public school curriculum of 
a government-mandated science standard. This is the unavoidable 
implication of Edwards and Epperson, which is now being tested by a third 
generation of creationism proposals. 
C. The Further Evolution of Creationism: The “Intelligent Design” 
Movement 
Despite the Supreme Court’s consistent refusal to uphold statutes that 
attempt to insert religious notions of creation into the public school science 
curriculum, creationism activists have not given up the fight. A new group of 
activists has begun pressing a third generation of creationism proposals in an 
effort to circumvent Epperson and Edwards. The tactical approach behind 
the latest version of creationism is to dilute the theory to the point of 
abandoning all but the core of the original concept: i.e., the central claim that 
biology can demonstrate that a supernatural being created and 
conscientiously organized the natural world.65 This third generation of 
creationist theory became prominent approximately a decade ago as the 
result of disputes over proposals for public schools to adopt a new creationist 
biology text entitled Of Pandas and People: The Central Question of 
 64. See Sch. Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 
U.S. 421 (1962). 
 65. Intelligent design proponents refer to this core theory as “mere creation.” See infra note 115 
and accompanying text. 
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Biological Origins.66 The approach taken in this book reflects the basic 
method of intelligent design creationism: avoid the word God, abandon many 
of the controversial details of earlier versions of creationism, focus on 
alleged problems within the theory of evolution, and avoid positing an 
affirmative alternative approach that coincides too closely with the Genesis 
version of creation. 
The basic similarities and differences between the three generations of 
creationist theory are outlined here, and the religious, philosophical, and 
scientific details of intelligent design creationism will be explored further in 
Sections II and III, infra. The first and second generations of creationist 
theory essentially codified the creation story of the Book of Genesis. The 
Louisiana statute struck down in Edwards defined “creation-science” as 
evidence indicating: 
(a) sudden creation of the universe, energy, and life from nothing; (b) 
the insufficiency of mutation and natural selection in bringing about 
development of all living kinds from a single organism; (c) changes 
only within fixed limits or originally created kinds of plants and 
animals; (d) separate ancestry for man and apes; (e) explanation of the 
earth’s geology by catastrophism, including the occurrence of a 
worldwide flood; and (f) a relatively recent inception of the earth and 
living kinds.67  
This view of creationism embodied in this second-generation statute is 
very similar to the first generation of creationist theory discussed by William 
Jennings Bryan in his testimony regarding the Tennessee statute in the 
Scopes trial.68 The two main differences between first- and second-
generation creationist legal mandates are: (1) first-generation creationists 
tended to base their conclusions explicitly on references to the biblical text, 
whereas second-generation creationists tended to shun specific references to 
the Bible and focus instead on (to use the Louisiana statutory terminology) 
“scientific evidences and related inferences”69 of creationism; and (2) 
second-generation creationism statutes simply attempted to insert creationism 
 66. PERCIVAL DAVIS & DEAN H. KENYON, OF PANDAS AND PEOPLE: THE CENTRAL QUESTION 
OF BIOLOGICAL ORIGINS (2d ed. 1993). Jay Wexler’s excellent student note on the subject documents 
one early battle over this textbook in Plano, Texas. See Jay D. Wexler, Note, Of Pandas, People, and 
the First Amendment: The Constitutionality of Teaching Intelligent Design in the Public Schools, 49 
STAN. L. REV. 439 (1997). 
 67. Edwards, 482 U.S. at 600–01 (Powell, J., concurring). 
 68. See Weinberg, supra note 9, at 192–206 (quoting Clarence Darrow’s cross-examination of 
William Jennings Bryan, in which Bryan discusses the age of the earth, the great flood, and biblical 
literalism regarding matters of creation). 
 69. Edwards, 482 U.S. at 600 (Powell, J., concurring). 
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into science curriculums as an alternative to mainstream scientific 
explanations of evolution, instead of banning discussion of evolution 
outright. These are not insignificant differences, but the basic scientific 
assertions of first- and second-generation creationist theories are identical: 
they each include fairly detailed theories of the sudden creation of the 
universe, the denial of interspecies evolution, the explanation of geological 
differences by catastrophism, and the belief in a young earth. All these details 
relate directly to the main conclusion of both theories—that a supernatural 
being created the universe in more or less its present form—and the details 
bolstering that conclusion are affirmatively stated and defended. 
The third generation of creationist theory is both simpler and far more 
imprecise than the two previous versions of creationism. It is difficult to 
avoid the conclusion that both the simplicity and the imprecision are the 
products of a conscious desire to present the religious concept of creation in a 
secular package that somehow can fit within the constitutional framework 
described in Edwards. Unlike the first and second generations of creationism, 
the third generation of “intelligent design” creationist theory contains few 
affirmative propositions other than the basic assertion that biology provides 
evidence that an “intelligent designer” created the natural world.70 Much of 
intelligent design theory is devoted to negative attacks on the evidence 
supporting evolutionary theory, but with little or no suggestion of a 
comprehensive alternative paradigm. The third-generation creationists have 
largely abandoned their predecessors’ support for the more outrageous 
creationist claims, such as that the entire geological structure can be 
explained by a single divinely ordained flood, or the demonstrably absurd 
claim that the earth is only a few thousand years old.71  
In lieu of affirmative explanations of the natural world, intelligent design 
creationists have chosen instead to expend most of their energy sniping at 
alleged flaws in the evidence supporting the theory of evolution. They bolster 
these empirical attacks on evolution with the assertion that the biomolecular 
structures of life are so complex that they could not have evolved gradually, 
 70. The absence of detail in material advancing notions of intelligent design may be explained as 
a matter of both legal and political strategy. The legal strategy is to circumvent Epperson and 
Edwards. The political strategy is to create a big tent under which various types of creationists can join 
in the battle against scientific evolution. On both of these points, see infra notes 91–92 and 
accompanying text. Of course, intelligent design proponents also face a major empirical dilemma: Any 
scientific theory that attempts to provide an affirmative case for an intelligent designer must at some 
point define and provide evidence of the characteristcs and identity of the designer, but as yet the 
designer has chosen not to reveal himself in an empirically verifiable manifestation.
 71. A few intelligent design proponents, such as Paul Nelson and Sigfried Sherer, remain young-
earth creationists. See Paul Nelson & John Mark Reynolds, Young Earth Creationism, in THREE 
VIEWS ON CREATION AND EVOLUTION 41, 41 (J.P. Moreland & John Mark Reynolds eds., 1999) (“We 
hold the view of recent or . . . young-earth creation.”). 
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but were more likely to have been purposefully designed.72 The alleged 
inevitability of a purposeful design, in turn, leads these theorists to 
presuppose the existence of an intelligent designer, although in their 
pronouncements to the general public and policymakers the intelligent design 
advocates are notably silent about the exact nature—or even the identity—of 
this key figure in their theory. 
The general refusal to call the “intelligent designer” by the name “God” is 
another characteristic that distinguishes the third generation of creationists 
from their predecessors. First- and second-generation creationists were quite 
willing to acknowledge who they believe designed the world. Proponents of 
intelligent design creationism, on the other hand, vociferously deny that the 
intelligent designer they postulate is equivalent to God, and in their 
statements to the general public they often deny taking any position at all on 
the nature of the world’s designer. Phillip Johnson, one of intelligent design’s 
leading spokesmen,73 once even suggested (perhaps puckishly) to an 
interviewer for the San Francisco Chronicle that it may have been “space 
aliens of high intelligence who did the designing.”74 Mark Edwards, a 
spokesman for the Discovery Institute, which is the most prominent 
intelligent design advocacy group, has likewise suggested that “a person 
could logically argue that some sort of human has been able to design 
features of life working through time travel.”75
Of course, if intelligent design theory is viewed skeptically as itself 
designed to finesse Epperson and Edwards and install creationism in public 
school biology classrooms, then it is understandable that proponents of 
intelligent design cannot acknowledge to the general public (much less to 
courts) the true identity of their intelligent designer. In every respect, 
however, the nature of the intelligent designer coincides precisely with the 
Western religious concept of an omniscient and all-powerful deity.  
Despite the secular public relations effort, religion is never far below the 
surface of most discussions of intelligent design. When directing their 
 72. The “irreducible complexity” of the biochemical world is the central theme of Michael 
Behe’s work, which is one of the most prominent intelligent design treatises. See MICHAEL J. BEHE, 
DARWIN’S BLACK BOX: THE BIOCHEMICAL CHALLENGE TO EVOLUTION (1996). 
 73. Johnson is not a scientist, but rather a retired criminal law professor at the University of 
California-Berkeley. Nevertheless, he is one of the most prolific and prominent intelligent design 
advocates. Johnson’s book Darwin on Trial is probably the most significant statement of the intelligent 
design position. See PHILLIP E. JOHNSON, DARWIN ON TRIAL (2d ed. 1993); see also PHILLIP E. 
JOHNSON, THE WEDGE OF TRUTH: SPLITTING THE FOUNDATIONS OF NATURALISM (2002) [hereinafter 
JOHNSON, WEDGE OF TRUTH]; PHILLIP E. JOHNSON, DEFEATING DARWINISM BY OPENING MINDS 
(1997) [hereinafter JOHNSON, DEFEATING DARWINISM]. 
 74. Louis Freedberg, Intelligent Design’s Public Defender, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 21, 2002, at D1. 
 75. Laurel Rosen, Darwin Faces a New Rival, SACRAMENTO BEE, June 22, 2003, at B1. 
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comments to friendly audiences, intelligent design proponents are usually 
less circumspect about denying their religious motivations. Phillip Johnson 
has spoken, for example, of developing a “wedge” strategy “to affirm the 
reality of God by challenging the domination of materialism and naturalism 
in the world of the mind.”76 Jonathan Wells, the author of a widely cited anti-
evolution book77 and a senior fellow at the Discovery Institute,78 has written 
extensively about the religious nature of his decision to attend graduate 
school in biology. Wells is a minister in the Reverend Sun Myung Moon’s 
Unification Church, and according to Wells his decision to “devote my life to 
destroying Darwinism” resulted from “Father’s [i.e., Rev. Moon’s] words, 
my studies, and my prayers [to God].”79 William Dembski, another 
prominent figure in the intelligent design movement, has openly discounted 
the possibility that the designer could have been space aliens—thus 
eliminating even the hypothetical possibility of a non-religious designer.80 
Other intelligent design advocates have made little effort to hide their 
religious motivations even in discussions with outsiders. In response to a 
question from a Wall Street Journal reporter about his motivation, for 
example, one of the co-authors of Pandas and People said, “Of course my 
motives were religious. There’s no question about it.”81  
The next section will describe in much greater detail the religious 
underpinning of intelligent design theory. Section III will then discuss the 
 76. JOHNSON, DEFEATING DARWINISM, supra note 73, at 91–92. 
 77. See JONATHAN WELLS, ICONS OF EVOLUTION: SCIENCE OR MYTH? (2000). 
 78. Wells is a Senior Fellow at the Center for Science & Culture, part of the Discovery Institute. 
See Center for Science & Culture, Center Fellows, at http://www.discovery.org/scripts/viewDB/ 
index.php?command=view&id=41&isFellow=true (last visited Mar. 21, 2004).  
 79. See Jonathan Wells, Darwinism: Why I Went for a Second Ph.D., at http://www.tparents.org/ 
Library/Unification/Talks/Wells/DARWIN.htm (last visited Mar. 21, 2004): 
At the end of the Washington Monument rally in September, 1976, I was admitted to the second 
entering class at Unification Theological Seminary. During the next two years, I took a long 
prayer walk every evening. I asked God what He wanted me to do with my life, and the answer 
came not only through my prayers, but also through Father’s many talks to us, and through my 
studies. Father encouraged us to set our sights high and accomplish great things.  
 He also spoke out against the evils in the world; among them, he frequently criticized 
Darwin’s theory that living things originated without God’s purposeful, creative activity. My 
studies included modern theologians who took Darwinism for granted and thus saw no room for 
God’s involvement in nature or history; in the process, they re-interpreted the fall, the incarnation, 
and even God as products of human imagination. 
 Father’s words, my studies, and my prayers convinced me that I should devote my life to 
destroying Darwinism, just as many of my fellow Unificationists had already devoted their lives to 
destroying Marxism. When Father chose me (along with about a dozen other seminary graduates) 
to enter a Ph.D. program in 1978, I welcomed the opportunity to prepare myself for battle. 
Id. 
 80. See infra notes 152–66 and accompanying text. 
 81. Erik Larson, Darwinian Struggle: Instead of Evolution, a Textbook Proposes “Intelligent 
Design”, WALL ST. J., Nov. 14, 1994, at A1 (quoting Percival Davis). 
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theory’s scientific flaws. Section IV will return to the constitutional questions 
surrounding intelligent design to consider whether novel legal arguments 
constructed from post-Edwards case law can justify inserting this new 
version of creationism into the public school classroom. For the moment, it is 
helpful to keep in mind Justice Powell’s reminder from Edwards that 
“[C]oncepts concerning God or a supreme being of some sort are manifestly 
religious . . . . These concepts do not shed that religiosity merely because 
they are presented as a philosophy or as a science.”82 Unless the proponents 
of intelligent design can convince the Court that they really do believe in 
“space aliens,” they will have a very difficult time reconciling their theory 
with this blunt constitutional conclusion.  
II. INTELLIGENT DESIGN’S RELIGIOUS IDENTITY AND RELEVANT 
PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES 
Creationists at Discovery Institute’s Center for Science and Culture 
(“CSC”) deny both that ID83 is religion and that it is creationism. To forestall 
the charge that it is religion, William Dembski in 1998 declared ID a robust 
scientific theory with an empirical research program: “The empirical 
detectability of intelligent causes renders intelligent design a fully scientific 
theory and distinguishes it from . . . natural theology. . . . [S]cience is now in 
a position to demonstrate design rigorously . . . [W]hat has been a long-
standing . . . intuition can now be cashed out as a robust program of scientific 
research.”84  
In 2004, Dembski called ID a “full-scale scientific revolution.”85 He 
denies that ID is creationism in disguise:  
As a Christian, I . . . believe . . . God created the world. For . . . atheists 
this is enough to classify me as a creationist . . . . By creationism one 
typically understands what is . . . called “young earth creationism,” 
and what [its] advocates . . . refer to . . . as “creation science” or 
“scientific creationism.” . . . Given this account of creationism, am I a 
creationist? No. I do not regard Genesis as a scientific text . . . . Ask 
 82. Edwards, 482 U.S. at 599 (Powell, J., concurring) (quoting Malnak v. Yogi, 440 F. Supp. 
1284, 1322 (D.N.J. 1977)) (internal quotations marks omitted). 
 83. When discussing the intelligent design literature in Sections II and III, we will follow the 
common practice of using the acronym “ID” to refer to intelligent design. 
 84. William A. Dembski, Introduction to MERE CREATION 13, 17–18 (William A. Dembski ed., 
1998).  
 85. WILLIAM A. DEMBSKI, THE DESIGN REVOLUTION 19 (2004). 
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any leader in the design movement whether intelligent design is stealth 
creationism, and they’ll deny it.86
These denials stem from ID creationists’ need for a post-Edwards legal 
strategy that they hope can withstand legal challenges. Indeed, they try to 
argue that Edwards mandates teaching ID in public schools. This is how they 
explain the legal landscape in their guidebook for teachers and school 
officials:  
 Happily, the law is not on the side of an enforced Darwinian 
orthodoxy. . . . [T]he U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Edwards v. 
Aguillard that “teaching a variety of scientific theories about the 
origins of humankind to school children might be validly done with 
the . . . secular intent of enhancing . . . science instruction.” . . . 
[T]eachers and school boards who . . . tell students about the evidence 
and arguments for intelligent design . . . fulfill this Supreme Court 
mandate.87
Pursuing this “mandate,” ID creationists since 1996 have executed a plan 
entitled The Wedge Strategy (sketched in a memorandum informally called 
the Wedge Document), adopted at the CSC’s formation.88 ID leader Phillip 
Johnson calls the movement “the Wedge,” reflecting its aim to wedge the 
supernatural into science: “Our strategy is to drive the thin edge of our 
Wedge into the cracks in the log of naturalism . . . .”89 Although he calls the 
Wedge an “intellectual movement, not a confessional movement with an 
official creed or statement of faith,” he wants to “explain . . . the Wedge 
Strategy to the public—especially the Christian public,” and “set out . . . how 
the Wedge program fits into the specific Christian gospel (as distinguished 
from a generic theism), and how and where questions of biblical authority 
enter the picture,” thus exposing the strategy as not only sectarian, but 
explicitly Christian.90  
 86. William A. Dembski, Intelligent Design Coming Clean, METANEXUS, Nov. 17, 2000, at 
http://www.leaderu.com/offices/dembski/docs/bd-meta098.html (last visited Mar. 17, 2004). 
 87. DAVID K. DEWOLF, STEPHEN C. MEYER, & MARK E. DEFORREST, INTELLIGENT DESIGN IN 
PUBLIC SCHOOL SCIENCE CURRICULA: A LEGAL GUIDEBOOK (1999), available at http://www.arn.org/ 
docs/dewolf/guidebook.htm. The authors argue elsewhere that “the Court’s decision does not apply to 
design theory because design theory is not based upon a religious text or doctrine.” See David K. 
DeWolf, Stephen C. Meyer & Mark Edward DeForrest, Teaching the Origins Controversy: Science, or 
Religion, or Speech?, 2000 UTAH L. REV. 39, 93 (2000). 
 88. The CSC’s original name was Center for the Renewal of Science and Culture. See The Wedge 
Strategy, at http://www.antievolution.org/features/wedge.html (visited Jan. 26, 2004); see also 
BARBARA FORREST & PAUL R. GROSS, CREATIONISM’S TROJAN HORSE 25–33 (2004) (concerning the 
document).  
 89. JOHNSON, WEDGE OF TRUTH, supra note 73, at 14. 
 90. Id. at 16–17.  
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Besides trying to sidestep Edwards by denying ID’s true nature, 
proponents seek to avoid the strategic pitfalls of young-earth creationism 
(“YEC”) by casting ID as a scientific alternative to evolution. (Most ID 
leaders are old-earth creationists (“OEC”).) Robert Pennock notes ID’s 
attempt to avoid its creationist forebears’ failures:  
[ID] theorists have learned . . . from the failures of their predecessors 
and have devised a more sophisticated strategy . . . . [T]hey have 
learned . . . what not to say. A major element of their strategy is to 
advance a form of creationism that not only omits any explicit 
mention of Genesis but is also usually vague, if not mute, about . . . 
specific claims . . . that readily identified young-earth creationism as a 
thinly disguised biblical literalism.91  
The Wedge has taken these failures into account in its quest to foment—
and win—a court case. But they also adopted this strategy to minimize 
creationist infighting and to forge an alliance with YECs in order to present a 
more powerful, unified front to the public and policymakers they hope to 
influence. The strategy was Johnson’s brainchild. His CSC colleague, Nancy 
Pearcey, describes its explicitly religious goals:  
Johnson’s . . . contribution has been a keen sense of strategy. 
Christians trained in the sciences . . . do . . . excellent work . . . 
advancing standard critiques of evolutionary theory. But scientists are 
. . . less adept at thinking strategically and mobilizing a movement. 
. . . [T]heists . . . fought each other instead of joining . . . to oppose . . . 
evolution. . . . They argued over the interpretation of . . . Genesis . . . .  
. . . Johnson . . . launched a new strategy. Call it “unite and win.” He 
rallied Christians behind the crucial . . . confrontation with the secular 
world—the issue . . . at the heart of the conflict between Christianity 
and secular academia.  
. . . It’s the question of philosophical naturalism: Is nature all there is? 
Can natural forces alone explain the universe . . . ? . . . In confronting 
secular culture, these are the right questions . . . Christians may argue 
about . . . how God created . . . but they all agree that the universe is 
the handiwork of a personal God.92
 91. See ROBERT T. PENNOCK, TOWER OF BABEL 227 (1999).  
 92. Nancy Pearcey, Foreword to PHILLIP E. JOHNSON, THE RIGHT QUESTIONS 8–9 (2002).  
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Given such statements by ID advocates, and despite their denials, two 
questions must be answered in any legal discussion of “intelligent design 
theory”: (1) Is ID a religious belief? and (2) Is it creationism? Despite the 
guidebook’s assertions of ID’s secular purpose, ample evidence—especially 
its rejection of naturalism—shows that ID is religious (indeed, biblically 
based): supernaturalism forms its structural foundation. It is also anti-secular, 
with no interest in enhancing public school science instruction. Its major 
tenets reveal that ID is not science, but the most recent version of traditional 
creationism.  
A. Intelligent Design as Religion 
1. ID’s Religious Roots 
The idea that natural entities are intelligently designed is not new. It is 
central to William Paley’s famous “watchmaker” argument for God's 
existence in Natural Theology (1802) and to traditional creationism.93 Since 
Thomas Aquinas’s cooption of Aristotle’s non-religious design argument to 
advance medieval Christianity’s theological mission, Western design 
arguments have invariably been theistic, used to advance religious aims. 
Continuing this tradition, ID reflects its founders’ religious callings and 
doctrinal loyalties. In 1996, Stephen C. Meyer became co-director (with John 
G. West, Jr.) of the Center for the Renewal of Science and Culture 
(“CRSC”), shortened to “Center for Science and Culture” (“CSC”) in 2002. 
William Dembski, Paul Nelson, Jonathan Wells, and Michael Behe were 
CRSC’s first fellows, with Phillip Johnson as advisor.94 Dembski, Meyer, 
Behe, and Wells became anti-evolutionists independently but were brought 
together in the early 1990s by Johnson, the catalyst for the Wedge’s 
formation.95  
By his own account, Johnson’s divorce and ensuing personal difficulties 
led to his religious conversion, from which his anti-evolutionism stems and 
which he says “aroused . . . [my] interest in . . . why the intellectual world is 
so dominated by naturalistic and agnostic thinking.”96 Meyer entered the 
 93. WILLIAM PALEY, NATURAL THEOLOGY; OR, EVIDENCES OF THE EXISTENCE AND 
ATTRIBUTES OF THE DIETY (1809), available at http://www.hti.umich.edu/cgi/p/pd-modeng/pd-
modeng-idx?type=header&id=PaleyNatur (last visited Aug. 2, 2005); see also SCIENTIFIC 
CREATIONISM (Henry Morris ed., Public School Edition 1974). 
 94. Discovery Institute, 1996–1997 Research Fellows at the Center for the Renewal of Science 
and Culture, at http://www.discovery.org/w3/discovery.org/crsc/crsc96fellows.html (last visited June 
6, 2000) (on file with Barbara Forrest).
 95. See Lynn Vincent, Science vs. Science, WORLD, Feb. 26, 2000. 
 96. Stephen Goode, Johnson Challenges Advocates of Evolution, INSIGHT ON THE NEWS, Oct. 
25, 1999, at 36, 39.  
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“origins” debate precisely because it is theistic, recollecting a conference he 
attended “that brought together top philosophers, cosmologists and origin-of-
life biologists to debate the religious implications of contemporary scientific 
findings.” He recalls, “I remember being especially fascinated with the 
origins debate . . . . It impressed me to see that scientists who had always 
accepted the standard evolutionary story were now defending a theistic 
belief. . . . I was really taken with this.”97 Dembski traces his ID commitment 
to his college days, when he offered his Christian witness to two seminary 
students. Their mainstream seminary had supposedly destroyed their faith by 
teaching that the Bible was not divinely inspired and was incompatible with 
evolution (thus undermining biblical veracity). Dembski calls this experience 
the “driving force behind what I’ve been doing all these years.”98 Wells’s 
anti-evolutionism stems from the influence of his spiritual mentor, the Rev. 
Sun Myung Moon.99
Nelson, grandson of well-known YEC Byron C. Nelson, adopted his 
grandfather’s YEC views. His mostly OEC Wedge colleagues know this, but 
they minimize differences over Earth’s age in order to build a “big tent,” a 
YEC-OEC coalition in which ID proponents and YECs defer such disputes 
to advance their common goal of cultural and legal acceptance of creationism 
in public schools.100 Nelson served on a subcommittee of the American 
Scientific Affiliation’s Commission on Creation, which wrote a General 
Statement on Creation outlining divergent views within the evangelical ASA, 
“a fellowship of men and women of science and disciplines that relate to 
science who share a common fidelity to the Word of God and a commitment 
to integrity in the practice of science.”101 His YEC views are thus included in 
the statement he helped draft. He believes that “[a]ll basic types of 
organisms, including human beings,” beginning with Adam and Eve, “were 
directly created by God” as in Genesis and that Noah’s flood was “an 
historical event.”102 Nelson’s creationism is clearly biblical, not scientific.  
 97. By Design: A Whitworth Professor Takes a Controversial Stand to Show That Life Was No 
Accident, WHITWORTH TODAY, Winter 1995, available at http://www.arn.org/docs/meyer/ 
sm_bydesign.htm. 
 98. FORREST & GROSS, supra note 88, at 293, chs. 1 & 9. 
 99. See Wells, supra note 79.  
 100. See Nancy Pearcey, The Evolution Backlash, WORLD, Mar. 1, 1997, reprinted as Opening 
the “Big Tent” in Science, in ACCESS RES. NETWORK, at http://www.arn.org/docs/pearcey/ 
np_bigtent30197.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2004); see also PENNOCK, supra note 91, at 29 (concerning 
Byron C. Nelson); Dembski, supra note 86 (noting Nelson’s YEC views). 
 101. Information About the American Scientific Affiliation, at http://www.asa3.org/ASA/ 
aboutASA.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2004). 
 102. See American Scientific Affiliation Commission on Creation, General Statement on 
Creation, Aug. 2000, at http://www.asa3.org/ASA/topics/Evolution/commission_on_creation.html 
(last visited Jan. 26, 2004). The statement includes theistic evolution, the view that God used evolution 
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Behe says his views resulted from a scientific assessment of evolution: 
“My religious beliefs haven’t influenced my scientific work. I . . . learned 
Darwin’s theory in parochial school. We were taught that it was God’s way 
of making life through natural laws. . . . It was only when I learned of 
scientific problems with . . . evolution that I became skeptical of it.”103 Yet 
Behe, the only ID leader who is a working scientist (a biochemist, not an 
evolutionary biologist), considers the chief question for science to be 
religious: “[R]eligion has made room for science for a long time. But as 
biology uncovers startling complexity in life, the question becomes, can 
science make room for religion?”104 His question betrays his belief that 
science must incorporate theism to achieve full explanatory adequacy (which 
helps explain his failure so far to publish original scientific data supporting 
his concept of “irreducible complexity,” a fundamental ID tenet). Moreover, 
in Darwin’s Black Box, a seminal ID book, although Behe declares that “the 
separateness of the spheres of science versus philosophy and religion is as it 
should be,” he then nullifies his statement by rejecting the restriction of 
science to naturalistic methodology and explanations: “The philosophical 
argument . . . that science should avoid theories which smack of the 
supernatural is an artificial restriction on science.”105 Elsewhere, when Behe, 
a Catholic, attacks claims by “prominent scientists” (e.g., Richard Dawkins) 
that “science sees no purpose in living things because there is no purpose, 
and therefore there is no God,” he quotes Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger (as he 
often does for religious audiences): “[T]he great projects of the living 
creation are not the products of chance and error . . . . [They] . . . show us a 
creating Intelligence . . . .”106 Though he denies ID’s religious agenda, Behe, 
according to Amanda Onion, holds that its explanation of “how the world got 
here” is mystical (yet he considers that irrelevant).107
 
 
to create biological organisms. Adherents see no conflict between evolution and religion since they are 
not biblical literalists. See also Nelson & Reynolds, supra note 71 (“We hold the view of recent or . . . 
young-earth creation.”). 
 103. Pamela R. Winnick, Scientist Gives Darwin’s Theory a Nudge, PITT. POST-GAZETTE, Feb. 8, 
2001, at C1. 
 104. Michael J. Behe, Darwin Under the Microscope, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 1996, at A25. 
 105. See BEHE, supra note 72, at 250–51; see also FORREST & GROSS, supra note 88, at 66–72 
(concerning Behe’s failure to publish ID data).  
 106. See Michael J. Behe, Darwin’s Breakdown, TOUCHSTONE, July/Aug. 1999, at 40 (quoting 
CARDINAL JOSEPH RATZINGER, “IN THE BEGINNING . . .”: A CATHOLIC UNDERSTANDING OF THE 
STORY OF THE CREATION AND THE FALL 54–56 (1986)). Ratzinger’s capitalization of “Intelligence” is 
a Christian tradition when referring to God. Johnson does it, too: “[T]he Creator is real.” PHILLIP E. 
JOHNSON, REASON IN THE BALANCE 49 (1995). Such stylistic practice is another mark of ID’s 
religious essence.  
 107. See Amanda Onion, New Evolution Battle Underway in Ohio, ABC NEWS, Apr. 1, 2002, at 
http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/print?id=98041 (last visited Feb. 9, 2005). 
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Since virtually all of the Wedge founders’ anti-evolutionism stems from 
personal religious views, since they have yet to produce empirical ID data or 
even a research program, and since their basic appeal is to an intelligent 
designer, the conclusion that ID is fundamentally religious in terms of its 
historical background is not only justified but unavoidable. Moreover, the 
Wedge’s development since its inception as a formal program confirms 
religion’s integral role in its agenda. In 1998, Dembski, tracing the 
movement’s development, objected to “Darwinism’s” exclusion of God: 
“Darwinism rules out . . . God or any guiding intelligence . . . in life’s origin 
and development.”108 In 2001, Johnson also referred to ID’s religious 
foundation: 
We founded . . . the Intelligent Design movement . . . to . . . explain 
the evidence which . . . point[s] towards . . . a Creator, . . . [and] to . . . 
unify the religious world. . . . [T]here should be a central issue . . . . 
[D]o you need a Creator to do the creating, or don’t you? . . . [T]he 
evidence of science is viewed through the . . . prejudice that natural 
causes can do . . . the whole job . . . . [S]o we thought . . . religious 
people ought to challenge that. The people of God ought to be 
unwilling to accept that . . . dogmatic decision.109
Nancy Pearcey explains the Wedge’s religious framework under 
Johnson’s leadership. She nullifies the disclaimer in her first statement by 
then revealing ID’s religious goals and the Wedge’s integral connection to 
Johnson’s personal religious life: 
[D]esign theory . . . does not start by asking what the Bible teaches; it 
starts by asking what can be known by scientific means: Can the . . . 
marks of design be detected empirically? And thus it reconnects 
Christian theology to the empirical world and restores its . . . claim to 
cognitive knowledge . . . .  
. . . .  
As the Intelligent Design Movement challenges naturalism in science, 
it will challenge naturalism in theology and other fields . . . restor[ing] 
religion and morality to the status of genuine knowledge . . . . 
 108. See William A. Dembski, The Intelligent Design Movement, COSMIC PURSUIT, Spring 1998, 
available at http://www.arn.org/docs/dembski/wd_idmovement.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2004). 
 109. Phillip E. Johnson, The State of the Wedge, Address at the Darwin, Design, and Democracy 
II Symposium (June 29, 2001) (transcript available from authors). 
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Johnson has charted this new course because he is sitting in the 
supernaturalist’s chair . . . .  
. . . .  
Johnson’s decision to sit in the supernaturalist’s chair in both the 
content and method of his ministry . . . stems from spiritual humility 
and brokenness. Here we touch on the heart of who Phil Johnson is as 
a person.110
“Spiritual humility and brokenness” refer to Johnson’s 2001 stroke, which 
threatened his leadership of the Wedge and resulted in his transferring duties 
to younger colleagues. Speaking of his recovery, Johnson considers the 
Wedge his religious calling and compares himself to Job, who, tested by 
God, renews his commitment to his Creator: 
“Why did this . . . happen to me just now?” . . . God was answering 
that question even as I was asking it. 
. . . [I]t seemed fitting that Satan might point to me as . . . to Job and 
say to God, “Of course that Phillip Johnson gives . . . thanks to you 
. . . . After one marriage failed, God gave him another . . . just as God 
gave Job . . . another family. Then in middle age he was blessed with 
an insight, and . . . a new vocation that . . . employs his gifts for a 
campaign that gives meaning to his life.” 
. . . .  
. . . I had been wondering how I could get back to where I had been 
. . . before . . . the stroke, . . . fit to direct the Wedge in the decisive 
moment of our struggle . . . . I had reason to think that the . . . 
breakthrough had . . . already been made . . . . [E]volutionary science 
would be split open . . . because so many people knew . . . the fatal 
flaw in the Darwinian logic . . . . If intelligent Christians followed up 
on what the Wedge . . . had . . . accomplished, then Darwinism would 
strangle in its own . . . illogic. If educated Christians continued to 
 110. Pearcey, supra note 92, at 15, 19–20, 22–23. Contra Pearcey, ID does start with biblical 
teaching. Rejecting natural selection’s power to create life, Johnson tells where he found ID’s biblical 
starting point:  
I looked for the best place to start . . . and I found it in the . . . Gospel of John . . . [T]he Gospel’s 
. . . explanation of . . . creation . . . is far better supported by scientific investigation than the 
contrary. . . . [A]ll I . . . want to do with the scientific evidence is to clear away the obstacle . . . it 
presents to a belief that the creator is the God of the Bible. 
John Perry, Courtly Combatant, WORLD, Dec. 13, 2003, available at http://www.worldmag.com/ 
displayarticle.cfm?id=8356 (last visited Feb. 9, 2005). 
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accept . . . the understanding that naturalism and “science” . . . are . . . 
the same, then nothing human could save such a cowardly faith.111
For Johnson, evolution will die if committed Christians promote ID. 
However, if Christians accept modern science, Christianity itself will die. 
2. ID’s Religious Essence 
Defining religion is troublesome, for both legal and philosophical 
purposes. Philosopher of religion and theologian John Hick points out that 
“The nature of religion is a . . . complex subject that can be approached from 
a bewildering variety of viewpoints. Religion is one thing to the 
anthropologist, another to the sociologist, . . . and yet another to the Jew or 
the Christian. . . . There is . . . no universally accepted definition . . . and . . . 
possibly . . . never will be.”112
However, traditional theism has unmistakable characteristics:  
Theism . . . perceives . . . physical things, organisms, persons . . . as 
dependent for their being and continuance on one self-existent God 
. . . . Theists . . . close ranks against deists, who . . . exclude revelation 
and divine intervention in world order, and against pantheists, who 
identify God with these orders. Theists hold that God, transcendent 
creator of the orders, remains an indivisible unity as he sustains them 
in accordance with their capacities and his ultimate purposes.113
Theism signifies belief in one God . . . who is (a) personal, (b) worthy 
of adoration, and (c) separate from the world but (d) continuously 
active in it.114
Whether some beliefs qualify as religion may be uncertain, but belief in a 
transcendent, i.e., supernatural, deity who intervenes in nature certainly 
 111. PHILLIP JOHNSON, THE RIGHT QUESTIONS 95–97 (2002). Johnson’s mid-life “insight” is that 
“theistic science” must replace naturalistic science because naturalism threatens religion: 
Why do people get this idea that naturalism is the only way to proceed? They think that it’s been 
validated by science. At the . . . heart of that scientific validation is the . . . story of our 
creation. . . . If it were only science . . . at stake, nobody would care about it so much, including 
the scientists. . . . They think they are going to get rid of religion . . . . 
Tim Stafford, The Making of a Revolution, CHRISTIANITY TODAY, Dec. 8, 1997, at 16, 20. His “new 
vocation” is anti-evolutionism: “Once Johnson had sunk his teeth into evolutionary theory, it 
dominated his thoughts, his work, his conversation.” Id. at 18. 
 112. JOHN HICK, PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION 3 (1973) (1963).  
 113. Peter A. Bertocci, Theism, in 14 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RELIGION 421, 421 (Mircea Eliade ed., 
1987). 
 114. H. P. Owen, Theism, in 8 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 97, 97 (Paul Edwards ed., 1967).  
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qualifies. Even without a firm consensus on how to define religion, ID 
unquestionably fits within the boundaries of traditional theism: as our 
analysis shows, ID is belief in the creative, purposeful activity of a 
supernatural deity.  
Wedge leaders, explaining ID to their followers (thus revealing how they 
intend it to be understood), have captured every major part of the definition 
of theism. Johnson defines “creationist” as one who believes in “a 
supernatural Creator” who created the world and “controls it in furtherance 
of a purpose.” This reflects his designation of “‘theistic realism’—or ‘mere 
creation’” as ID’s “defining concept.”115 In a book he wrote to advance the 
Wedge Strategy, he rejects deism in favor of traditional theism, integrating 
ID with the latter: “The important question is not whether God ‘exists’; it is 
whether God cares about us, and whether we need to care about God’s 
purposes. Deism answers no to these questions.” For Johnson, exchanging 
“the Creator God of the Bible for the lifeless First Cause of deism” is like 
“trading . . . gold for counterfeit money.”116 Stephen Meyer, arguing that a 
four-dimensional universe can be accounted for only by a transcendent 
entity, considers God a better explanation for the Big Bang than naturalism: 
“In so far as God, as conceived by Judeo-Christian theists, possesses . . . such 
transcendent causal powers, theism provides a better explanation than 
naturalism for . . . Big Bang cosmology.”117 Meyer uses the same reasoning 
to reject pantheism.  
In Intelligent Design: The Bridge Between Science and Theology, in 
which he explains ID to his lay audience, Dembski amply shows that ID 
instantiates the definition of theism. God is personal: “God’s lovingkindness, 
steadfastness and tender mercy, all find their guarantee in God’s role as 
Creator. . . . All instances of fatherhood reflect the fatherhood of God.”118 
Only God is worthy of adoration:  
Naturalism leads irresistibly to idolatry . . . .  
[I]t sets the creation above the Creator and . . . transforms creation into 
nature . . . .  
 115. See JOHNSON, DARWIN ON TRIAL, supra note 73, at 4 n.1 (for Johnson’s definition of 
creationist); see also Phillip E. Johnson, Starting a Conversation About Evolution, Aug. 31, 1996, 
available at http://www.arn.org/docs/johnson/ratzsch.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2004) (book review) 
(concerning ID as theistic realism). Johnson’s definition of ID as theistic realism also stipulates that 
“the reality of God is tangibly recorded in evidence accessible to science, particularly in biology.” Id.  
 116. See JOHNSON, DEFEATING DARWINISM, supra note 73, at 17. 
 117. Stephen C. Meyer, The Return of the God Hypothesis, 11 J. INTERDISC. STUD. NO. 1/2, 1999, 
at 25, quoted in Robert T. Pennock, DNA by Design? Stephen Meyer and the Return of the God 
Hypothesis, in DEBATING DESIGN: DARWIN TO DNA (William Dembski & Michael Ruse eds., 2004). 
 118. WILLIAM A. DEMBSKI, INTELLIGENT DESIGN: THE BRIDGE BETWEEN SCIENCE AND 
THEOLOGY 102, 231 (1999). 
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Naturalism . . . pervades our cultural atmosphere. . . . We see it, alas, 
whenever we forget God and worship the creature more than the 
Creator.  
. . . No longer do we live in a naturalistic world devoid of 
transcendence. Rather the world . . . becomes a sacrament, radiating 
God’s glory. . . . [O]ur language becomes capable of celebrating that 
glory by speaking truly about what God has wrought . . . .119
God is separate from the world, but continuously intervenes:  
. . . Either the world derives its order from . . . outside . . . (à la 
creation) or it possesses . . . order . . . intrinsically. . . . So long as the 
order is coming from outside, we are dealing with a . . . creation . . . .  
. . . Not only has God created the world, but God upholds the world 
moment by moment. . . .  
[T]here is no question that God interacts with the world.120
Finally, of “Hindu pantheism,” Dembski says that “cosmic law” is 
“embedded in nature” and “supplants divine creation”; therefore, “[t]here can 
be no transcendent God within such a framework.” And he rejects deism 
unequivocally: “Theists are not deists. God is not an absentee landlord.”121
Incredibly, Dembski asserts in the appendix that “[i]ntelligent design 
nowhere attempts to identify the intelligent cause responsible for the design 
in nature” and that “[i]ntelligent design is a strictly scientific theory devoid of 
religious commitments.”122 But if this were true, he would not have devoted 
virtually the entire book to explaining the essentiality of theism to ID. The 
appendix, exemplifying his well-known (and calculated) inconsistency, is 
easily explained: Dembski is trying to deny the most damaging criticisms of 
ID, especially the charge that it is “scientific creationism.”  
Thus, the ID movement has relieved its critics of the need to define 
religion in order to classify ID as a religious belief; its leaders’ statements 
reveal its religious essence at every turn.123 Johnson asserts that “he and most 
others in the intelligent design movement believe the designer is the God of 
the Bible.”124 Dembski laments the putative obstacle evolution poses to 
 119. Id. at 101–03, 231.  
 120. Id. at 99, 104.  
 121. Id. at 100–01, 104.  
 122. Id. at 247, 252.  
 123. See FORREST & GROSS, supra note 88, ch.9. 
 124. Steve Maynard, Life’s Intelligent Design, TACOMA NEWS-TRIBUNE, May 7, 2001, available 
at http://www.arn.org/docs/news/lifesintelligentdesign050701.htm (last visited Apr. 13, 2004). 
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potential Christians: “[I]f . . . anything . . . has blocked the growth of Christ 
. . . and people accepting the Scripture and Jesus Christ, it is the Darwinian 
naturalistic view.”125 Since there is no ID science, ID’s corpus consists only 
of its advocates’ non-scientific publications and pronouncements. Since 
Johnson is the Wedge’s founder and chief promoter and Dembski its chief 
intellectual and apologist, their words (and those of other ID leaders) are 
legitimately viewed as affirmations of ID’s substance. 
Supernaturalist religion’s foundational importance to ID is clear not only 
in Wedge leaders’ statements but in the organization’s rationale. An early 
CRSC website announced that “new developments in biology, physics, and 
cognitive science . . . have re-opened the case for the supernatural.”126 The 
site’s signature banner was the overtly religious image of Michelangelo’s 
God creating Adam. As the Wedge has taken a higher public profile, the 
banner was gradually changed to present the CRSC as a secular, scientific 
organization—from God creating Adam (1996–1999), to God creating DNA 
(1999–2001), to a Hubble photo of the MyCn 18 Hourglass Nebula (2001–
2002), to the photo of the Hourglass Nebula but with “renewal” dropped 
from the center’s name (2002–2004), to the current banner showing 
Leonardo da Vinci’s Vitruvian Man beneath a DNA helix.127  
The Wedge Strategy specifies the Wedge’s aim to replace naturalistic 
science with “a broadly theistic understanding of nature,” i.e., “theistic 
science.”128 Though Dembski denies that ID is theistic science, he uses 
theistic language for his popular audience, explicitly identifying the designer 
as God, belying his claim that ID does not do this:  
Theism (whether Christian, Jewish, or Muslim) holds that God . . . 
created the world. The origin of the world . . . thus result[s] from the 
designing activity of an intelligent agent—God. Naturalism . . . allows 
no place for intelligent agency except at the end of a blind, 
purposeless, material process. Within naturalism, . . . humans . . . are 
. . . certainly not creatures made in the image of a benevolent God.129
 125. Steve Benen, The Discovery Institute: Genesis of “Intelligent Design”, CHURCH & ST., May 
2002, at 11.  
 126. Discovery Institute, What Is the Center for the Renewal of Science & Culture All About?, at 
http://www.discovery.org/w3/discovery.org/crsc/aboutcrsc.html (visited Mar. 18, 2000) (on file with 
Barbara Forrest). 
 127. See Glenn Branch, Evolving Banners at the Discovery Institute, REP. OF THE NAT’L CENTER 
FOR SCI. EDUC., Sept.–Oct. 2002, at 12. The CSC says the old name “was simply too long and we got 
tired of saying it.” Mark Edwards, The Center’s Name Change, at http://www.crsc.org/TopQuestions/ 
nameChange.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2004).  
 128. See The Wedge Strategy, supra note 88. 
 129. DEMBSKI, supra note 85, at 22 (emphasis added). For Dembski’s disavowal of theistic 
science, see Donald Yerxa, Questioning Darwin, RES. NEWS & OPPORTUNITIES IN SCI. & THEOLOGY 
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Even a brief perusal of Intelligent Design confirms that Dembski 
proposes what can only be called theistic science. In fact, he believes 
naturalistic science is idolatry: 
There is something profoundly unsettling about conceiving of the 
world as nature . . . . The scientist . . . ignores . . . God and looks at the 
world in and for itself . . . .  
. . . For the scientist, God is [an unnecessary] hypothesis . . . . As long 
as scientists are . . . getting results, why compel them to bring God 
into the picture? 
But . . . [t]he problem with conceiving of the world as nature is . . . 
this: For nature to be an object of inquiry for the scientist, nature must 
have an order . . . . This is the mystery confronting the scientist. Why 
is the world ordered and whence cometh this order? 
There are but two options . . . . So long as the order is coming from 
outside, we are dealing with a . . . creation . . . . [I]f the order belongs 
to the world intrinsically, we are dealing with nature . . . .  
. . . [S]evering . . . the world from God is . . . idolatry . . . .130  
For Dembski, scientific explanations must incorporate God. The 
alternative, idolatry, is a religious offense, a violation of the first 
commandment. Ironically, while denying that ID is “creation science,” 
(which is theistic, thus unconstitutional, if taught as public school science), 
he insists passionately that ID’s creator is the Bible’s patriarchal God who 
creates by verbal fiat: 
God speaks the divine Logos to create the world . . . .131
. . . Certain feminist theologians . . . object to referring to God as 
father. . . . “Father,” we are told, is a metaphor co-opted from human 
 
 
(Templeton Found.), Nov. 2001: “I am not at all sympathetic to [theistic science] because intelligent 
design is not dealing with a doctrine of creation.” But Dembski’s CSC colleague Robert Koons uses 
“theistic science” and “intelligent design theory” interchangeably: “If theistic science or intelligent 
design theory is to become a progressive research program, it must do more than poke holes in the 
evidence for Darwinism . . . .” Robert Koons, Making Progress in the Origins Debate: A Summary of 
NTSE, THE REAL ISSUE, Mar.–Apr. 1997, at http://www.leaderu.com/real/ri9701/koons2.html (last 
visited Jan. 26, 2004); see also J.P. Moreland, Theistic Science and Methodological Naturalism, in 
THE CREATION HYPOTHESIS 41 (J.P. Moreland ed., 1994). 
 130. DEMBSKI, supra note 118, at 98–99.  
 131. Recall Genesis 1:1-6 (King James): “And God said, Let there be light: and there was light 
. . . . And God said, let there be a firmament in the midst of the waters . . . .”  
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experience and pressed into theological service. No, No, NO! This 
view of theological language . . . destroys the Christian faith.  
The concept father is not an anthropomorphism, nor is referring to 
God as father metaphorical. All instances of fatherhood reflect the 
fatherhood of God.132
Though couched in the idiom of “design theory,” he leaves no doubt of 
ID’s inseparability from doctrinal commitment: 
The crucial breakthrough of the . . . [ID] movement has been to show 
that this great theological truth—that God acts in the world by 
dispersing information—also has scientific content. . . .  
Predictive prophecies in Scripture are instances of specified 
complexity and signal information inputted by God as part of his 
sovereign activity within creation.133  
Dembski thus posits scriptural prophecies as examples of specified 
complexity, his ID specialty, but has not demonstrated how the latter can be 
detected in a biological system, though he claims to have done so: “This 
[complexity-specification] criterion is relevant to biology. When applied to 
the complex, information-rich structures of biology, it detects design.”134 Nor 
has he responded to requests for data confirming his claim.135 His failure 
 132. DEMBSKI, supra note 118, at 230–31. Dembski will object that, as a theist, he identifies the 
designer as God, whereas ID as science does not identify the designer. This argument is insufficient to 
overcome the courts’ insistence that any reference to a transcendent intelligence is religious for 
purposes of the Establishment Clause. See infra notes 392–593 and accompanying text. 
 133. DEMBSKI, supra note 118, at 233. “Specified complexity” (also called “complex specified 
information” or CSI) is Dembski’s contribution to the ID opus. See also id. at 153–83 (concerning 
specified complexity).  
 134. Id. at 149.  
 135. Zoologist Wesley Elsberry asked for such data in an Oct. 1, 2000, e-mail; Dembski never 
responded. See Posting of Wesley R. Elsberry, to evolution@calvin.edu (Oct. 1, 2000), available at 
http://www.antievolution.org/people/dembski_wa/corr_wre_cs_bio.txt (visited Jan. 22, 2004) 
(showing the request). In 2001 Elsberry requested it again; Dembski deferred until publication of his 
book No Free Lunch. 
NFL has precisely one attempted application to a biological system, . . . the E. coli flagellum. It is 
. . . incomplete . . . (see . . . Elsberry and Shallit . . .). So there was no direct response, and the 
indirect fulfillment had definite problems. Further, there is no evidence that *any* work of the sort 
which Dembski implied had been done when he made his claim had actually been accomplished. I 
know of no other attempted application of Dembski’s EF/DI [Explanatory Filter/Design 
Inference] to a biological system.  
E-mail from Wesley R. Elsberry to Barbara Forrest (Jan. 19, 2004) (on file with Barbara Forrest); see 
also WILLIAM A. DEMBSKI, NO FREE LUNCH (2002); Wesley Elsberry & Jeffrey Shallit, Information 
Theory, Evolutionary Computation, and Dembski’s “Complex Specified Information,” Nov. 16, 2003, 
at http://www.talkreason.org/articles/eandsdembski.pdf (last visited Mar. 4, 2004). Physicist Howard 
Van Till also judges Dembski’s attempt in No Free Lunch a failure. See Howard J. Van Till, E. Coli at 
the No Free Lunchroom, DIALOGUE ON SCI., ETHICS & RELIGION (Am. Ass’n for the Advancement of 
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reveals the hollowness of his claim that ID is robust science rather than 
religion.  
Dembski’s statements force his Wedge colleague Francis Beckwith to 
employ verbal sleight-of-hand to sidestep the question of whether ID is a 
religious belief: “ID is not a conventional religion and thus is not a paradigm 
case of a religion. Rather, it is a point of view based on philosophical and 
empirical arguments.”136 But Beckwith has built a straw man. If by 
“conventional” he means “institutional,” then ID need not be an institutional 
religion in order to qualify as a religious belief. Nor need it be a religion. ID 
is not a religion in the same sense that belief in the resurrection is not a 
religion but a foundational element of one. ID's commitment to a 
supernatural creator is something more important—it is the essential 
component of three major institutional religions: Christianity, Judaism, and 
Islam—a fact made explicit by Dembski himself.137  
3. Intelligent Design’s Religious Structure and Content 
Evidence of ID’s religious essence lies not merely in its visual symbols 
(as on CRSC’s early website) and proponents’ religious confessions, but also 
in its conceptual structure and substantive content. In fact, ID presupposes 
religion (specifically Christianity). This presupposition is clear in Meyer’s 
1986 article, Scientific Tenets of Faith. Reflecting on creationists’ losses in 
early stages of Edwards, he asserts that the courtroom proceedings exposed a 
“philosophical naiveté” about science’s need for its own “tenets of faith.”138 
Discussing the “methodological and presuppositional roots of science,” he 
rejects the “context of philosophic naturalism and positivism that ignores the 
entire conceptual framework necessary to modern science” and contends that 
this framework must be religious.139 Arguing that scientists must decide what 
constitutes data by referring to “a whole network of foundational beliefs” that 
include their own “concepts and intuitions,” he calls those beliefs a 
“gridwork” structuring the scientist’s observations.140 Thus, arguing that 
“Such creative mental contributions must be presupposed to correlate 
 
 
Sci.), July 22, 2002, at http://www.aaas.org/spp/dser/evolution/perspectives/vantillecoli.pdf (last 
visited Jan. 22, 2004). 
 136. Francis J. Beckwith, Public Education, Religious Establishment, and the Challenge of 
Intelligent Design, 17 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 461, 488 (2003) (emphasis added) 
(concerning whether ID is a religion). 
 137. See supra note 129 and accompanying text. 
 138. Stephen C. Meyer, Scientific Tenets of Faith, 38 PERS. ON SCI. & CHRISTIAN FAITH 40, 40 
(1986).  
 139. Id. at 40. 
 140. Id. at 42. 
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meaningfully to the world outside the observer,” he rationalizes his 
contention that the Bible undergirds scientific truth: 
Given the . . . difficulty human philosophic systems have faced in 
accounting for truth as autonomous from revelation, scientists and 
philosophers might be most receptive to systems of thought that find 
their roots in Biblical theology. 
The Judeo-Christian scriptures have much to say about the ultimate 
source of human reason, the existence of a real and uniformly ordered 
universe, and the ability present in a creative and ordered human 
intellect to know that universe. Both the Old and New Testaments 
define these relationships such that the presuppositional base 
necessary to modern science is not only explicable but [also] 
meaningful . . . . [A]ll of us would do well to reflect on the scriptural 
axiom that “in Him all things hold together,” and . . . on the serious 
consequences to . . . culture[s] that divorce spiritual thought not only 
from moral considerations but scientific ones as well.141
Meyer’s sectarian religious presuppositions are the basis for the Wedge’s 
later definition of ID.142  
Thus framed by Meyer, Johnson’s and Dembski’s early definitions of ID 
betray its religious grounding. In 1996, the CRSC’s religious identity had to 
be established quickly and publicly to attract financing and to build “a 
popular base of support among our natural constituency, namely, Christians” 
as a source of political momentum.143 Johnson then defined ID as dependent 
on God’s existence: “My colleagues and I speak of ‘theistic realism’—or . . . 
‘mere creation’—as the defining concept of our movement. This means that 
we affirm that God is objectively real as Creator, and that the reality of God 
is tangibly recorded in evidence accessible to science, particularly in 
biology.”144 In 1999, Dembski rooted ID specifically in the New Testament, 
incorporating an explicit Christian sectarianism: “Intelligent design . . . 
embraces the sacramental nature of physical reality. Indeed, intelligent 
design is just the Logos theology of John’s Gospel restated in the idiom of 
information theory.”145 Inside ID’s “big tent,” the Wedge seeks to avoid 
 141. Id. at 42. 
 142. See Pennock, supra note 117 (discussing Meyer’s presuppositions in DNA by Design?). 
 143. See The Wedge Strategy, supra note 88 (concerning ID’s Christian base); see also FORREST 
& GROSS, supra note 88, chs.6 & 9 (concerning ID’s financial benefactors). 
 144. Johnson, Starting a Conversation About Evolution, supra note 115 (emphasis added); see 
also JOHNSON, supra note 106, at 48–50. 
 145. William A. Dembski, Signs of Intelligence, TOUCHSTONE, Jul./Aug. 1999, at 76, 84. 
“Information theory” refers to ways of measuring the information content of strings of symbols. 
Claude E. Shannon introduced a measure based on the probabilities of symbols transmitted over a 
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conflict by de-emphasizing Genesis in favor of the minimalist creation 
account in John 1:1: “In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with 
God, and the Word was God . . . . All things were made by him; and without 
him was not anything made that was made.”146 This is what Johnson means 
by “mere creation”: God created the world, and how he did it is secondary in 
importance to reconstructing science (more accurately, public understanding 
of it) to accommodate this truth.147
Dembski candidly revealed ID’s supernatural, theistic essence—and the 
designer’s identity—in 1992, long before his 2000 assurance that “[d]esign 
has no prior commitment to supernaturalism” and his 2002 avowal that “the 
designer need not be a deity” but “could be an extraterrestrial or a telic 
[purposeful] process inherent in the universe.”148 He offered this revelation in 
The Incompleteness of Scientific Naturalism, four years before the CRSC’s 
 
 
communication channel, and Kolmogorov and others proposed a measure based on minimum 
program/input pair lengths needed to encode a string (algorithmic information theory). While Dembski 
refers to each of these methods in his arguments, his proposed information measure, “complex 
specified information,” demonstrates none of the elegance and rigor of either Shannon information or 
algorithmic information theory. He argues that natural selection’s ability to generate “complex 
specified information” is strictly bounded, but his arguments are deeply flawed and lack force. See 
DEMBSKI, supra note 118, at 153–83 (concerning ID as information theory); see also DEMBSKI, supra 
note 135, at 141, 144, 153, 159. But see VICTOR STENGER, HAS SCIENCE FOUND GOD?, at ch. 4 
(2003); Elsberry & Shallit, supra note 135 (concerning Dembski’s misuse of information theory). For 
a lucid explanation of information theory, see Richard Dawkins, The “Information Challenge”, 7 
SKEPTIC No. 2, at 64, 64–69 (1999). 
 146. John 1:1, 4 (King James). 
 147. See Dembski, supra note 84, at 13.  
 148. See Fred Heeren, The Lynching of Bill Dembski, AM. SPECTATOR, Nov. 2000, at 44, 51; see 
also William A. Dembski, Commentary on Eugenie Scott and Glenn Branch’s “Guest Viewpoint: 
‘Intelligent Design’ Not Accepted by Most Scientists”, 7/2/02, at http://www.designinference.com/ 
documents/2002.07.Scott_and_Branch.htm (last visited Mar. 6, 2004). Dembski’s audiences for these 
denials should be noted. The Spectator audience was conservatives who would sympathize with ID 
supporter Heeren’s casting Dembski as a young Baylor University researcher being harassed by 
Baylor’s establishment. He was trying to rehabilitate Dembski’s reputation after Dembski was relieved 
of his directorship of the Polanyi Center, an ID think tank he established there. See FORREST & GROSS, 
supra note 88, at 207–10, 307 (concerning the Polanyi Center). Heeren cast Dembski as a martyr to 
academic freedom, “a mild-mannered mathematician more at home with probability theory than with 
politics,” persecuted for “set[ting] about developing mathematical methods for detecting intelligent 
design . . . in nature. That’s all.” Heeren, supra note 148. The audience in his response to Scott and 
Branch is school boards, whom Scott and Branch warn about lawsuits against schools teaching ID: “ID 
proponents may argue that a neutral-sounding ‘intelligence’ is responsible for design, but it is clear 
from the ‘cultural renewal’ aspect of ID that a deity—in particular, God as He is conceived of by 
certain conservative Christians—is envisioned as the agent of design.” Eugenie C. Scott and Glenn 
Branch, Guest Viewpoint: “Intelligent Design” Not Accepted by Most Scientists, SCH. BOARD NEWS 
(Nat’l Sch. Boards Ass’n), Jul. 2, 2002, at http://www.nsba.org/site/doc_sbn.asp?TrackID=&SID= 
1&DID=8127&CID=310&VID=58 (last visited Mar. 6, 2004). Since the Scott-Branch article was 
aimed at school boards, we may assume Dembski wrote his response also for that audience, which 
includes ID supporters.  
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establishment.149 His topic sets the context for his argument that “it is 
legitimate within scientific discourse to entertain questions about 
supernatural design” and that “a complete understanding of the world . . . 
apart from God” is only a “pretension.”150
[I]s there anything that has, could, or might happen in the world from 
which . . . to conclude that God had acted? Are there . . . any facts in 
the world for which an appeal to God is the best explanation? 
. . . What are the conditions for . . . discovering design (i.e., 
supernatural intervention, nonmaterial interference, divine meddling 
. . . ) in the actual world?151  
Dembski sets up a “thought experiment” he calls “[t]he incredible talking 
pulsar” to correct the misconception that the world “cannot even in principle 
produce events that would evidence design.”152 The pulsar communicates 
with humans in Morse code, calling itself “the mouthpiece of Yahweh, the 
God of both the Old and the New Testaments, the creator of the universe.”153 
It conveys God’s instructions for curing AIDS, solving intractable 
mathematical problems, etc. Dembski contends that natural science would be 
unable to explain the source of the messages because they outreach nature’s 
empirical resources and thus the explanatory reach of science, forcing one to 
look to the supernatural for explanations. Notably, Dembski does not 
consider the messages’ source to be an extraterrestrial being. Not only does 
the pulsar example constitute in effect his disavowal that the source can be an 
extraterrestrial, but he also stipulates that the source must be a supernatural 
entity.154
[I]t is hard to conceive how any naturalistic explanation will ever 
account for the pulsar’s behavior. 
. . . [W]e are dealing with . . . a super-intelligence . . . . I don’t mean 
. . . a super-human intelligence that might nevertheless be realized in 
some finite rational material agent embedded in the world (. . . an 
 149. Scientific naturalism refers to science’s search for natural explanations of natural 
phenomena. Since the rejection of naturalism is the most important factor identifying ID as a religious 
belief, we discuss this later. 
 150. William A. Dembski, The Incompleteness of Scientific Naturalism, in DARWINISM: SCIENCE 
OR PHILOSOPHY? (Jon Buell & Virginia Hearn eds., 1994), at http://www.leaderu.com/orgs/fte/ 
darwinism/chapter7.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2004) (emphasis added). 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id.  
 153. Id. 
 154. An extraterrestrial communicating with humans, in ways they could detect, would be a 
natural entity, even if much more powerful than humans.  
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extraterrestrial intelligence or a conscious super-computer) . . . . I 
mean a supernatural intelligence . . . surpassing anything . . . humans 
or finite rational agents . . . are capable of even in principle.155  
Dembski’s pulsar is an analogy, but he uses it to illuminate a real 
phenomenon that he says also exhausts science’s explanatory resources: the 
“origin of life,” which he says could not have occurred naturally because of 
the “staggering” mathematical improbability.156 The lesson of the pulsar is 
that life’s origin has only a supernatural explanation. To salvage the 
possibility of a naturalistic explanation, he says one must either adopt a 
“metaphysical hypothesis that postulates a lot more naturalistic stuff than 
science can sanction” or opt for “an entirely different . . . metaphysical 
hypothesis—God.”157 Disavowing an intention to “pitch metaphysical 
hypotheses,” he does precisely that: “[W]hen its empirical resources are 
exhausted, science itself closes the door to naturalistic explanation.”158 (This 
early rejection of naturalism marks ID as a supernaturalist, thus religious, 
belief.) 
Dembski is clearly not referring to mere extraterrestrials or “space 
aliens.”159 Neither can he point to the “telic process inherent in the universe” 
as the designer’s identity.160 An “inherent” process would be an intrinsic, or 
immanent, feature of the universe, not an external supernatural process. But 
Dembski specifies that the designer is transcendent. An “inherent telic 
process” would by definition be exclusively immanent and, by his own 
stipulations, could not be the designer. He stipulates that “God both 
 155. Dembski, supra note 150 (emphasis added). 
 156. Id. The “origin of life” is not synonymous with evolution, but creationists typically treat it as 
such, or as if scientists’ inability to explain it also taints their explanation of evolution. YEC Henry 
Morris, like Dembski, argues against a natural explanation of life’s origin, and for the same reason—
its supposed mathematical improbability. He purports to calculate the improbability of life’s 
originating by natural means. See SCIENTIFIC CREATIONISM 46, 59–69 (Henry M. Morris ed., 1974). 
 157. Dembski, supra note 151. 
 158. Id.  
 159. Contrast Dembski’s position with that of the Raëlians, who believe a natural, extraterrestrial 
entity created humans:  
On the 13th of December 1973, French journalist Rael was contacted by a visitor from another 
planet, and asked to establish an Embassy to welcome these people back to Earth. The extra-
terrestrial was about four feet in height, had long dark hair, almond shaped eyes, [and] olive 
skin. . . . He told Rael that: “[W]e were the ones who made all life on earth.”. . . The messages 
dictated to Rael explain how life on Earth is not the result of random evolution, nor the work of a 
supernatural “God.” It is a deliberate creation, using DNA, by a scientifically advanced people 
who made human beings literally “in their image.”  
The Raëlian Message: Scientists from Another Planet Created All Life on Earth Using D.N.A., at 
http://www.rael.org/english/pages/summary/sum_quicksummary.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2004). 
 160. See Dembski, supra note 148. 
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transcends creation and is immanent in it.”161 As mere process, such a 
designer would also lack the personal character on which he insists (recall his 
adamancy that God is male).162 He even rejects process theology, in which 
God, though personal in character, is more limited than traditional theism’s 
omnipotent, interventionist deity. In short, he rejects all modern theologies 
that try to assimilate modern scientific findings and methodology.163
Since Dembski does not think science can explain life’s origin 
naturalistically, he clearly thinks science must admit supernatural 
explanations; this is logically entailed by his rejection of naturalism.164 
Disguising his supernaturalism with rhetorical sleight-of-hand is thus futile, 
though he tries to do so by creating this false dichotomy: “In arguing that . . . 
natural causes cannot account for certain features of the natural world, I am 
placing natural causes in contradistinction to intelligent causes.”165 He says 
that “[l]ogically, the only alternative [to naturalistic evolution] is intelligent 
 161. William A. Dembski, Transcendence, in NEW DICTIONARY OF CHRISTIAN APOLOGETICS 
(forthcoming 2005), available at http://www.designinference.com/documents/2003.10.Transcen 
dence_NDOCApol.pdf (last visited Apr. 15, 2004). Van Till dismisses Dembski’s extraterrestrial: 
“Who designed ET?” Of the telic process, he says, “Dembski’s attempt to argue that ‘telic principles’ 
are a real option strike me as hollow, given his arguments in No Free Lunch that the designing 
intelligence must be interactive. . . . How would any telic principle function interactively with the 
universe?” Howard Van Till, Howard Van Till’s Response to William Dembski’s Remarks (Oct. 18, 
2002), available at http://www.aaas.org/spp/dser/evolution/perspectives/vantillresponse.pdf (last 
visited Jan. 22, 2004). 
 162. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.  
 163. Process theology is rooted in the process philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead and Charles 
Hartshorne, who “reject the traditional doctrine of divine power, according to which God . . . can 
interrupt [the world’s] basic causal processes—a doctrine that . . . conflicts with the assumption of 
scientific naturalism that no such interruptions can occur.” See David Ray Griffin, Process Philosophy, 
in ROUTLEDGE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 711, at 714 (Edward Craig ed., 1998). Responding to 
criticism by Van Till (an evangelical Christian), Dembski attacks him as “steeped in process 
theology”:  
Instead of intelligence and nature working in tandem, Van Till limits intelligence (increasingly a 
process God) to endowing nature with purely natural capacities. . . . To keep this from 
degenerating into deism, Van Till invokes the vocabulary of process theology, which describes 
God as guiding or persuading creation. But all such talk is empty. 
William A. Dembski, Naturalism’s Argument from Invincible Ignorance, at http://www.design 
inference.com/documents/2002.09.Van_Till_Response.htm (last visited on Mar. 6, 2004). But see 
Howard Van Till’s Response, supra note 161.  
 164. Dembski takes the same position concerning “complex specified information” (CSI). As he 
intends for it to apply to biology, CSI is genetic or molecular information that is (1) complex, i.e., 
could not have occurred by chance and thus has a very small probability, and (2) specified, i.e., 
exhibits a pattern understandable according to a prior, independent system of meaning. CSI is genetic 
or molecular information so complicated, yet intelligible, that it must have been intentionally designed. 
Dembski asserts that natural processes cannot, even in principle, create CSI, but only transmit existing 
information. Only a designer can create the information. See Dembski, supra note 118, at 127–39, 160, 
167–79; see also DEMBSKI, supra note 135, at 149. 
 165. William A. Dembski, Is Intelligent Design a Form of Natural Theology? (2001), at 
http://www.designinference.com/documents/2001.03.ID_as_nat_theol.htm (last visited Mar. 6, 2004).  
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design.”166 But in explaining phenomena and events within the natural order, 
whether they occur naturally or are intelligently produced, there is no basis 
for his distinction between natural causes and intelligent causes. Both kinds 
of causes occur within the natural order, so the proper distinction is between 
intelligent and unintelligent causes. If Dembski wants to make “natural” one 
of only two explanatory alternatives, the other must be “supernatural,” 
referring to events whose causes are outside the natural order. Once natural 
explanation is disallowed, the supernatural is the sole alternative. Rejecting 
naturalism makes supernaturalism the essence of ID, thus rendering it an 
inescapably religious belief, even if the words “supernatural” and “religion” 
are never uttered.  
4. ID’s Rejection of Naturalism 
ID leaders’ total rejection of naturalism is the core conceptual issue 
identifying it as a religious belief in its very substance. In the face of their 
denials, their anti-naturalism is the “smoking gun.” It immediately and 
irrefutably unmasks ID as supernaturalism, not science, and is thus crucially 
important: it destroys their claim that ID is exempt from the prohibitions of 
Edwards.167  
ID’s anti-naturalism rests on two chief complaints: (1) that scientists 
arbitrarily force upon science an a priori naturalism, i.e., “methodological 
naturalism,” and (2) that methodological naturalism (“MN”) logically entails 
philosophical naturalism (“PN”, also called “ontological” or “metaphysical” 
naturalism), a comprehensive metaphysics denying any reality beyond nature 
and natural laws, thus precluding a creator. Dembski declares MN the 
“functional equivalent of a full-blown metaphysical naturalism.”168 Wedge 
member Beckwith, reflecting his ID colleagues’ anti-naturalism, claims that 
“many citizens” object to “the methodological naturalism that evolution 
presupposes and the ontological materialism it entails,” the point of this 
(mistaken) objection being his assertion that “the existence of God . . . is 
inconsistent with materialism.”169 (ID proponents equate “naturalism” and 
 166. DEMBSKI, supra note 118, at 119.  
 167. DeWolf, Meyer & DeForrest, supra note 87, at 93.  
 168. DEMBSKI, supra note 118, at 119. 
 169. Beckwith, supra note 136, at 493. Beckwith is wrong on this point. “Entailment” is the 
strongest logical relationship and would mean that MN and PN are conceptually inseparable. However, 
not only are MN and PN conceptually separate, but MN is in fact accepted by many theists. See 
Barbara Forrest, Methodological Naturalism and Philosophical Naturalism, PHILO, Fall–Winter 2000, 
at 7 (concerning MN’s non-entailment of PN) [hereinafter Forrest, Methodolgical Naturalism]; see 
also Barbara Forrest, A Defense of Naturalism as a Defense of Secularism, in SIDNEY HOOK 
RECONSIDERED (Matthew J. Cotter ed., 2004) [hereinafter Forrest, A Defense of Naturalism]; Francis 
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“materialism,” but the latter is a more limited term.170) The objection, in 
effect, is that evolutionary theory is tantamount to atheism, a perennial ID 
charge.  
Johnson’s anti-naturalism was central to his anti-evolutionism even 
before the Wedge’s formation. 
[E]volutionary biologists all agree. . . . [that] naturalistic evolution . . . 
rules out any miraculous or supernatural intervention . . . .  
. . . Creationists are disqualified from making a positive case, because 
science by definition is based upon naturalism. The rules of science 
also disqualify . . . negative argumentation designed to dilute the 
persuasiveness of the theory of evolution. Creationism is thus [ruled] 
out of court and . . . the classroom—before any consideration of 
evidence. . . .  
When pressed about the unfairness of disqualifying their opponents a 
priori, naturalists sometimes portray themselves as merely insisting 
upon a proper definition of “science,” . . . .  
By skilful manipulation of categories and definitions, the Darwinists 
have established philosophical naturalism as educational orthodoxy 
. . . . 
[S]cientific naturalism as a worldview . . . [transforms] a sound 
methodological premise of natural science . . . into a dogmatic 
statement about the nature of the universe. . . . 
The assumption of naturalism is in the realm of speculative 
philosophy, and the rule against negative argument is arbitrary.171  
 
 
J. Beckwith, Fellow-CSC, at http://www.discovery.org/scripts/viewDB/index.php?command=view 
&id=43&isFellow=true (last visited Jan. 23, 2004) (regarding Beckwith’s CSC fellowship). 
 170. “ID creationists typically use . . . ‘naturalism’ interchangeably with ‘materialism,’ even 
though metaphysical naturalism is a richer concept that says that nature and its laws are all that exist, 
but allows that nature may not be limited to matter per se. More importantly, they regularly conflate 
these metaphysical concepts with the related methodological norms that are actually employed by 
science.” Robert T. Pennock, God of the Gaps: The Argument from Ignorance and the Limits of 
Methodological Naturalism, in SCIENTISTS CONFRONT CREATIONISM (A. J. Petto & L. R. Godfrey 
eds., rev. ed. forthcoming 2005). 
 171. Phillip E. Johnson, Evolution as Dogma: The Establishment of Naturalism, FIRST THINGS, 
Oct. 1990, http://www.arn.org/docs/johnson/pjdogma1.htm (last visited Apr. 13, 2004). Johnson’s 
remarks are noteworthy because (1) his objection to scientists’ refusal to invoke the supernatural 
clearly indicates that ID is religious, and (2) his defense of the “creationist” view makes no distinction 
between it and ID, thus supporting our contention that ID is creationism. 
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Beckwith echoes Johnson’s anti-naturalism:  
ID proponents maintain that there is a fundamental reason why 
evolution seems to most scholars . . . to be the only real legitimate 
explanation for the origin of the universe and life: a prior commitment 
to methodological naturalism . . . . ID proponents maintain that MN is 
a necessary presupposition for the veracity of the evolutionary edifice 
and entails ontological materialism (OM) as a worldview, but is . . . 
not necessary for the practice of science qua science . . . .  
 [D]esign theorists argue that . . . [at] times . . . an intelligent designer 
better accounts for certain phenomena than do material causes. And if 
that is the case, then the naturalist’s appeal to possible future 
materialist accounts of the phenomena is driven, not by the data, but 
by MN . . . .  
Thus, the real question, according to design theorists, is whether their 
arguments for ID work, not whether ID conflicts with MN or OM . . . . 
[I]f the ID arguments work and . . . conflict with MN, then . . . MN is 
not a necessary precondition of natural science . . . and . . . an a priori 
commitment to OM cannot be employed to exclude positions contrary 
to it. For to exclude non-materialist (or ID) accounts of natural 
phenomena by merely defining science as requiring MN (and/or 
entailing OM) does not count either as a philosophical argument 
against ID or an argument for MN (or OM); it is at best, circular 
reasoning, and at worst, intellectual imperialism.172  
The Wedge’s anti-naturalism strategy is thus three-pronged. The first 
prong is to accuse evolutionary scientists of an a priori commitment to MN 
and of manipulating the definition of science, making it naturalistic by 
decree. They aim to convince supporters and potential recruits that science’s 
naturalism is arbitrary, lacking foundation in the pragmatic necessities of 
scientific explanation. This makes scientists appear dogmatic and 
conspiratorial, concerned only to keep creationists’ putatively competitive 
explanation of “origins” from assuming its rightful scientific status. This 
approach appeals to Americans’ desire that each side of an issue be heard. 
The second prong is to conflate MN and PN. The rationale is that if scientists 
restrict evolutionary biology a priori to MN, and MN entails PN, then 
evolutionary theory necessarily implies atheism.173 Most Americans are 
 172. Beckwith, supra note 136, at 466–69 (citations omitted). 
 173. The second prong points to the Wedge’s complaint that teaching only evolution causes moral 
relativism, which they consider synonymous with moral confusion at best and outright immorality at 
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theists, which explains ID proponents’ use of this strategy.174 The third prong 
is to reject naturalism without straightforwardly admitting that their 
alternative is supernaturalism, a tactic exemplified by Beckwith’s use of 
euphemisms like “non-natural” and “non-materialist” rather than 
“supernatural.”175  
ID proponents’ anti-naturalism strategy ignores the historical reasons for 
science’s transition from supernatural to natural explanations, the difference 
between methodological and philosophical naturalism, and the reasons 
intrinsic to both naturalism and supernaturalism for science’s embrace of 
MN. Finally, the fact that ID’s anti-naturalism logically implies its 
supernaturalism requires proponents to use thinly veiled euphemisms to 
disguise its supernatural foundation—a verbal maneuver enabling them to 
speak to their Christian audience while simultaneously arguing for legal 
purposes that ID is non-religious and therefore legal.176 All three prongs of 
this strategy are based upon significant misunderstandings and errors.177
 
 
worst. This is a variant of the creationist line that “if you tell children they are descended from 
monkeys, they will act like animals.” Johnson typifies the complaint: 
[A]bsolutism in evolutionary science and relativism . . . in morals . . . reflects the established 
religious philosophy of . . . America. Naturalism . . . provides the foundation for liberal rationalism 
in morals, by keeping . . . divine authority . . . out of the picture. . . . The schools . . . teach that 
humans discover the . . . truth of evolution but . . . invent moral standards and can change them as 
human needs change. 
JOHNSON, supra note 106, at 166. 
 174. George Bishop, director of the University of Cincinnati’s Graduate Certificate Program in 
Public Opinion and Survey Research, provides figures relevant to Americans’ theistic beliefs and 
views on evolution: 
[N]early half (47%) of adult Americans believes in th[e] literalist, creationist account. Another 
40% believes that, while human beings may have evolved over millions of years from less 
advanced forms of life, God guided this process. Barely one in ten (9%) believes the naturalistic 
position of modern science that human evolution has occurred without divine intervention. 
George Bishop, Back to the Garden, PUB. PERSP., May/June 2000, at 21. 
 175. Beckwith, supra note 136, at 467, 469.  
 176. Though ID proponents often do not bother to disguise their appeals to the supernatural, they 
adjust their terminology to fit their audiences.  
 177. Criticisms of naturalism come almost exclusively from non-scientists like Johnson and 
Beckwith. Johnson disingenuously refuses to explain how supernaturalism would function in his own 
discipline, law. He recalls nostalgically when law was based on religion: “For much of Western 
history, lawmakers assumed that authoritative moral guidance was available to them in the Bible . . . .” 
JOHNSON, supra note 106, at 39. As a law professor, he asserted that holding criminals accountable 
requires grounding law in religion and criticized the law’s naturalistic methodology:  
During the last two centuries, the dominant intellectual culture has discarded a theistic 
understanding of human nature and replaced it with a naturalistic understanding . . . . 
We might have expected such an intellectual revolution to affect the criminal law, and it has . . . . 
 Whatever scientific naturalists . . . say, criminal law has found it necessary to assume that 
humans are moral agents created . . . with a . . . knowledge of God’s moral order . . . . When . . . 
dealing with human beings, naturalism is a bust—especially as a methodology. 
Phillip E. Johnson, Those Madcap Menendez Boys, BOOKS & CULTURE, Nov.–Dec. 1997, 
http://members.iinet.net.au/~sejones/pjmdcpmb.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2004). Pennock discusses 
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a. Error 1: MN as Arbitrary and A Priori 
By charging that scientists arbitrarily impose an a priori naturalistic 
methodology upon science, ID proponents in effect accuse scientists of 
relying on MN with neither epistemological nor methodological warrant. But 
there is ample warrant for science’s naturalism. Though specific sciences use 
variants of MN based on their relative appropriateness for gathering and 
explaining data (i.e., developing theories) in their respective investigations, 
all sciences are naturalistic as a matter of pragmatic necessity. An a priori 
stipulation that science must use MN (if it were actually made) would mean 
that scientists make science naturalistic merely by definition, as Johnson 
charges.178 However, the correct explanation of why science is defined as 
naturalistic is important to understand. 
MN is science’s universal procedural protocol requiring natural 
explanations for natural phenomena. Comprising the empirical and logical 
procedures by which scientists test explanations, it is nothing more than what 
is known less controversially as “scientific method.” This protocol is not 
arbitrary, and contrary to ID proponents’ accusations, requires no a priori 
metaphysical commitments.179 The only commitment is to an empirical 
methodology, which scientists use with good reason: it works. Natural 
explanations are scientifically successful; supernatural ones are not. The 
commitment to MN is thus pragmatic and provisional, not ideological. If a 
 
 
how MN is today recognized to be as essential in the law as in science. Contra Johnson’s nostalgia for 
a time when lawyers assumed that the Bible gave authoritative moral guidance and were not 
constrained by MN, he discusses the evidential problems that arose when laws “incorporated the 
scriptural command that one not suffer a witch to live.” Neither science nor law can incorporate the 
possibility of the supernatural, since there is no way to detect its supposed interventions. Pennock 
challenged Johnson to specify whether “divine interventions [are] occurring today” and how to detect 
them, but Johnson tellingly refuses. Pennock notes that “despite Johnson’s preaching to scientists to 
incorporate the ‘possibility’ of supernatural interventions . . . , it is . . . not very surprising that he never 
incorporates these in his own professional texts on criminal law.” See PENNOCK, supra note 91, at 
294–300. 
 178. See Johnson, supra note 171. Johnson reveals his own apriorism in his preferred definition of 
science, requiring a naïve empiricism in which “science is . . . the unbiased examination of 
experimental evidence . . . free from any philosophical . . . or political . . . or religious prejudice.” He 
ignores science’s need for broader explanations which necessarily move beyond immediate data (while 
remaining naturalistic). His charge that the naturalistic definition of science is deceptive exposes his 
bias toward a supernatural definition: “[Science’s assumptions are] concealed. . . . The deceit comes in 
by concealing the fact that there are two definitions [of science], and pretending that you are following 
the evidence wherever it goes when . . . you’ve decided before you even looked at the evidence that 
. . . [it] will exclude God . . . .” His criticism proves Johnson wants God in the definition. See Tal 
Brooke, An Interview in Berkeley, 24–25 SCP J., 1999, http://www.scp-inc.org/publications/journals/ 
J2404/PhilJohnsonInt.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2004) (Spiritual Counterfeits Project) (interview of 
Phillip Johnson). 
 179. See Robert T. Pennock, Naturalism, Evidence and Creationism: The Case of Phillip Johnson, 
11 BIOLOGY & PHIL. 543, 543–59 (1996); see also PENNOCK, supra note 91, at 276–308. 
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better methodology were devised, science would adopt it and adjust the 
definition of science to reflect its use, but humans have no recognized 
cognitive faculties for knowing the supernatural. Consequently, despite other 
ways in which people claim to know things (intuition, revelation, etc.), 
naturalistic methodology is the only intersubjective, public way of knowing 
nature.180 MN’s success has eliminated rivals such as the centuries-old effort 
to explain nature in a way consistent with the Bible. Its success makes it 
unlikely to be replaced except by a better methodology, and none now exists. 
But MN’s success was acknowledged slowly and with resistance within 
science itself. ID’s accusation that MN is arbitrary and a priori would be 
legitimate if it were true, but it contradicts historical fact.  
It is well known that pre-modern science was hampered methodologically 
by efforts to explain nature according to scriptural constraints. Such 
constraint was a genuine apriorism with practical consequences for science: it 
did not work. Copernicus’s heliocentric theory and Darwin’s theory of 
natural selection more successfully explained phenomena in the natural 
world and were adopted for their greater explanatory adequacy.181 Both 
Darwin, an agnostic, and American scientist Asa Gray, a Christian who 
endorsed Darwin’s work, recognized the need for natural rather than 
supernatural explanations:  
As early as 1838 Darwin had concluded that attributing the structure 
of animals to “the will of the Deity” was “no explanation—it has not 
the character of a physical law & is therefore utterly useless.” As Asa 
Gray put it, the great strength of evolution appeared “on comparing it 
with the rival hypothesis . . . of immediate creation, which neither 
explains nor pretends to explain any [facts].”182  
Evolutionary biologist Ernst Mayr explains the difference between 
religious apriorism and the explanatory needs of science in terms of the 
 180. See Forrest, A Defense of Naturalism, supra note 169:  
[N]aturalistic methodology . . . [is] what is done generally, but not exclusively, in science: the 
search for natural explanations of what we experience . . . using the . . . cognitive faculties . . . we 
know humans to have and that therefore make experience intersubjective. 
[It] . . . is any way of doing things that does not . . . require the invocation of supernaturalist beliefs 
to get them done. Such methodology . . . is nothing other than what both theists and nontheists 
already commonly do. . . .  
[It] is . . . the extension into science . . . of ways of solving problems and constructing explanations 
. . . proven successful outside science. 
 181. See JOHN HERMAN RANDALL, JR., THE MAKING OF THE MODERN MIND, chs. XI & XVIII 
(1940) (concerning science’s gradual abandonment of supernaturalism). 
 182. R. L. NUMBERS, DARWINISM COMES TO AMERICA 47 (1998). Numbers gives an excellent 
account of American science’s shift away from supernaturalism toward MN.  
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relative value not only of revealed dogma and scientific explanation, but of 
one scientific explanation as opposed to another: 
A fundamental difference between religion and science . . . is that 
religion usually consists of a set of dogmas, often “revealed” . . . , to 
which there is no alternative nor much leeway in interpretation. In 
science, by contrast, there is . . . a premium on alternative explanations 
and a readiness to replace one theory by another . . . . The goodness of 
a scientific idea is judged only to a minor degree by criteria extrinsic 
to science because it is on the whole judged entirely by its efficacy in 
explanation and, sometimes, prediction.183  
Noting the necessary (but naturalistic) methodological diversity in the 
physical and biological sciences, Mayr locates their unity in a 
common effort to explain the world: “When confronted by mythology 
or religion, science offers a unified front. All sciences, in spite of 
manifold differences, . . . endeavor to understand the world. Science 
wants to explain, . . . generalize, and . . . determine the causation of 
things, events, and processes. To that extent . . . there is a unity of 
science.”184
ID proponents’ contention that science imposes MN upon science 
arbitrarily therefore reflects either ignorance or deliberate distortion of the 
history of science. Scientific naturalism has nothing to do with a crass desire 
for explanatory (or political) hegemony. Scientists exclude the supernatural 
because they are unable to construct explanations that require access to a 
reality beyond the cognitive faculties and sources of knowledge humans are 
known to have. As philosopher of science Robert Pennock explains, 
“Methodological naturalism is not a dogmatic ideology that simply is tacked 
on to the principles of scientific method; it is essential for the basic standards 
of empirical evidence.”185
 183. ERNST MAYR, THE GROWTH OF BIOLOGICAL THOUGHT 22 (1982). The history of science 
reveals the extent to which biology rejected even the apriorism of another science, i.e., physics. Mayr 
explains why biologists could not meet physicists’ expectation that biology, like physics, should aspire 
to mathematical certainty. Id. at 36–43. 
 184. Id. at 32. Ernst Mayr, along with T. Dobzhansky, G.G. Simpson, Julian Huxley, Ronald 
Fisher, Sewell Wright, and J.B.S. Haldane, formulated the “New Synthesis” of Darwinian biology with 
modern genetics and population biology. His ideas about the nature of species and speciation remain at 
the center of evolutionary science. He has been one of the world’s most eminent biologists since the 
1930s. See MENNO SCHILTHUIZEN, FROGS, FLIES AND DANDELIONS (2001) (concerning Mayr’s work 
on clarifying the concept of species). 
 185. PENNOCK, supra note 91, at 196. Pennock explains the need to limit science to naturalistic 
explanations:  
The moment one . . . opens the door to supernatural interventions . . . explanatory chaos breaks 
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Two preeminent scientists in disciplines relevant to creationist claims 
have addressed this issue. Arthur Strahler, noted for contributions both to 
geology and the evolution/creation issue, explains why science is limited to 
MN: 
[S]upernatural forces . . . cannot be observed, measured, or recorded 
by the procedures of science—that’s . . . what . . . “supernatural” 
means. There can be no limit to the . . . supernatural forces . . . the 
human mind is capable of conjuring up . . . . Scientists therefore have 
no alternative but to ignore claims of . . . supernatural forces and 
causes. This . . . basic position . . . must be stoutly adhered to by 
scientists or their entire system of evaluating and processing 
information will collapse.186
Nobelist Christian de Duve (1974, Physiology or Medicine) explains why, 
concerning the origin of life, scientists proceed naturalistically. De Duve’s 
position is not the dogmatism of which ID proponents accuse evolutionary 
scientists, but the mainstream scientific view. 
[A]ll that we have seen so far supports a naturalistic explanation of the 
origin of life . . . . If . . . [amino acids and other organic substances] 
represent the chemical seeds from which life developed, . . . at least 
the first step in the birth of life was the outcome of natural processes. 
But this is only a first step in . . . a very long succession . . . . One may 
well wonder . . . whether this . . . is naturally explainable. 
In the view of most scientists interested in the problem, one can but 
answer . . . affirmatively, at least as a working hypothesis. . . . To 
assume the opposite amounts to denying the possibility of finding an 
explanation for the phenomenon one studies and thus declaring one’s 
research futile . . . . [S]cience must proceed on the assumption that the 
problems it approaches are soluble. There will always be time to call 
on “something else” after all attempts at finding a natural explanation 
have failed. In . . . the origin of life, this is still far from . . . the case.187
 
 
loose, since there are no known constraints upon processes that transcend natural laws. A 
supernatural force could be called upon to “explain” any event in any circumstance; . . . However, 
the concept of a transcendent designer or other miraculous force that can explain any event under 
any set of conditions is no explanation at all. 
Pennock, supra note 170. 
 186. ARTHUR N. STRAHLER, UNDERSTANDING SCIENCE 13–14 (1992); see also ARTHUR N. 
STRAHLER, SCIENCE AND EARTH HISTORY (1999). Many such statements from other scientists could 
be provided here. 
 187. CHRISTIAN DE DUVE, LIFE EVOLVING 50–51 (2002). De Duve, criticizing Behe and 
Dembski, says that “[c]ontrary to what is sometimes claimed, a naturalistic view of the origin of life 
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Explanations by scientists and philosophers of science as to why science 
is naturalistic should be contrasted with the views of Dembski, a 
mathematician/philosopher/Christian apologist but not a scientist, when he 
chastises Christian theologian/physicist Ian Barbour for constructing a 
theology that accommodates science:  
Barbour has built his “theology of nature” . . . on Darwinian theory 
and the naturalistic philosophy that undergirds it. . . .  
. . . Traditional theologies—whether Jewish, Christian, Muslim, or 
even Mormon—take as their basic datum divine revelation . . . in 
inspired and authoritative texts that have an objective sense and . . . are 
binding on believers. 
But divine revelation is not the decisive factor for Barbour . . . . 
Instead, the decisive factor is how the divine is “understood from the 
religious experience of a historical community.” . . . [I]n putting the 
emphasis on our current understanding of religious experience as 
opposed to our obligation to align ourselves with an objective 
revelation, Barbour opens the door to radical re-understandings of the 
divine as the religious experience of the community of faith 
evolves.188
Requiring that science be bound by “divine revelation” in “authoritative 
texts” is precisely the pre-modern apriorism science was forced to abandon. 
Yet such apriorism is proposed by ID’s leading intellectual.  
b. Error 2: MN’s Supposed Entailment of PN (and Atheism) 
“Methodological naturalism” is a fairly recent term that distinguishes it 
more precisely from philosophical naturalism. ID proponents wrongly charge 
that MN entails and is thus equivalent to PN. However, MN is not just a 
procedural protocol, but an epistemology, employing the cognitive faculties 
and reasoning capabilities we know humans to have: the ability to survey 
phenomena available to the senses, gather empirical data and reflect critically 
upon it, and draw conclusions using established rules of logic and evidence. 
Not only scientists but also laymen, even theistic laymen, do this all the time; 
it is the only way to navigate the natural world.  
PN, however, is a comprehensive metaphysics, comprising beliefs about 
what exists and what does not. Though PN “is a substantive world view built 
 
 
does not necessarily exclude belief in a Creator.” Id. at 51–53 (criticizing ID). 
 188. Dembski, supra note 165. 
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on the cumulative results of methodological naturalism,” i.e., on scientific 
knowledge, PN itself is not a part of science.189 Science simply uses any 
methodology that affords explanatory and predictive success, and only MN 
does this. MN’s epistemological reach is coextensive only with human 
sensory faculties and inferences derived from empirical data. It need not, nor 
does it, assume a priori that MN is the only source of truth and that claims 
purportedly derived from intuition and revelation are false, but neither is 
there any known methodology for intersubjectively calling upon intuition and 
revelation to explain the natural world. Any putatively scientific claim that is 
beyond the reach of empirical data and data-based inferences is unverifiable, 
both procedurally and in principle.190 Some humans may be privileged with 
divine revelation about the origin of life and the universe, but while the 
content of claimed revelations is in principle verifiable (if they are about the 
natural world), the process of revelation is neither sharable nor verifiable. 
Lacking reliable indications that intuition and revelation are genuine 
cognitive faculties, as well as ways to achieve consensus on what they 
convey, we also lack sharable epistemological advances attributable to them. 
Science uses the only methodology capable of both establishing consensus 
and advancing knowledge of science’s limited field of inquiry.  
Given the intersubjectivity of empirical claims, MN yields knowledge of 
the natural world that provides the foundation for PN insofar as the latter, in 
its modern form, is grounded in knowledge yielded by science. But MN does 
not entail PN. Neither does MN disprove the supernatural’s existence; it has 
neither means nor obligation to do so. (Those making supernatural 
knowledge claims bear the epistemological and methodological burdens of 
proof.) Proving the non-existence of the supernatural using naturalistic 
methodology, by the nature of the task, is impossible: “[T]he attempt to 
prove a negative existential claim . . . makes no sense: nothing can count as 
positive evidence of non-existence.”191 MN therefore precludes the denial of 
 189. Forrest, Methodological Naturalism, supra note 169, at 21.  
 190. Knowledge claims are procedurally verifiable when scientists, in addition to their cognitive 
faculties, have the means of acquiring the data to do so, e.g., technology (e.g., electron microscopes) or 
opportunities for field observations. Even when the means are unavailable, claims are verifiable in 
principle as long as they could be verified if the means were at hand. For example, claims about life in 
other galaxies, though not yet procedurally verifiable, are verifiable in principle—if we could travel 
there and collect data, we could find out if life exists. Conclusions extending beyond the reach of 
known cognitive faculties and any procedures we could implement are unverifiable in principle, thus 
beyond the reach of science. Such so far are conclusions about the supernatural, e.g., an intelligent 
designer, if that designer is not intersubjectively accessible. And if it were, verification by means of 
our natural faculties would mean the designer is a natural, not supernatural, entity. This does not mean 
it cannot be known; revelation is a logical possibility. But no one has identified an intersubjective 
procedure for verifying such occurrences. See id. at 10.  
 191. Id. at 15.  
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the supernatural, since this would constitute the epistemologically arrogant 
claim that human cognitive faculties are sufficient to survey the whole of 
reality. Barbara Forrest discusses this:  
[T]he theist can consistently view . . . [MN] as a way of understanding 
. . . a divinely created universe. The philosophical naturalist’s reasons 
for not seeing the world this way do not stem merely from reliance 
upon . . . [MN], but from . . . the absence of any methodology for 
detecting the supernatural, the problem of evil, etc. . . . . [PN] is a 
product not of . . . mere . . . naturalistic methodology, but of inferences 
based on the knowledge it yields in combination with other 
considerations. Reflecting philosophically upon what . . . [MN] yields, 
the believer may . . . conclude that the universe is the product of . . . an 
“intelligent designer.” The philosophical naturalist will view this . . . 
not as a logical inconsistency, but . . . a[n] . . . evidentially 
unsupported ontological category. 
. . . And because it does not nullify the logical possibility of theism . . . 
[MN] . . . preserves for theism an ontological category unavailable to 
atheism—the supernatural . . . albeit without the benefit of scientific 
evidence . . . .  
. . . [MN] leaves the theistic question on the table . . . absolv[ing] the 
naturalist of the . . . charge that the supernatural is ruled out a priori 
. . . . 
 . . . [MN], therefore, is not . . . antireligious or atheistic . . . but a non-
religious, that is, a secular, methodology . . . . [F]ar from spelling the a 
priori negation of religious belief, . . . [MN] . . . [preserves] it by 
leaving a space for it to exist . . . .  
[MN] . . . leaves theists the option to make whatever additional, 
logically coherent ontological commitments they choose (although 
they also have the political freedom to make even logically incoherent 
commitments).192
The naturalistic methodology and epistemology upon which PN relies thus 
precludes a priori denial of the supernatural, since such a denial ignores an 
essential element of PN: respect for evidence. Even ID proponents in effect 
admit the need for empirical justification of factual claims (e.g., their 
supernatural designer’s causal interventions) by declaring ID empirically 
 192. Forrest, A Defense of Naturalism, supra note 169. 
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detectable.193 But philosophical naturalists’ assertions of the designer’s non-
existence are provisional in the absence of omniscience. Contrary to ID 
proponents’ charge that MN logically entails PN, they are not, as Dembski 
charges, “functionally equivalent.” Consequently, MN is not tantamount to 
atheism: “It actually preserves a metaphysical ‘neutral zone,’ while being 
necessary in a practical sense because of the lack of a methodology for 
testing supernatural claims.”194 MN actually preserves a logical space for 
personal religious belief, even by scientists. And in a secular, constitutional 
democracy, whether personal religious belief is consistent with science is 
irrelevant. Supernaturalism represents a commitment that steps beyond the 
constraints of empirical data. Because the choice is personal, the reasons for 
it are not a matter of public concern—until those making such commitments 
seek government sanction for them as science, to be taught in a public school 
science curriculum. 
ID proponents, however, show no respect for evidential requirements. Not 
only do they reject MN, but they have also produced no ID science through 
any other workable methodology. More than a decade since the Wedge’s 
founding, scientists charged with doing the science that The Wedge Strategy 
specifies as central to its cultural goals—Paul Chien, Michael Behe and 
Douglas Axe—have not done so (though all publish standard science articles, 
using MN, independently of their ID affiliation).195 Nor has Wells, a scientist 
who does no science but promotes ID full-time.196 Surveys of scientific 
databases where peer-reviewed ID publications are indexed have yielded no 
articles using ID as a scientific theory.197 And Dembski, admitting ID’s lack 
of scientific progress, prefers to cultivate political influence without it.198  
 193. Ironically, by insisting that ID is empirically detectable, proponents naturalize God. See 
PENNOCK, supra note 91, at 304–07. Nonetheless, Dembski claims that “[W]hen science points to a 
transcendent reality, it can do so as science and not merely as religion. . . . [D]esign . . . is empirically 
detectable and . . . the claim that natural systems exhibit design can have empirical content.” Dembski, 
supra note 86. 
 194. Forrest, A Defense of Naturalism, supra note 169.  
 195. See FORREST & GROSS, supra note 88, at chs. 3 & 4; see also The Wedge Strategy, supra 
note 88. 
 196. FORREST & GROSS, supra note 88, at 88–112.  
 197. Id. at 41–44, 64–66, 68–72; see also George W. Gilchrist, The Elusive Scientific Basis of 
Intelligent Design, REP. OF THE NAT’L CENTER FOR SCI. EDUC., May–June 1997, at 14, 14–15. 
Responding to criticism of ID proponents’ failure to publish peer-reviewed science articles, Dembski 
commissioned physicist and ID supporter Frank Tipler to write an article devaluing scientific peer-
review: “[T]he referee . . . [T]he referee is . . . often not as intellectually able as the author whose work 
he judges. We have pygmies standing in judgment on giants . . . . Another possibility is that the 
increasing centralization of scientific research has allowed powerful but mediocre scientists to 
suppress any idea that would diminish their prestige.” Frank Tipler, Refereed Journals: Do They 
Insure Quality or Enforce Orthodoxy?, in UNCOMMON DISSENT (William A. Dembski ed., 2004), 
available at http://www.iscid.org/papers/Tipler_PeerReview_070103.pdf (last visited Apr. 16, 2004); 
see also William A. Dembski, The Myths of Darwinism, in UNCOMMON DISSENT, supra, available at 
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ID needs to succeed as a scientific enterprise to succeed as a cultural 
and political enterprise . . . . But this is . . . different from requiring 
that . . . [ID] attain . . . maturity and acceptance in the scientific world 
before it may . . . legitimately influence public opinion . . . .  
Any rule-setting about what [ID] must accomplish in the scientific 
sphere before it may legitimately influence the political sphere is 
arbitrary and betrays a naiveté about the actual workings of science 
. . . .  
. . . We have done amazingly well in creating a cultural movement, but 
we must not exaggerate ID’s successes on the scientific front. . . .  
Because of ID’s . . . success at gaining a cultural hearing, the scientific 
research . . . is now lagging behind . . . .199
If ID proponents were confident of its scientific value, Wedge scientists 
would use it professionally, reaping the rewards of superior scientific 
scholarship. But without supporting data, only their criticisms of evolution 
and superficially scientific assertions remain. In published critiques, 
philosophers and scientists in the relevant fields have evaluated their work 
and found it wanting.200 Their consensus is that ID’s criticisms of evolution 
 
 
http://www.designinference.com/documents/2003.09.UncDiss_Intro_Contribs.pdf (last visited Apr. 
16, 2004) (concerning Tipler’s article). 
 198. Politics is a constant in American creationism, especially ID. See FORREST & GROSS, supra 
note 88, at ch.8. 
 199. William A. Dembski, Becoming a Disciplined Science, Address at the Research and Progress 
in Intelligent Design Conference (Oct. 25, 2002), available at http://www.designinference.com/ 
documents/2002.10.27.Disciplined_Science.htm (last visited Jan. 5, 2004) [hereinafter Dembski, 
Disciplined Science]. In 2003, Dembski tried to influence the selection of Texas science textbooks. He 
gave the Texas Board of Education a FAQ listing “peer-reviewed publications supporting intelligent 
design in biology.” See William A. Dembski, Three Frequently Asked Questions About Intelligent 
Design, at http://www.designinference.com/documents/2003.09.ID_FAQ.pdf (last visited Apr. 9, 
2004). But all the publications are by ID supporters, and none uses “intelligent design” as a descriptor. 
Qualified scientists say none support ID in biology. See Nat’l Center for Sci. Educ., Textbooks 
Approved in Texas, at http://www.ncseweb.org/resources/news/2003/TX/682_textbooks_approved_in_ 
texas_11_7_2003.asp (concerning textbook controversy); see Steven Schafersman, Frequently Asked 
Questions About the Texas Science Textbook Adoption Controversy, at http://www.txscience.org/ 
files/faqs.htm; Jeffrey Shallit, Letters to the Editor, 7 SCI. INSIGHTS 27, 27–28 (Nov. 2003) 
(concerning the articles’ non-support of ID). Dembski included his book The Design Inference in his 
handout; only two months before, he wrote that “the book didn’t address the implications of the design 
inference for biology.” Posting of William A. Dembski, William_Dembski@baylor.edu, to ISCID 
Forums (July 2, 2003), at http://www.iscid.org/boards/ubb-get_topic-f-6-t-000386.html; see Wesley R. 
Elsberry, The Design Inference, REP. OF THE NAT’L CENTER FOR SCI. EDUC., Mar.–Apr. 1999, at 32, 
32–35 (book review). 
 200. The list of ID critiques by scientists and philosophers of science is long and growing. The 
longest criticisms of Behe are KENNETH R. MILLER, FINDING DARWIN’S GOD 129–64 (1999) and 
PENNOCK, supra note 91, at 166–72, 248–49, 263–72. Other scientists have criticized Behe. See Neil 
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are either misunderstandings or distortions of science and its methodology. 
Only ID’s supernaturalism and its proponents’ doctrinal loyalties remain to 
constitute its clearly theistic foundation. 
c. Error 3: A Thinly Disguised Supernaturalism 
Having rejected MN, ID advocates must develop another scientifically 
workable methodology and explanation of natural phenomena if they are to 
do “theistic science.” Doubts about the supernatural as a scientific 
explanation would vanish were they to produce (1) an epistemology for 
intersubjective knowledge of the supernatural and (2) a workable 
methodology for producing original data and constructing explanations of it. 
In Intelligent Design, Dembski does offer a replacement for MN. It hardly 
meets either criterion and certainly does not qualify as science, but he has 
little else to which to appeal. In the contest between Christian theism and 
scientific naturalism, theism wins: Dembski proposes using “Christology” to 
judge a scientific explanation’s “conceptual soundness.”201 (“Christology is 
the study of the Person and attributes of Christ, in particular the union in Him 
of divine and human natures.”202) He means that science must include Christ 
in its conceptual framework, confirming that ID’s presupposition of religion, 
enunciated by Meyer, is not only sectarian but explicitly Christian. 
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eds., 2004); Robert T. Pennock, Creationism and Intelligent Design, 2003 ANN REV. GENOMICS & 
HUM. GENETICS, at 143, 143–63 [hereinafter Pennock, Creationism and Intelligent Design]; Robert T. 
Pennock, Creationism’s War on Science, ENVTL. REV., Feb. 1998, at 7; Pennock, supra note 170; 
Robert T. Pennock, The Prospects for a Theistic Science, 50 PERSP. SCI. & CHRISTIAN FAITH 205, 
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Mar. 2002, at 111, 111–33; Jason Rosenhouse, The Design Detectives, SKEPTIC, Vol. 8, No. 4, 2001, at 
59, 59–64; Elliott Sober, Intelligent Design and Probability Reasoning, at http://www.talkreason.org/ 
articles/iD&PRW.pdf (last visited Mar. 4, 2004); Victor J. Stenger, Intelligent Design: The New 
Stealth Creationism, at http://www.talkreason.org/articles/Stealth.pdf (last visited Mar. 4, 2004). This 
is only a sample of published ID critiques. 
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ed. 2003).  
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Apart from saying that “when Christ is the lens through which we survey 
the world . . . we should expect the christological lens to focus on Christ as 
well,”203 Dembski leaves unspecified the particulars of how Christology can 
be used to safeguard science’s conceptual soundness, but he does not doubt 
Jesus’s centrality to science: “Christ, as the completion of our scientific 
theories . . . renders all our studies the study of himself.”204
If we take seriously the . . . Christology of Chalcedon ( . . . Christ is 
fully human and fully divine) and view Christ as the telos toward 
which God is drawing . . . creation, then any view of the sciences that 
leaves Christ out . . . must be . . . deficient. . . .  
. . . If Christ enters substantively into our scientific theories, must not 
their scientific status be . . . compromised? . . . [T]here need never be 
any worry about smuggling Christ into our scientific theories 
[because] Christ can enter substantively into a scientific theory 
without violating its integrity. 
. . . [T]he conceptual soundness of a scientific theory cannot be 
maintained apart from Christ. . . . [A] scientist, in trying to understand 
some aspect of the world, is . . . concerned with that aspect as it relates 
to Christ . . . regardless of whether the scientist acknowledges 
Christ. . . . 
Christ is indispensable to any scientific theory, even if its practitioners 
don’t have a clue about him.205
Dembski’s proposal to constrain science according to fifth-century Christian 
orthodoxy confirms ID’s religious foundation in a way that Beckwith’s 
superficially non-religious euphemisms are not sufficient to conceal. 
5. ID’s Religious Motivation and Goals 
Since Christian theism is ID’s foundation, the movement’s religious 
motives and goals are unsurprising. Proponents reject not only naturalism, 
but also secularism—their admitted aim is to de-secularize America, though 
Johnson denies favoring theocracy: 
 203. DEMBSKI, supra note 118, at 207.  
 204. Id. at 210. 
 205. Id. at 206–10 (citations omitted). The Christology of Chalcedon is the orthodox Catholic 
doctrine of Jesus as “perfect God and man, . . . one sole being in two natures, without division or 
separation and without confusion or change,” affirmed at the Council of Chalcedon in 451 A.D. See P. 
T. Camelot, Chalcedon, Council of, in 3 NEW CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA 363, 365 (2d ed. 2003); see 
also Pennock, The Wizards of ID, supra note 200 (discussing Dembski’s fusion of science and 
Christology).  
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I would oppose a theocracy of any kind, including a Christian 
theocracy, not in spite of the fact that I believe Christian theism to be 
the correct religious worldview, but because I believe the Christian 
teaching about the sinful heart of man . . . . [T]heocrats wielding 
absolute power will not long remain Christians in any sense that I can 
recognize. 
. . . Acceptance of religious pluralism—separation of church and state 
in American constitutional jargon—is one of the important ways in 
which Christianity differs from Islam . . . or from Marxist-Leninism 
. . . .206
But his other comments make his denial unconvincing. He suggests that 
he defines theocracy narrowly, as the result of force: “Whether a specific 
religious worldview is correct is one question. Whether and to what extent 
anyone would use force to ensure that his own religious worldview 
predominates over the others is a separate question.”207 Yet the manner in 
which a theocracy is effected is irrelevant. A theocracy could result from 
changes to a political system from within by using the system’s legitimate 
mechanisms, winning either enough political power or sufficient public 
approval (or both) to minimize effective resistance. ID’s Wedge Strategy and 
political maneuvering point to this scenario. The strategy “seeks nothing less 
than the overthrow of materialism and its cultural legacies” and “[t]o see 
design theory permeate our religious, cultural, moral and political life.”208 
Such thorough permeation by a religious view points threateningly toward 
theocracy.209 If ID proponents convince federal courts that teaching “the 
 206. JOHNSON, supra note 92, at 169–70 (emphasis in original); see also The “Wedge Document”: 
So What?, at http://www.discovery.org/scripts/viewDB/filesDB-download.php?=109 (last visited May 
22, 2005) (stating the Discovery Institute’s disavowal of theocracy); see also Forrest & Gross, supra 
note 88, at 259–64, 270–73; Barbara Forrest & Paul R. Gross, The Wedge of Intelligent Design: 
Retrograde Science, Schooling and Society, in SCIENTIFIC VALUES AND CIVIC VIRTUES (Noretta 
Koertge ed., forthcoming 2005) (discussing the Wedge’s theocratic leanings). 
 207. JOHNSON, supra note 111, at 170.  
 208. The Wedge Strategy, supra note 88; see also FORREST & GROSS, supra note 88, at 239–55 
(discussing the Wedge’s political influence at the national level). 
 209. Theocracy has taken different forms and has several meanings. According to The 
Encyclopedia of Religion, “Theocracy . . . refers to a type of government in which God or gods are 
thought to have sovereignty, or to any state so governed.” Dewey D. Wallace, Jr., Theocracy, in 14 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RELIGION, supra note 113, at 427. Although the concept has no rigorous definition 
in social science or the history of religion and does not denote a specific political system (as does 
“monarchy,” for example), it “designates a certain kind of placement of the ultimate source of state 
authority, regardless of the form of government.” Id. There are four types: “hierocracy, or rule by 
religious functionaries; royal theocracy, or rule by a sacred king; general theocracy, or rule in a more 
general sense by a divine will or law; and eschatological theocracy, or future rule by the divine.” Id. 
The meaning we intend here is general theocracy, “wherein ultimate authority is considered to be 
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controversy” is legal, they will have moved the country closer to theocracy 
by means of the judicial system, undermining secular government using the 
system itself. Meyer highlighted one aspect of such a strategy even before the 
Wedge’s formation, commenting on a creationist defeat in the early stages of 
Edwards: “The lawyers representing creationism have already submitted an 
appeal in the U.S. Court of Appeals. The creationist strategy, in general, 
remains the waging of a war of attrition. They plan to keep creation-science 
alive in appeal until conservative Reagan appointees begin to stock the courts 
in greater numbers.”210
Johnson’s constant drumbeat against academic and political secularism 
suggests that Christian theocracy is precisely his goal. He mourns American 
universities’ transition “from Protestant establishment to established 
nonbelief” and Yale’s subordination of its “Christian atmosphere” to “the 
secular enlightenment values of freedom of inquiry, political equality, and 
public service.”211 He accuses “secularized intellectuals” of “apostasy,” 
asserting that “[theists] need to help the public . . . understand that the 
nihilism permeating contemporary life is the inevitable consequence of 
apostasy.”212 Calling naturalism America’s “established religion,” he strongly 
implies that the Christian majority’s views deserve government sanction and 
that religious neutrality is wrong: 
 
 
vested in a divine law or revelation, mediated through a variety of structures or polities,” which 
embodies an ideal shared by John Calvin, Oliver Cromwell, and the Massachusetts Puritans: “a holy 
community on earth in which the sovereignty was God’s and in which the actual law should reflect the 
divine will and the government seek to promote the divine glory.” Id. at 429. In Cromwell’s England 
and the Massachusetts Bay Colony, “there was both a hearkening after Old Testament theocratic 
patterns and a sense of the importance of government entrusted to truly regenerate persons—or the 
saints—in an effort to create a holy commonwealth,” in which “rule was exercised . . . more through a 
godly laity than through the clergy.” Id. This is closest to what ID leaders seem to favor. For example, 
when Johnson observes that scientific naturalists “will tolerate Christianity provided that Christian 
doctrines are confined to private life and not proposed as a basis for lawmaking or employed in public 
education,” he clearly believes law and public education should be free from such constraints. See 
JOHNSON, supra note 92, at 121. The subtitle of his book, Reason in the Balance: The Case Against 
Naturalism in Science, Law and Education, names the “structures and polities” through which he 
believes divine law should be mediated. Though he speaks nostalgically of biblically based law (see 
supra note 177), he disapproves of “modernist culture [which] retains the prohibition of theft and 
murder, retains the sabbath merely as a secular day of recreation, discards the admonition to have ‘no 
other gods before me’ . . . , and regards ambivalently the prohibition of adultery and the command to 
honor parents.” JOHNSON, supra note 106, at 39. Elsewhere, his dislike of secular law and longing for 
a God-based legal system pervades his entire discussion. See Phillip E. Johnson, Nihilism and the End 
of Law, FIRST THINGS, Mar. 1993, at 19 [hereinafter Johnson, Nihilism]. 
 210. Meyer, supra note 138, at n.1 (Mar. 1986). Creationists continue to rely upon the federal 
courts’ increasing conservatism.  
 211. Phillip E. Johnson, What (If Anything) Hath God Wrought?, ACADEME, Sept.–Oct. 1995.  
 212. Johnson, Nihilism, supra note 209. 
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Government [and] lawmaking . . . presuppose the viewpoint of . . . 
[agnostics]. . . . Their view is that God is real if that idea works for 
you.  
So that’s the viewpoint on God . . . throughout public life in the United 
States. . . . This . . . is presupposed in public life, and . . . is why . . . 
tolerance has become central. In this way of thinking, true religion 
means that you never interfere with somebody else’s belief system and 
that all of these are relative systems good only for the person who 
holds that belief, so government should presuppose none of these 
beliefs. 
That means . . . that the agnostic position . . . becomes the neutral 
position which governs the country. This is what the Supreme Court 
has effectively enacted and imposed in its religious-liberty 
decisions.213
At a 1996 ID conference, he spoke longingly of days before Engel v. 
Vitale, when “America was unified by the concept that people of different 
races and religious traditions all worship . . . the God of the Bible,” and 
regretfully of post-Engel America, which “has declared its independence 
from God.”214
Its early nomenclature (Center for the Renewal of Science and Culture) 
indicates that the CSC is working aggressively for a cultural renewal fueled 
by evangelical religion. Johnson characterizes ID’s strategy:  
Christians in the 20th century have been . . . fighting a defensive war 
to defend what they have . . . . It never turns the tide. . . . [W]e’re 
trying to do . . . something entirely different . . . to go into enemy 
territory . . . and blow up the ammunition dump. What is their 
ammunition dump in this metaphor? It is their version of creation.215  
ID proponents hope to de-secularize American society, which can only 
mean that they hope to move the country toward theocracy. In the Catholic 
Crisis magazine, CSC fellow Benjamin Wiker predicts an ID-fomented 
cultural de-secularization:  
 213. Jerry Aust, Creation and Evolution, GOOD NEWS, July–Aug. 1998, at http://www.gn 
magazine.org/issues/gn17/gn98ja.pdf (last visited Jan. 24, 2004).  
 214. Phillip E. Johnson, How to Sink a Battleship: A Call to Separate Materialist Philosophy, 
REAL ISSUE, Nov.–Dec. 1996, at http://www.leaderu.com/real/ri9602/johnson.html (last visited Apr. 
14, 2004). 
 215. Steve Benen, Science Test, CHURCH & ST., July–Aug. 2000, at 8–9. 
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Secularized science has as its aim the reduction of apparent design . . . 
to the unintelligent interplay of chance and brute necessity . . . . 
Secularized science . . . supports secularized philosophy, . . . the . . . 
mouthpiece of the alliance. 
The ID movement seeks to restore sanity to science, philosophy, and 
hence culture by investigating the possibility that nature . . . can only 
be understood as the effect of an Intelligent Designer . . . . 
[S]ecularized philosophy will be forced to confront the scientific 
evidence that truth is not . . . a mere human artifact . . . . Soon enough, 
secularized culture will be compelled to realign.216
Moreover, the logic of Dembski’s anti-naturalism points inexorably 
toward theocracy. He declares that scientific naturalism is idolatry, i.e., to 
exclude God from science is to worship nature.217 If secular science is 
idolatrous, then a secular political system protecting science and public 
education is also idolatrous. The only remedy would be the de-secularization 
of science, government, and education.218  
The Wedge Strategy spells out the “cultural renewal” program. Science—
or public understanding of it—is only the first target: “Design theory 
promises to reverse the stifling dominance of the materialist worldview, and 
to replace it with a science consonant with Christian and theistic 
convictions.”219 But the strategy includes “Twenty Year Goals” 
encompassing “psychology, ethics, politics, theology and philosophy . . . the 
 216. Benjamin D. Wiker, Does Science Point to God?: The Intelligent Design Revolution, CRISIS, 
Apr. 7, 2003, at http://www.crisismagazine.com/april2003/feature1.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2004). 
 217. See supra note 130 and accompanying text. 
 218. This logic reflects Johnson’s arguments in Reason in the Balance, supra note 106. The 
Wedge has received money from Howard F. Ahmanson, who for many years funded and was on the 
board of the Christian Reconstructionist Chalcedon Institute, which aims to reorganize American 
culture and government according to “Biblical law.” See FORREST & GROSS, supra note 88, at 265–67; 
see also Max Blumenthal, Avenging Angel of the Religious Right, SALON, Jan. 6, 2004, at 
http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2004/01/06/ahmanson/print.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2004). 
Ahmanson is now on the Discovery Institute’s board of directors. See Discovery Institute, About 
Discovery, at http://www.discovery.org/fellows (last visited Apr. 10, 2004). 
 219. The Wedge Strategy, supra note 88. The ID movement will not alter the way science is done; 
science is merely its cultural vehicle. Johnson admits, “This isn’t really, and never has been, a debate 
about science. . . . It’s about religion and philosophy.” Jay Grelen, Witnesses for the Prosecution, 
WORLD, Nov. 30, 1996. The Wedge aims to persuade a significant segment of the public and 
politicians that ID, as an alternative to evolution, should be taught as public school science. Their 
vehicle is well chosen: Americans’ high levels of religious and political conservatism and low science 
literacy are well documented. See Science and Technology: Public Attitudes and Public 
Understanding, in SCI. & ENGINEERING INDICATORS 2002, at http://www.nsf.gov/sbe/srs/seind02/ 
pdf/c07.pdf (last visited Apr. 14, 2004); see also Religion and Politics: Contention and Consensus, 
July 24, 2003, at http://pewforum.org/publications/surveys/religion-politics.pdf (last visited Mar. 6, 
2004). 
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fine arts [and] . . . religious, cultural, moral and political life.”220 Behe sees 
ID as the antidote to the “materialism” infecting modern culture and as an 
evangelical counter-weapon against attacks on Christianity: 
[S]cientific evidence of design means a lot for Christians . . . . First, 
. . . understanding . . . God’s creation allows us to . . . delight in his 
works . . . . [W]e . . . appreciate his power and . . . realize that our lives 
are in strong hands.  
Second, Christians live in the world with non-Christians. We want to 
share the Good News . . . and to defend the faith against attacks. 
Materialism is . . . a weapon that . . . antagonists use against 
Christianity and a stumbling block to some who would otherwise enter 
the church. To the extent that the credibility of materialism is blunted, 
. . . showing the reasonableness of the faith is . . . easier.221
However, the Christian convictions that the ID movement promotes are 
quite regressive (and do not reflect the broader, more tolerant Christian 
community). Dembski and CSC fellow Jay Wesley Richards define them 
unambiguously in Unapologetic Apologetics, which contains essays they 
wrote in the mid-1990s as Princeton Theological Seminary students. 
Dembski and Richards wrote these essays after the Wedge’s formation, at 
approximately the time of the CRSC’s establishment, so they can be seen as 
ID’s theological framework. In the foreword, Johnson affirms that behind 
their anti-evolution student movement at PTS stands a “movement that will 
bear fruit in the coming century,” i.e., ID.222 Dembski believes Christian 
apologetics is crucial to ID’s agenda: “The job of apologetics is to . . . clear 
obstacles that prevent people from coming to . . . Christ . . . . [I]f . . . . 
anything . . . has blocked . . . people accepting the Scripture and Jesus Christ, 
it is the Darwinian naturalistic view . . . .”223  
Dembski and Richards’s vision of a culturally renewed, Christian 
America is not only theocratic but also disturbingly exclusionary. They speak 
nostalgically of “the sixth century up to the Enlightenment,” when “the West 
was thoroughly imbued with Christian ideals and . . . intellectual elites were 
 220. The Wedge Strategy, supra note 88. 
 221. Michael J. Behe, Tulips and Dandelions, BOOKS & CULTURE, Sept.–Oct. 1998, at 
http://web.archive.org/web/20030622153241/http://www.christianitytoday.com/bc/8b5/8b5034.html 
(last visited Apr. 14, 2004).  
 222. One of the Wedge Strategy’s objectives is “Seminaries increasingly recognize & repudiate 
naturalistic presuppositions.” The Wedge Strategy, supra note 88. See FORREST & GROSS, supra note 
88, at 157 (concerning PTS student organization). 
 223. Benen, supra note 215, at 14.  
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overwhelmingly Christian,” when “[f]alse ideas that undermined the . . . 
Christian faith (e.g., denying the resurrection or the Trinity) were swiftly 
challenged and uprooted.”224 They disavow “inquisitorial” methods but 
lament allowing “the collective thought of the world to be controlled by ideas 
that prevent Christianity from being regarded as anything but a harmless 
delusion.”225 Declaring a mandate to “[bring] every aspect of life under the 
influence of . . . [Christ],” despite such a mandate's “elitism and 
intrusiveness,” they insist, “humans must decide their allegiances.” Jesus 
says that we are either for him or against him. There is no middle ground.”226 
Dembski then surpasses even these regressive sentiments by proposing to 
revive the transgression of heresy, even at the cost of peaceful coexistence:  
Within . . . North American Christianity, heresy has become an 
unpopular word. Can’t we all just get along and live together in peace? 
Unfortunately the answer is no. Peace cannot be purchased at the 
expense of truth. . . . There is an inviolable core to the Christian faith. 
Harsh as it sounds, to violate that core is to place ourselves outside the 
Christian tradition. This is the essence of heresy, and heresy remains a 
valid category for today . . . .227  
Dembski’s exclusionism is echoed by Johnson, who dismisses the faith 
even of other Christians, as he did of evolutionary biologist and Behe critic 
Kenneth Miller, like Behe a devout Catholic: 
The only reason I have to believe that Kenneth Miller is a Christian is 
that he says so. Maybe he’s sincere. But I don’t know that. If he is, I 
can say this: you often find the greatest enemies of Christ in the 
church . . . . [T]here is a kind of person who may be sincere in a way, 
but . . . goes into church . . . to save it from itself by bringing it into 
concert with evolutionary naturalism . . . . [T]hese are . . . people . . . 
more dangerous than an outside atheist . . . . So I am not impressed 
that somebody says that he is a Christian . . . and believes that 
evolution is our creator. . . . [S]uch people often do a great deal of 
damage within the church.228  
 224. See William A. Dembski & Jay Wesley Richards, Reclaiming Theological Education, in 
UNAPOLOGETIC APOLOGETICS 11, 20 (William A. Dembski & Jay Wesley Richards eds., 2001); see 
also Forrest & Gross, supra note 206 (concerning ID proponents’ religious exclusionism). 
 225. Dembski & Richards, supra note 224, at 19.  
 226. Id. at 18.  
 227. William A. Dembski, The Task of Apologetics, in UNAPOLOGETIC APOLOGETICS 31, 43 
(William A. Dembski & Jay Wesley Richards eds., 2001). 
 228. Interview by Hank Hanegraaff with Phillip Johnson, Bible Answer Man (Christian Res. Inst. 
online broadcast, Feb. 21, 2003) (transcript on file with Barbara Forrest).  
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Miller’s religiosity would be irrelevant if ID were about science. 
Johnson’s disparagement of Miller’s faith reeks of intolerance. He also 
directs his exclusionism against Islam, placing his comments within the 
context of the 2001 World Trade Center attack:  
This isn’t the same country we were in the previous decades . . . . 
[T]he country is almost cringing in fear of these Muslim terrorists 
from the Middle East. I see professors afraid to discuss the subject 
because they’re afraid of . . . the Muslim students . . . . I never thought 
our country would descend to this level. 
We are afraid to search the truth and to proclaim it. We once knew who 
the true God was and were able to proclaim it frankly. But since about 
1960 we’ve been hiding from that. We’ve been trying to pretend that 
all religions are the same.229  
The Wedge’s vision of cultural renewal devalues religious views that do 
not coincide with the controlling Christian viewpoints of its leaders. Such 
religious exclusionism not only identifies the ID movement as sectarian, but 
brands it as a radically peripheral Christian sectarianism. 
Dembski and Johnson thus make plain their mission’s urgency: America 
needs ID’s culturally regenerative message, and the Wedge Strategy’s goals 
must be pursued where that message can take root most deeply and 
comprehensively: the minds of public school students. Thus, establishing a 
beachhead in public schools is the first priority—so urgent, in fact, that 
Dembski wants ID taught despite lacking any science to legitimate it.  
Mike [Gene] . . . takes the “high road” that ID must first be developed 
further as a scientific and scholarly program before it may be . . . 
taught in public school science curricula . . . . But I’ve come to reject 
this view entirely . . . .  
Why should ID supporters allow the Darwinian establishment to 
indoctrinate students at the high school level, only to divert some of 
 229. Dick Staub, The Dick Staub Interview: Phillip Johnson, CHRISTIANITY TODAY, Dec. 3, 2002, 
at http://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2002/147/22.0.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2004) (emphasis 
added). Dembski and Johnson make such comments despite at least one Wedge’s member being 
Jewish (David Berlinski) and ISCID’s having a Muslim fellow (Muzaffar Iqbal of the Center for Islam 
and Science). But diversity is negligible in the Wedge; it is a conservative Christian movement. The 
implication of Dembski and Johnson’s theology regarding their non-Christian fellows raises the 
question of whether the Wedge is using them opportunistically. See Nancy Pearcey, We’re Not in 
Kansas Anymore, CHRISTIANITY TODAY, May 22, 2000, at 47 (concerning Berlinski); Int’l Soc’y for 
Complexity, Info. & Design, Society Fellows, at http://www.iscid.org/fellows.php (last visited Jan. 27, 
2004) (concerning Iqbal). 
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the brightest to becoming supporters of . . . evolution, when by 
presenting ID at the high school level some of these same students 
would go on to careers trying to develop ID as a positive research 
program? If ID is going to succeed as a research program, it will need 
workers, and these are best recruited at a young age.230
Speaking of ID’s failure to become a “disciplined science,” Dembski 
noted schools’ importance for ID recruiting: 
For scientific ideas to prosper ( . . . whether . . . correct or ultimately 
mistaken . . . ), they must be . . . taught within the educational 
mainstream. This is the only way to win the next generation of 
scholars to intelligent design. Without a presence in the science 
curriculum, [ID] will limp along, merely winning stragglers here and 
there. 
. . . Without a significant presence in the educational mainstream, . . . 
[ID] will . . . be marginalized and never attain its full potential. A 
design-theoretic curriculum is therefore indispensable to the success of 
. . . [ID] as a scientific and intellectual movement.231  
A presence in public education is vital to spreading ID and reversing the 
damage of secularism, which Johnson sees as incompatible with 
Christianity.232 He is confident of victory: “[I]t is nearly inevitable that ‘teach 
the controversy’ will become public policy.”233 And the Wedge is being 
helped by powerful Christian organizations that see ID as a way to advance 
 230. William A. Dembski, Then and Only Then: A Response to Mike Gene, at http://www.design 
inference.com/documents/2002.07.Mike_Gene.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2004). “Mike Gene” is a 
pseudonymous ID supporter. See FORREST & GROSS, supra note 88, at 331. ID advocates also 
cultivate followers in higher education, seeing a presence there as crucial to influencing public 
education. Academic supporters are used as a selling point when approaching school boards. See id. at 
165, 199–201, 296–314. 
 231. Dembski, Disciplined Science, supra note 199. Two ID advocates have been more forthright 
(publicly) about teaching ID in public schools. Paul Nelson says, “[ID] isn’t a fully fledged theory—
there isn’t yet enough there to actually teach.” See Colin Barry, “Intelligent Design” May Underlie 
Life, DARTMOUTH ONLINE (Feb. 21, 2003), at http://www.thedartmouth.com/article.php?aid= 
2003022101040 (last visited Jan. 27, 2004). Bruce Gordon, Dembski’s Polanyi Center partner, stated 
that “[ID] has been prematurely drawn into discussions of public science education where it has no 
business making an appearance without broad recognition from the scientific community.” Bruce 
Gordon, Intelligent Design Movement Struggles with Identity Crisis, RES. NEWS & OPPORTUNITIES IN 
SCI. & THEOLOGY (Templeton Found.), Jan. 2001, at 9; see also Blair Martin, Polanyi Center’s Future 
Is Unclear, BAYLOR LARIAT, Oct. 24, 2000 (concerning Gordon and the Polanyi Center). 
 232. See Aust, supra note 213. 
 233. Phillip E. Johnson, Wells Hits a Home Run at Harvard, WEEKLY WEDGE UPDATE, Dec. 2, 
2001, at http://www.arn.org/docs/pjweekly/pj_weekly_011202.htm (last visited Mar. 6, 2004).  
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their own efforts to breach the constitutional wall between church and 
state.234
Johnson thus sees the Wedge Strategy’s success as Christianity’s 
victory—in education, lawmaking, and restoring America’s Christian 
foundations: 
“Secular society, and particularly the educational institutions, . . . 
assumed throughout the 20th century that the Christian religion is . . . 
a hangover from superstitious days,” Johnson said. “With . . . [ID’s] 
success . . . we’re going to understand that . . . Christians have been 
right . . . at least on . . . major elements . . . like divine creation.”  
As a result, Johnson says, it will no longer be plausible to argue that 
“Christian ideas have no legitimate place in public education, in public 
lawmaking, in public discussion generally.” 
. . . [S]cientific materialism . . . lead[s] to bad consequences for society 
. . . . [M]aybe we had a better grasp of the truth when we were a 
Christian country than . . . when Christian truths were spurned.”235
This anti-secularism is not confined to the CSC, but permeates an 
institution that Johnson calls a model for “prepar[ing] students to meet the 
intellectual challenges of evolutionary naturalism”—Biola University’s 
Torrey Honors Institute.236 Named by ID auxiliary Access Research Network 
(“ARN”) as one of two “ID Colleges,” Biola promotes ID actively.237 Torrey 
is a distinctly anti-secular model for ID’s entry into public education, as its 
director, CSC fellow John Mark Reynolds, affirms: “Torrey . . . is at war 
with the modern culture. Torrey does not want to ‘get along’ with 
materialism, secularism, naturalism, post-modernism, radical feminism, or 
spiritualism. We want to win over through service every facet of the culture, 
from the arts to the sciences, for the Kingdom of Christ.”238 Reynolds’ 
comments reflect Wedge Strategy goals precisely. 
 234. See FORREST & GROSS, supra note 88, at 270–73.  
 235. Mark Hartwig, The Meaning of Intelligent Design, BOUNDLESS, July 18, 2001, at 
http://www.boundless.org/2000/features/a0000455.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2004). 
 236. See Biola University: Torrey Honors Institute, at http://www.arn.org/colleges/biola.htm (last 
visited Mar. 6, 2004). 
 237. The other college is Oklahoma Baptist University. See ID Colleges, at http://www.arn.org/ 
college.htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2004). Biola made ID even more integral to its curriculum by adding 
a master’s degree in religion and science: “This program is a component of the educational wing of the 
ID movement, which also includes Biola’s Torrey Honors Institute.” See Intelligent Design Theory 
and Biola University, at http://www.biola.edu/id/about.cfm (last visited Mar. 12, 2004).  
 238. John Mark Reynolds, Origin of Torrey, at http://www.biola.edu/academics/torrey/about/ 
reynolds.cfm (last visited Mar. 6, 2004).  
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B. ID as Traditional Creationism 
In 1996, when the CRSC needed to build its religious support base, 
Wells, one of its first fellows, openly called ID proponents creationists: “The 
most vocal advocates of design in the creation-evolution controversies . . . are 
creationists . . . such as . . . Phillip E. Johnson . . . [who] charg[e] 
evolutionists with misusing science as a platform for their atheistic 
beliefs.”239 But with a secure base and financial support, the Wedge must 
now portray ID as constitutional; hence Dembski’s denial on Metanexus, a 
website for a broader, more diverse audience, that ID is creationism.240 In an 
interview by D. James Kennedy, when Dembski tried to disconnect ID from 
creationism and religion, Kennedy got the point quickly: 
Kennedy: . . . Darwinian advocates use the term [intelligent design] 
differently than those . . . actually associated with the movement. How 
is it used by Darwinians? What’s the difference? 
Dembski: Well, the phrase “intelligent design,” you mean. I think the 
Darwinians will want to identify intelligent design with 
creationism. . . . [T]here’s a crucial distinction. . . . Intelligent design is 
. . . friendly to the Christian doctrine of creation, but they’re not 
identical. . . .  
Kennedy: Well, . . . there are several advantages to that. . . . [I]t keeps 
them [Darwinian advocates] from throwing intelligent design out . . . 
of the courts as being merely religious, which they have frequently 
done, in Arkansas and the Supreme Court, saying creation is religious 
and evolution is scientific.241
As the ID movement assumes a more public profile and is more subject to 
the hoped-for legal challenge, its strategy has evolved. Certain of a challenge 
 239. Jonathan Wells, Issues in the Creation-Evolution Controversies, WORLD & I, Jan. 1996, 
http://www.worldandi.com/public/1996/january/ar6.cfm (last visited Apr. 14, 2004). 
 240. See Dembski, supra note 86. 
 241. Radio interview by D. James Kennedy with William A. Dembski, Truths that Transform 
(Feb. 25, 2002). Kennedy’s Coral Ridge Ministries mission is “to evangelize, nurture Christian growth 
through biblical instruction, and act in obedience to the Cultural Mandate by applying the truth of 
Scripture to all of life, including civic affairs.” Coral Ridge Ministries: About Coral Ridge Ministries, 
at http://www.coralridge.org/about_crm.htm (last visited Mar. 6, 2004). Kennedy has begun his own 
“creation evangelism” program in partnership with the Creation Studies Institute (CSI) and is actively 
promoting ID. See Coral Ridge Ministries Launches Creation Outreach, IMPACT (Coral Ridge 
Ministries), May 2004, at http://www.crministries.org/impact/2004_May_Pg1.htm (last visited May 
26, 2004); see also Creation Studies Institute, at http://www.creationstudies.org (last visited May 26, 
2004); Intelligent Design in the Classroom, FASTFACTS: CREATION V. EVOLUTION (Ctr. for 
Reclaiming Am., Ft. Lauderdale, FL.), at http://www.reclaimamerica.org/pages/fastfacts/creation 
evolution.pdf (last visited May 26, 2004) (Kennedy’s promotion of ID). 
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if a gullible or politically unscrupulous school board can be persuaded to 
teach ID, proponents now use semantic subterfuge toward this end: Both ID 
leaders and supporters sanitize their language, cleansing it of references to 
God and even to ID itself. Denying that ID is creationism, they use 
seemingly innocuous euphemisms for “intelligent design,” knowing the term 
will now arouse opposition from lawsuit-wary (or principled) board 
members. Ohio is an exemplary case of such linguistic chicanery.  
ID proponents’ Ohio strategy began with infiltrating the science standards 
writing team and promoting ID as “intelligent design” to the Ohio Board of 
Education. John Calvert of Intelligent Design Network (IDnet), a Wedge 
auxiliary, urged the standards committee to allow teaching the “Design 
Hypothesis.”242 Ohio ID supporter Robert Lattimer joined the writing team to 
make sure ID was considered: “Our main contention is that these standards 
. . . leave no room for the possibility that part of nature can be designed.”243 
Lattimer and Calvert urged that “intelligent design . . . be included in the 
curriculum.” Board member Michael Cochran wanted ID in the standards: 
“Mr. Cochran recommended that alternative standards . . . include . . . 
intelligent design theory.”244 But facing opposition, Stephen Meyer suddenly 
offered a “compromise,” asking the board merely to “permit” teachers to 
“teach the controversy” about evolution rather than require ID. The board 
compromised by allowing a benchmark requiring students to know how 
scientists “critically analyze aspects of evolutionary theory,” a euphemism 
for teaching ID criticisms of evolution.245 (Johnson confirmed Wells’s early 
candor by declaring the concession a victory for “divine creation.”246) ID 
supporters were then allowed to write a lesson for the benchmark and used 
this opportunity to structure ID into the lesson.247 Since ID is not in 
 242. See John H. Calvert, Remarks to the Standards Committee of the Ohio State Board of 
Education (Jan. 13, 2002), at http://www.IntelligentDesignNetwork.org/ohioboardtalk.htm (last visited 
Mar. 15, 2004). 
 243. See David Lore, Ohio Closer to Standards for Teaching of Evolution, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, 
Jan. 31, 2002, at 4C (concerning Lattimer on the writing team). 
 244. See Robert Lattimer & John Calvert, Intelligent Design is a Matter of Academic Freedom, 
CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Jan. 18, 2002 (concerning intelligent design cirriculum); see also Science 
Excellence for All Ohioans, The Ohio Firestorm of 2002, at http://www.sciohio.org/firestorm.htm (last 
visited Mar. 16, 2004) (concerning Cochran). SEAO is the Ohio affiliate of IDnet, thus an ID 
advocacy organization.  
 245. See Stephen C. Meyer, Teach the Controversy, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Mar. 30, 2002 
(concerning Meyer’s proposal); Kenneth R. Miller, Goodbye, Columbus, REP. OF THE NAT’L CENTER 
FOR SCI. EDUC., Jan.–Apr. 2002, at 6. The board inserted a disclaimer after this benchmark, but it 
failed to deter ID supporters. See infra notes 424–30 and accompanying text. 
 246. See Phillip E. Johnson, A Step Forward in Ohio, TOUCHSTONE, Jan.–Feb. 2003; see also 
FORREST & GROSS, supra note 88, at 227–38 (concerning Ohio).  
 247. See infra notes 424–30 and accompanying text; see also Ohio Dep’t. Educ., CRITICAL 
ANALYSIS OF EVOLUTION, GRADE 10, at http://www.ode.state.oh.us/academic_content_ 
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legitimate science sources, students would nonetheless find such “evidence” 
easily—a Google search for “evidence challenging evolution” yields a 
wealth of ID material. Despite Ohio Citizens for Science’s efforts to delete 
the lesson, the board approved it. Knowing a legal challenge loomed, 
Lattimer kept his public response aligned with the new strategy: “Our 
opposition has . . . paint[ed] this lesson as something that promotes 
religion—intelligent design, creationism or both . . . . It . . . has no content 
that is religious at all. It’s totally science.”248 Yet Lattimer had earlier termed 
the “critical analysis” compromise as a victory for which “the real credit goes 
to God.”249  
Focus on the Family had sent letters to 128,000 Ohioans supporting the 
Wedge’s effort to alter the standards. The Religious Right now applauded 
again, seeing the true implications but preserving the verbal façade, as long-
time Religious Right activist Phyllis Schlafly did: “There is nothing 
religious, or about creationism, or even about intelligent design in the new 
Ohio standards . . . . The new lesson encourages students to consider both 
supporting and ‘challenging’ evidence for evolution.”250 Such support shows 
that, in the long run, the ID movement comprises far more than the Wedge. It 
is broad and deep, with supporters from Georgia to California, from the 
national to the local level. All view the movement as religious. 





(last visited Mar. 18, 2004). Other euphemisms are “objective origins,” in a policy that was almost 
adopted in Darby, Montana, and Discovery Institute’s pleas in Texas for teaching evolution’s 
“strengths and weaknesses.” See Michael Moore, Darby Schools OK “Objective Origins,” 
MISSOULIAN, Feb. 3, 2004, at http://www.missoulian.com/articles/2004/02/03/news/top/news01.txt 
(last visited Apr. 14, 2004); see also Bruce Chapman, How Should Schools Teach Evolution? Don’t 
Forget Weaknesses in Theory, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 21, 2003, http://www.discovery.org/ 
scripts/viewDB/index.php?program=CRSC&command=view&id=1574 (last visited Apr. 14. 2004); 
Michael Moore, Darby Rejects “Objective Origins” Supporters, MISSOULIAN, May 5, 2004, 
http://www.missoulian.com/articles/2004/05/05/news/mtregional/news06.txt (last visited May 26, 
2004). Still another is in a Minnesota bill calling for state science standards to require students to know 
how “new evidence can challenge . . . accepted theories and models including . . . [the] theory of 
evolution.” H.F. 2558, 83rd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2003–2004) (emphasis added).  
 248. Jim Brown, Ohio Schools Adopt Curriculum Critically Challenging Evolution, AGAPE 
PRESS, Mar. 12, 2004, at http://headlines.agapepress.org/archive/3/122004b.asp (last visited Mar. 
19,2004). 
 249. Clem Boyd, Loosening Darwin’s Grip, CITIZEN (Focus on the Family), Mar. 2003, 
http://family.org/cforum/citizenmag/coverstory/a0024918.cfm (last visited Apr. 14, 2004). 
 250. Phyllis Schlafly, Ohio Lesson Plan Pleases Parents, Irks Apostles of Darwin, HUM. EVENTS, 
Mar. 18, 2004, at http://www.humaneventsonline.com/article.php?id=3305 (last visited Mar. 18, 
2004); see also Boyd, Loosening Darwin’s Grip, supra note 249. These responses typify Religious 
Right support of ID. 
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(1) belief in . . . creation . . . by a supernatural designer and . . . the 
designer’s continuing intervention . . . ; (2) . . . anti-evolutionism . . . 
on theological, moral, ideological, and political, but never scientific 
grounds; (3) criticism of . . . methodologies underpinning . . . scientific 
evidence for . . . evolution . . . without presenting for peer-review any 
competing theory . . . ; and (4) . . . grounding of anti-evolutionism in 
. . . scripture. (citation omitted) And . . . the . . . political effort to 
influence and . . . rewrite school science curricula.251
ID thus interfaces seamlessly with traditional creationism. All of Dembski’s 
key arguments were prefigured by Norman Geisler, a creationist witness in 
the 1981 Arkansas trial.252 Forrest and Gross show that ID grew directly out 
of 1980s progressive creationism (“PC”), epitomized in a 1984 article, The 
Trustworthiness of Scripture in Areas Relating to Natural Science, by CRSC 
fellows Walter Bradley and Charles Thaxton. Dembski’s complex specified 
information and Behe’s “molecular machines” are also prefigured in PC.253  
ID is also continuous with the most regressive creationism: Dembski’s 
anti-evolutionism mirrors that of YECs Duane Gish and Henry Morris. He 
lists as “intractable” problems for natural selection and “any other undirected 
natural process” 
the origin of life, . . . the genetic code, . . . multicellular life, [and] . . . 
sexuality, the absence of transitional [fossil] forms . . . , the 
[Cambrian] biological big bang, . . . the development of complex 
organ systems and . . . irreducibly complex molecular machines.254
Gish and Morris cited the same putative problems in 1978 and 1974, 
respectively. Further, ID’s anti-naturalism is presaged in Gish’s attacks on 
science’s “materialistic, naturalistic explanation for the origin of all living 
things.”255 Both ID and YEC also charge that teaching only evolution 
violates academic freedom, and both market creationist textbooks as 
scientific supplements to public school texts.256 Moreover, Johnson’s 
definition of creationism is virtually identical to Morris’s. Morris calls the 
 251. FORREST & GROSS, supra note 88, at 283–90.  
 252. See PENNOCK, supra note 91, at 250–52; Pennock, The Wizards of Id, supra note 200, at 650; 
see also Trial Transcript, McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255 (E.D. Ark. 1982), 
available at http://www.antievolution.org/projects/mclean/new_site/index.htm (last visited Mar. 6, 
2004).  
 253. See FORREST & GROSS, supra note 88, at 276–81 (concerning ID and PC). 
 254. Dembski, supra note 84, at 13, 22–23.  
 255. See Pennock, Creationism and Intelligent Design, supra note 200, at 143, 155. 
 256. See FORREST & GROSS, supra note 88, at 284–87. Morris’s book is Scientific Creationism 
(1974) and the ID book is Of Pandas and People (1993). See supra notes 66, 156. 
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“creation model . . . (1) supernaturalistic; (2) externally directed; (3) 
purposive, and (4) completed.”257 Johnson defines creationism as belief that 
“a supernatural Creator not only initiated this process [of creation] but in 
some meaningful sense controls it in furtherance of a purpose.”258 Johnson’s 
control is Morris’s external direction. And since Johnson rejects 
macroevolution, allowing “microevolution” only within species, he, like 
Morris, views creation as completed. 
Johnson’s minimalist definition may appear to include theistic evolution 
(“TE”), the view that God created life through evolution, but this 
inclusiveness is deceptive, since he applies the definition selectively. ID 
rejects TE, definitively marking it as creationism. Johnson speaks 
dismissively of well-known theistic evolutionists and charges, “Theistic 
evolutionists generally accept the entire Darwinian scientific picture, but say 
that God was invisible and undetectably behind it.”259 ID, however, insists 
upon the designer’s empirical detectability. He calls TE “a false dream that 
we can . . . give in to the world, and yet still hold a little bit of 
Christianity.”260 Dembski rejects TE even more emphatically. Employing his 
well-known hedging and self-contradiction, he declares ID “compatible with 
everything from . . . discontinuous creation (e.g., God intervening at every 
conceivable point to create new species) to the most far-ranging evolution 
(e.g., God seamlessly melding all organisms together into one great tree of 
life)”—i.e., theistic evolution.261 He then retreats, equating TE with atheism: 
“That said, intelligent design is incompatible with . . . ‘theistic evolution’ . . . 
[which] is no different from atheistic evolution. . . . Within theistic evolution, 
God is a master of stealth who . . . eludes our . . . efforts to detect him 
empirically.”262 In 1995, he proclaimed, “Design theorists are no friends of 
theistic evolution. . . . [TE] is American evangelicalism’s ill-conceived 
accommodation to Darwinism.”263 He has also called TE ID’s “most 
implacable foe.”264 But there is no more religiously acceptable reconciliation 
 257. SCIENTIFIC CREATIONISM, supra note 156, at 11. 
 258. Johnson, Darwin on Trial, supra note 73, at 4 n.1. This definition is the minimalist 
creationism that Johnson says unites believers in a Creator. It dates from the early 1990s, when 
Johnson was not yet treating ID and creationism as distinct, but distinguishing between creationism 
and naturalism. See FORREST & GROSS, supra note 88, at 282–84.  
 259. See JOHNSON, WEDGE OF TRUTH, supra note 73, at 65, 89. 
 260. Interview by Hank Hanegraaff, supra note 228.  
 261. DEMBSKI, supra note 118, at 109. 
 262. Id. at 110. Despite superficial attempts to cast ID as mainstream science, Dembski must 
always reveal his true position so as not to alienate ID’s creationist supporters. 
 263. William A. Dembski, What Every Theologian Should Know About Creation, Evolution and 
Design, PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL REV., Mar. 1996, available at http://www.arn.org/docs/dembski/ 
wd_theologn.htm (last visited on Mar. 6, 2004). 
 264. Dembski, supra note 163. Rejecting TE is part of Dembski’s objection to “this tendency to 
lump [design theorists] with fundamentalism as opposed to placing them squarely within the 
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of evolution and theism than TE; most Christians and Jews endorse it.265 
Since ID proponents obviously do not reject theism, rejecting TE equals 
rejecting evolution. Johnson confirms this outright, declaring both that 
“evolution is not true” and that “evolution is basically a hoax.”266  
1. ID’s Creationist Supporters 
Another significant indication of ID’s creationist identity is support by 
other creationists, who recognize it as creationism and share its goals. 
Despite differences, YECs are ID’s (sometimes uneasy) allies and promoters; 
they would not do this unless the Wedge Strategy advanced their own 
agenda. Ashby Camp, of the Creation Research Society, acknowledges 
advantages in an ID-YEC partnership:  
If the science establishment can be forced to acknowledge . . . 
intelligent design, theism will become part of the ‘post-Christian’ 
cultural air . . . [A] new set of options will open . . . one of which will 
be biblical creation. If ID is successful in changing the culture, the 
presumption against the supernatural will be eliminated. . . . I 
definitely see the ID movement as an ally.267  
ID supporter Hal Ostrander, in the Feb./Mar.1998 SBC Life, spoke with what 
appeared to be firsthand knowledge of an early version of The Wedge 
Strategy and referred to Wedge members by name as “Creationists, one and 
all.”268 Bob Marsh of the YEC Creation Science Fellowship of Pittsburgh 
praised Johnson in CSF’s newsletter.269 Henry Morris’s successor John 
Morris, while suspicious that ID does not go far enough by promoting 
 
 
mainstream of American evangelicalism,” indicating his preference for the latter. See Dembski, supra 
note 263. 
 265. See Eugenie C. Scott, Creationism, Ideology, and Science, in THE FLIGHT FROM REASON, 
775 Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences (June 24, 1996), available at 
http://www.ncseweb.org/resources/articles/5200_creationism_ideology_and_sci_6_24_1996.asp (last 
visited July 8, 2005); National Center for Science Education, Statements from Religious 
Organizations, in VOICES FOR EVOLUTION, at http://www.ncseweb.org/resources/articles/7445_ 
statements_from_religious_org_12_19_2002.asp (last visited July 8, 2005). 
 266. Johnson made these statements, respectively, in Peter Hastie, Designer Genes, AUSTRALIAN 
PRESBYTERIAN, Oct. 2001, at 7, and an interview by Hank Hanegraaff, supra note 228. 
 267. Ashby Camp, The Intelligent Design Movement: An Ally?, CREATION MATTERS (Creation 
Res. Soc’y), Nov.–Dec. 1999, at 8. This newsletter also contains an article by Wells and other ID-
related pieces.  
 268. See Hal Ostrander, Intelligent Design Theory: A Powerful Tool in Confronting Darwinism, 
SBC LIFE, Feb.–Mar. 1998 (on file with the National Center for Science Education). 
 269. See Bob Harsh, The Wedge of Truth: The Beginning of the end for Neo-Darwinism’s Cultural 
[sic], ORIGINS INSIGHT, Mar. 2001, available at http://web.archive.org/web/20010817021310/ 
http://www.csfpittsburgh.org/Mar01.PDF (last visited July 8, 2005). 
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Christianity (we refute this), calls ID a “major player” and supports its 
efforts.270 Carl Baugh, notorious even among other creationists for 
intellectual dishonesty, publicly championed ID, hosting Dembski at a YEC 
event: “Intelligent design is an honest, bona fide, unbiased, academic 
research program. . . . If we . . . want answers for the data . . . , intelligent 
design embraces the potential for eternity.”271 There are many such 
examples. 
ID’s religious, creationist identity is clear. Its constitutional protection 
derives only from the Free Exercise Clause's protection of private religious 
preference, but the Establishment Clause prohibits teaching it in public 
school science classes.  
III. A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO THE SCIENTIFIC CLAIMS OF INTELLIGENT 
DESIGN 
Any evaluation of ID must take its dual nature—both as a putative 
direction for scientific inquiry and as an organized political movement—into 
account. William Dembski recognizes this when he acknowledges that the 
movement’s explanatory program does not exist beyond its political and 
cultural context: 
Two animating principles drive intelligent design. The more popular 
by far takes intelligent design as a tool for liberation from ideologies 
that suffocate the human spirit, such as reductionism and materialism. 
The other . . . principle, less popular but more intellectually 
compelling, takes intelligent design as the key for opening up fresh 
insights into nature. The first of these . . . principles is purely 
instrumental—it treats intelligent design as a tool for attaining some 
other end (like defeating materialism). Presumably if other tools could 
more effectively accomplish that end, intelligent design would be 
abandoned.272
When he discusses “intelligent design as the key for opening up fresh 
insights into nature,” to what is Dembski referring? The evidence for ID as a 
tool for achieving a political goal could hardly be stronger. Is there similar 
evidence for any scientific content to ID? 
 270. John Morris, Cracks Are Widening in Evolution’s Dam!, ACTS AND FACTS (Institute for 
Creation Research), May 2002, available at http://www.icr.org/pdf/af/af0205.pdf (last visited July 9, 
2005). 
 271. For documentation of these alliances and YEC support, see FORREST & GROSS, supra note 
88, at 290–95. 
 272. Dembski, supra note 199. 
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The central scientific assertions of the ID movement are: (1) that a 
purposeful agent is necessarily involved in certain natural processes and (2) 
that there are objective methods for detecting design in nature. The first claim 
is concerned with features of the natural world not adequately explained by 
modern science, and assumes that those features will remain inexplicable 
without invoking a designer. (In this regard ID resembles a “god-of-the-
gaps” argument.) The second claim is that methodologies have been 
developed that can unambiguously detect the presence of this designer in 
natural processes. There are no specific scientific claims for ID beyond these. 
The vagueness of this position allows the movement to include among its 
ranks those that believe in an earth that is 6000 years old as well as those that 
accept a modern cosmological model, and everyone in between.273
In spite of this vagueness the leaders of the ID movement work hard to 
convince the public that there is some content to ID beyond its politically 
motivated “instrumental principle,” and that the claims of ID may be brought 
into the scientific mainstream. In a recent review, DeWolf, Meyer, and 
DeForrest emphasized this when they identified three salient questions about 
a hypothetical curriculum addressing the “Origins Controversy” from an ID 
perspective.274 The first and most important was: Is the ID curriculum 
scientific?275
The questions DeWolf, Meyer, and DeForrest posed are founded on at 
least three unsupported assumptions. First, they assume that there is in fact a 
scientific “origins controversy.” Second, they assume that ID can contribute 
to the resolution of the controversy in a manner consistent with good 
scientific practices. Finally, they assume that teaching ID is currently 
possible and that an ID science curriculum is more than a hypothetical case 
study.276 As we shall see, all three of their assumptions are false. 
 273. In fact the ID “hypothesis” is so scrupulously vague that it cannot distinguish between the 
science-fiction origins scenarios of the Raelians and the literal six-day creation story of Genesis. 
 274. See DeWolf, Meyer & DeForrest, Teaching the Origins Controversy, supra note 87, at 45–
46. 
 275. The other questions addressed are whether the content of the curriculum religious in nature 
and whether such a curriculum would be considered protected speech. Id. 
 276. William Dembski and Paul Nelson acknowledge that there is currently nothing to teach. See 
supra note 231 and accompanying text.  
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A. What Constitutes Controversy? 
In an important sense, it is the very existence of controversy that drives 
scientific progress.277 The scientifically useful controversy generates new 
ideas, models, or approaches. Controversies are similarly important to the 
teaching of science as a dynamic and vital process: pedagogically useful 
controversies illustrate the salient points in the curriculum and generate 
interest among the students. Not every controversy is necessarily useful 
however. Many conflicts do not contribute to greater understanding, but 
serve to confuse rather than illuminate. 
The distinction between controversies that are productive and those that 
are trivial can best be understood by briefly examining some examples. The 
first of these is from twentieth century evolutionary biology, and shows how 
controversies are handled in that field specifically. This controversy 
challenged a basic tenet of evolutionary theory as it was then understood, and 
during the course of the dispute a large amount of dialog took place in the 
scientific literature. The debate has led to a more complete view of the 
evolutionary process. 
A second example is the medical “controversy” about the causative agent 
of human Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (“AIDS”). Though not a 
question in evolutionary biology, this controversy is included because it 
shares several elements with the “origins controversy”. After a brief 
recounting of these two controversies, we examine the “origins controversy” 
to determine its status and potential for influence within science. 
1. The “Endosymbiosis” Controversy 
Lynn Margulis’ theory of endosymbiosis also seemed to challenge the 
neo-Darwinian “Modern Synthesis.”278 In Margulis’ theory, many complex 
subcellular structures in eukaryotic cells had a mutualistic (or cooperative 
symbiotic) origin.279 She argued that complex organelles, such as 
mitochondria, might not have evolved from simpler cellular structures along 
a pathway of gradually increasing complexity.280 Rather, Margulis’ insight 
 277. See THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1970). This idea has 
fueled countless conspiracy theories, and “overturning the dominant paradigm” has become the 
philosophical justification for almost every modern “crank science” advocate. For a discussion of how 
the ID movement misrepresents and misappropriates Kuhn’s, see PENNOCK, supra note 91, at 206–14. 
 278. See Lynn Sagan, On the Origin of Mitosing Cells, 14 J. THEORETICAL BIOLOGY 255–74 
(1967); see also LYNN MARGULIS, ORIGIN OF EUKARYOTIC CELLS (1970).  
 279. Eukaryotes are complex cells that have “organelles,” specialized membrane-bound 
substructures. Examples include fungi, paramecia, and the cells of unicellular and multicellular plants 
and animals (including humans). They are contrasted with simple prokaryotic cells, such as bacteria. 
 280. MARGULIS, supra note 278, at 2. 
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was that mitochondria and other cellular structures resemble degenerate 
prokaryotic cells, and that they could well have originated when one 
primitive cell encapsulated another.281 Thus, in a sudden leap in complexity, 
a fundamentally new type of cell originated.282
Such an endosymbiotic event could not be explained by quantitative 
population genetics; its proposal fell far outside the simple gradualist model 
by which evolutionary change was then described. Margulis was vehemently 
opposed for many years.283 However, initial skepticism was overcome by 
several strongly suggestive observations. The subcellular structure of certain 
organelles does indeed resemble that of prokaryotic cells.284 More 
importantly, several classes of organelles were discovered to have their own 
genomes—DNA that they use to code for certain proteins specific to their 
function.285 These genomes have the structure one would expect of 
degenerate prokaryotes.286 Finally, many other clear instances of 
endosymbiosis have since been discovered.287 In the light of such evidence, 
all of her former critics have been won over. 
That Margulis’ astonishing hypothesis was initially rejected should not be 
surprising. However, neither should its eventual acceptance as irrefutable 
data accumulated. The reason endosymbiosis theory became part of the 
understanding of the evolutionary process is that Margulis proposed a 
specific, testable hypothesis with significant, practical implications. That is, 
she committed herself and her theory to a specific outcome. Her hypothesis 
was not a vague statement of the inadequacy of current evolutionary science 
to explain certain patterns (although this would in some sense have been 
true). Rather, it was a robust statement, entailing a definite outcome, that 
could be and was tested. When the tests matched the prediction, 
endosymbiosis became part of the expanded understanding of evolution.288
As with other legitimate controversies, endosymbiosis has commanded 
great scientific interest, much being written both pro and con. This is 
apparent in the citation index for Margulis’ 1970 book outlining the theory: 
 281. See id. at ch.2. 
 282. See id. 
 283. For a review of the controversy’s history, see JOEL B. HAGEN ET AL., DOING BIOLOGY 
(1996). 
 284. See supra note 281. 
 285. See id. 
 286. See id. 
 287. Hajime Ishikawa, Insect Symbiosis: An Introduction, in INSECT SYMBIOSIS (Thomas A. 
Miller ed., 2003); Geoffrey Ian McFadden, Primary and Secondary Endiosymbiosis and the Origin of 
Plastids, 37 J. PHYCOLOGY 951 (2001).  
 288. See supra note 283. 
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751 citations, peaking in 1981 with 44, with a long commanding presence in 
the literature.289
2. The “HIV/AIDS” Controversy 
The controversy over endosymbiosis commanded the attention of large 
numbers of researchers for a long period of time. The second example 
illustrates a different kind of controversy. Although it had a biomedical 
subject, the controversy quickly became independent of any particular line of 
scientific questioning. Rather, the “HIV/AIDS” controversy moved into the 
sphere of public debate and turned upon issues of academic freedom and 
research priorities.290
The main proponent of the idea that the human immunodeficiency virus 
(“HIV”) is not the causative agent of acquired immune deficiency syndrome 
(“AIDS”) has been Peter Duesberg, a successful and well-respected 
researcher in cancer biology. In 1987 he published a paper in Cancer 
Genetics that included his views that HIV was a benign “passenger virus” 
that simply happened to associate with cases of AIDS.291 At the time little 
was known about either the virus or AIDS epidemiology, and Duesberg’s 
proposal was not particularly far-fetched. However, the majority of scientific 
researchers soon came to believe that the evidence was strong for a causal 
link between HIV and AIDS. 
By 1988, the controversy had escaped the bounds of the scientific 
community, and Duesberg was using the popular press to attack his research 
colleagues as part of the “AIDS establishment.”292 To most AIDS 
researchers, Duesberg’s arguments were “constructed by selective reading of 
the scientific literature, dismissing evidence that contradict[ed] his theses, 
requiring impossibly definitive proof, and dismissing outright studies marked 
by inconsequential weaknesses.”293 At the same time, it was noted that the 
AIDS reappraisal movement had attracted several participants in the “culture 
wars,” including the journalist Tom Bethell (also a skeptic of relativity and 
evolution) and prominent advocates of ID Phillip E. Johnson and Jonathan C. 
Wells, of the Discovery Institute.294 (Wells’s publisher, Regnery Press, also 
 289. Science Citation Index search conducted Feb. 14, 2004. 
 290. The HIV/AIDS controversy is reviewed in Jon Cohen, The Duesberg Phenomenon, 266 
SCIENCE 1641–44 (1994).  
 291. Peter H. Duesberg, Retroviruses as Carcinogens and Pathogens: Expectations and Reality, 
47 CANCER RES. 1199 (1987). 
 292. See supra note 290. 
 293. Id.  
 294. See Johnson’s and Wells’ signatures on the statement by “The Group” at The Group for the 
Scientific Reappraisal of the HIV-AIDS Hypothesis, at http://www.virusmyth.net/aids/group.htm (last 
visited Feb. 26, 2004) [hereinafter The Group].  
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published Duesberg’s book, which contended that the HIV explanation for 
AIDS is the result of a massive government and industrial conspiracy.295) 
The reappraisers made little headway among scientists, but took their 
message directly to the public; for example, issuing petitions questioning the 
link between HIV and AIDS.296
The HIV-AIDS deniers have not made a convincing case for any 
particular alternative cause (i.e., other than HIV) for AIDS. The deniers 
contend that in Africa and other developing nations, AIDS is the result of 
malnutrition and unspecified “tropical diseases”.297 They propose that in the 
US and other developed nations, it is the result of “lifestyle” decisions (such 
as drug use or sexual behavior) or even that it is caused by anti-retroviral 
drugs.298 Such ad hoc explanations do not strengthen the deniers’ case, but 
they do further frustrate researchers who are already poorly disposed to the 
purely negative argument that HIV does not cause AIDS. 
The HIV/AIDS controversy became very visible in the public sphere, but 
it has had little presence in the scientific world. Although it is conceivable 
that this relative absence may be due to censorship by the biomedical 
establishment, as Duesberg has claimed,299 it is more likely, as his critics 
contend, that the scientific work presented by HIV reappraisers is simply not 
rigorous or interesting enough to warrant a response. Whatever the reason, 
Duesberg’s HIV skepticism has not been a significant scientific controversy. 
All that can be said is that there remains a very small group of hard-core 
skeptics. While the HIV/AIDS “controversy” makes interesting reading in 
philosophy or sociology, Duesberg’s scientific beliefs are clearly not 
significant enough to be part of a biology course. 
3. The “Origins Controversy” 
How does the “Origins Controversy” compare to genuine scientific 
controversies? Has there been any scientific impact of the ID movement’s 
seminal publications as compared to legitimate controversies? Examining the 
literature one finds that the “Origins Controversy” has a less significant 
scientific presence than even the “HIV does not cause AIDS” controversy.300
 295. PETER H. DUESBERG, INVENTING THE AIDS VIRUS (1997).  
 296. See supra note 290. 
 297. See id. 
 298. See id. 
 299. See id. 
 300. Science Citation Index and PubMed searches for citations of Behe, Darwin’s Black Box; 
Dembski, The Design Inference: Eliminating Chance Through Small Probabilities; Dembski, No Free 
Lunch; and Denton, Evolution: A Theory in Crisis were compared with citations to Duesberg’s 1987 
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Michael Behe’s Darwin’s Black Box is perhaps the seminal work of the 
modern ID movement. Although its primary audience is the general public, it 
is the work most cited in the scientific literature, and its author is a tenured 
biochemist at a research university.301 The book incorporates Behe’s idea of 
“Irreducible Complexity,” which has become a fundamental ID concept, 
cited as being of major importance by nearly every ID advocate.302
In the eight years since publication, Darwin’s Black Box has been cited 50 
times in the scientific literature. Its peak citation rate (to date) was ten 
citations each in 2002 and 2003.303 This rate is not declining but does not 
increase at anywhere near the scale seen in other controversies: Darwin’s 
Black Box has not even been cited in the scientific literature as much 
Duesberg’s paper. Its citation rate is almost an order of magnitude smaller 
than that of legitimate controversies. More significantly, the content of these 
papers does not indicate a vibrant scientific controversy. A large number of 
the papers that cite Behe’s book are refutations, rather than incorporations or 
applications of the ideas he proposes.304 Several others cite the book 
specifically in the context of the political and cultural controversy. The other 
“seminal works” of ID are likewise lacking in the scientific literature. In fact, 
the combined citation rates for four foundational works of ID305 had fewer 
than half of the citations generated by Margulis’ single paper over a similar 
period. 
Searching the scientific literature for concepts and terms specific to ID 
yields sparse results. From the two major databases of scientific literature no 
more than 17 papers came up that used any of four ID-specific terms in an 
ID-specific sense.306 Of these, at least five were critical reviews of the ID 
program and two were Behe’s responses to criticism. This result contrasts 
with that of a keyword search for a genuine controversy in evolutionary 
biology: the term “endosymbiosis” yielded 369 references.307
Lack of scientific attention need not imply anything about an idea’s truth 
or falsity. The only conclusion that can be drawn is that scientists, rightly or 
wrongly, have not generally discussed that particular idea—implying that 
 
 
paper in Cancer Research, supra note 291. Search conducted February 14, 2004. 
 301. Department of Biology, Lehigh University. See Michael J. Behe, Ph.D., at http:// 
www.lehigh.edu/~inbios/behe.html (last visited Aug. 2, 2005). 
 302. See FORREST & GROSS, supra note 88, at 78. 
 303. Science Citation Index search conducted February 14, 2004 
 304. See supra notes 289, 300. 
 305. BEHE, supra note 72; DEMBSKI, supra note 135; WILLIAM A. DEMBSKI, THE DESIGN 
INFERENCE: ELIMINATING CHANCE THROUGH SMALL PROBABILITIES (1998); MICHAEL DENTON, 
EVOLUTION: A THEORY IN CRISIS (1985). 
 306. BIOSIS and PubMed searches for the terms “Intelligent Design,” “Complex Specified 
Information”, “Specified Complexity” and “Irreducible Complexity” conducted February 14, 2004. 
 307. See supra notes 289, 300. 
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there is no significant controversy. If it exists, the “origins controversy” does 
not appear in scientific discourse. The scientific claims of the ID movement’s 
claims must therefore be considered, charitably, as provisional.308
What, then, can be said about the “origins controversy”? The basis of this 
supposed controversy lies in a hodge-podge of dissatisfactions with various 
aspects of neo-Darwinian evolutionary theory, origin-of-life research, and 
even modern cosmology and astrophysics. Of the examples discussed, the 
“origins controversy” most closely resembles the dispute that questions HIV 
as the primary cause of AIDS.309 Like the HIV-AIDS debate, the “origins 
controversy” exists only on the fringes of established science. Both 
controversies survive by seizing upon unresolved details and magnifying 
their impact out of all reasonable proportion. And both are almost entirely 
invisible in the scientific forum, contributing nothing to the understanding of 
their respective fields. 
The “controversy” about origins is cultural and political rather than 
scientific or medical.310 In order to press the case for preferential treatment in 
science classes, though, advocates in the ID movement must attempt to 
convince the courts and public that a true scientific controversy exists. 
4. Inventing a Controversy 
As we have seen, the “origins controversy” does not exist in the scientific 
literature. Now let us look at how ID proponents, led by the Discovery 
Institute, are misrepresenting science to try to make it appear otherwise, 
using petitions and commissioned polls, magazine and law review articles, 
popular books, and bibliographies. 
 308. It might be argued that the “origins controversy” exists as a scientific controversy in a more 
diffuse form than the group selection controversy, i.e., the founding document (analogous to Wynne-
Edwards’ 1962 book) may not have been written yet. See V. C. WYNNE-EDWARDS, ANIMAL 
DISPERSION IN RELATION TO SOCIAL BEHAVIOR (1962). Although Wells advances the idea that there 
is a general, vague dissatisfaction with evolutionary theory, no single research group is competent to 
challenge the entire multidisciplinary paradigm. 
 309. The Discovery Institute circulated a statement challenging Darwinian evolution: “We are 
skeptical of claims for the ability of random mutation and natural selection to account for the 
complexity of life. Careful examination of the evidence for Darwinian theory should be encouraged.” 
See A Scientific Dissent from Darwinism, at http://www.discovery.org/articleFiles/PDFs/100 
ScientistsAd.pdf. This statement is very similar to that circulated by the HIV/AIDS reappraisers: 
It is widely believed by the general public that a retrovirus called HIV causes the group diseases 
called AIDS. Many biochemical scientists now question this hypothesis. We propose that a 
thorough reappraisal of the existing evidence for and against this hypothesis be conducted by a 
suitable independent group. We further propose that critical epidemiological studies be devised 
and undertaken. 
See The Group, supra note 294.  
 310. See PENNOCK, supra note 91, at 37–42. 
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To begin with a recent example, DeWolf, Meyer, and DeForrest claim 
that there is an “origins controversy” on the following grounds: 
(1) The currently known mechanisms of modern evolutionary biology, 
including random mutation, recombination, migration and other 
effects of population structure, symbiosis, sexual selection, natural 
selection, genetic drift, etc., are inadequate to explain biological 
process and pattern. Furthermore, no possible future mechanisms will 
ever be able to account for this process and pattern so long as these 
mechanisms exclude the possibility of supernatural intervention. 
(2) There is so much significant scientific dispute about these ideas 
that an overhaul of basic scientific methodology is warranted.311
They buttress these claims with footnotes referring to the primary 
scientific literature. For example, they argue that “[t]he neo-Darwinian 
mechanism of natural selection acting on random variations does not seem 
sufficient to produce . . . novel organs and morphological structures (such as 
wings, feathers, eyes, echo location, the amniotic egg, skin, nervous systems 
and multicellularity).”312 They cite H.A. Orr and J.A. Coyne’s paper with the 
provocative title The Genetics of Adaptation: A Reassessment as evidence for 
this claim.313 Should the reader believe that Orr and Coyne doubt the ability 
of neo-Darwinian mechanisms to produce novel structures? Not if one 
actually reads the paper, which stands in direct contradiction to this 
interpretation. Orr and Coyne wrote about an altogether separate controversy 
in evolutionary biology—the average size of mutational effects during the 
course of adaptation. They conclude that mutations of large effect might play 
a bigger role in adaptive processes than once thought.314 They are indeed 
discussing a controversy, but the fact that it is not germane to the “origins 
controversy” that DeWolf, Meyer, and DeForrest have in mind does not deter 
the latter from presenting it as though it were. DeWolf, Meyer, and DeForrest 
give the work of Stephen Jay Gould, Niles Eldredge, Douglas Futuyma, 
Jaques Monod, and many other evolutionary biologists the same 
mistreatment.315 Their criterion for citing a scientific paper appears to be the 
extent to which the title suggests a controversy—and apparently any 
controversy will do.316
 311. See DeWalf, Meyer & DeForrest, supra note 87, at 50–56. 
 312. Id. at 50–51. 
 313. H. Allen Orr & Jerry A. Coyne, The Genetics of Adaptation: A Reassessment, 140 AM. 
NATURALIST 725 (1992).  
 314. See id. at 738. 
 315. See DeWolf, Meyer & DeForrest, supra note 87, at 55. 
 316. This improper use of scientific citations is not limited to Discovery Institute fellows. In an 
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The Discovery Institute frequently engages in this kind of 
misrepresentative “quote-mining.” During a fractious dispute over teaching 
ID in March 2002, the Discovery Institute submitted to the Ohio Board of 
Education a “Bibliography of Supplementary Resources for Ohio Science 
Education.”317 The document’s introduction suggested that the papers 
referenced were genuinely contrary to modern evolutionary theory: “The 
publications represent dissenting viewpoints that challenge one or another 
aspect of neo-Darwinism (the prevailing theory of evolution taught in 
biology textbooks), discuss problems that evolutionary theory faces, or 
suggest important new lines of evidence that biology must consider when 
explaining origins.”318 However, a much different story emerged when the 
authors of the papers were contacted. A survey of authors by the National 
Center for Science Education revealed that DI had seriously misrepresented 
the publications’ significance and conclusions. NCSE reported that none of 
the survey respondents (representing 34 of the 44 publications in the 
Bibliography) considered their work to provide scientific evidence for ID or 
against evolution.319 Furthermore, more than half of the respondents 
considered the summaries in the DI Bibliography to be “inaccurate and 
tendentious.”320 Only after these inaccuracies were published did the 
Discovery Institute add a disclaimer to its bibliography: “The publications 
are not presented either as support for the theory of intelligent design, or as 
indicating that the authors cited doubt evolution.”321  
In addition to misquotes and misinterpretations, several claims made by 
ID advocates cannot be rigorously evaluated because either they are not 
clearly defined or are not derived from an identifiable scientific field. 
According to proponents of the “origins controversy,” the neo-Darwinian 
mechanism—an ID euphemism for natural selection—cannot account for 
“novel specified genetic information” or “‘irreducibly complex’, or 
 
 
egregious instance of quote-pruning, Behe misrepresents Orr and Coyne by citing only the first half of 
a particular sentence, the remainder of which completely changes the argument’s conclusions. See 
Matthew J. Brauer & Daniel R. Brumbaugh, Biology Remystified: The Scientific Claims of the New 
Creationists, in INTELLIGENT DESIGN CREATIONISM AND ITS CRITICS: PHILOSOPHICAL, 
THEOLOGICAL, AND SCIENTIFIC PERSPECTIVES 289–334 (Robert T. Pennock ed., 2001).  
 317. Press Release, National Center for Science Educatiion, CRSC Claims Intelligent Design 
Scientists Author Bibliography Papers (Apr. 7, 2002), at http://www.ncsewe.org/resources/news/2002/ 
OH/627_crsc_claims_intelligent_design_4_7_2002.asp (last visited Aug. 2, 2005). 
 318. See Nat’l Ctr. for Sci. Educ., Analysis of the Discovery Institute’s Bibliography of 
Supplementary Resources for Ohio Science Instruction, at http://www.ncseweb.org/media/Analysis-
of-the-Discovery-Institute.pdf (last visited May 22, 2005). 
 319. See supra note 317. 
 320. Id.  
 321. Id. 
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‘functionally integrated’ molecular machines and systems.”322 It is difficult to 
know what to make of this claim, since it is founded entirely on an 
idiosyncratic vocabulary with no standard biological meaning. The citation 
for “irreducible complexity,” for example, is from Behe’s Darwin’s Black 
Box,323 written for a general audience. The term appeared only five times in a 
recent search of the BIOSIS scientific database; two entries were Behe’s 
responses to his critics.324 Behe has revised the definition of “irreducible 
complexity” several times since introducing it in 1996, partly in response to 
criticisms that it employs an argument of “truth by definition.”325 Despite his 
acknowledgement of the concept’s inappropriateness for addressing 
evolutionary questions,326 Behe and other ID advocates proceed unhindered 
in promoting the idea’s validity.  
With their invented controversy, ID advocates claim to be pushing the 
frontiers of scientific exploration. The implicit assumption is that the 
controversy is useful, that it is not merely a political controversy, and that the 
ID movement can have a productive role in its resolution. The following 
sections examine the scientific credibility of the approaches the ID 
movement takes to address their self-styled and hypothetical “origins 
controversy.” It is quite apparent that even if there were a scientific “origins 
controversy,” the ID movement would not be scientifically equipped to 
address it in any meaningful way. 
B. Intelligent Design’s Contributions to the “Origins Controversy” 
1. Retreat from Objectivity: The Pseudo-scientific Methodology of ID 
ID asserts that the simple “appearance of design” can be used as evidence 
for the historical presence of design and for the resulting inference of the 
designer’s existence. The modern incarnation of ID attempts to refine this 
ancient idea by attempting to formalize the meaning of “appearance of 
design,” conceding that some things look designed but aren’t. The criterion 
for design thus requires that an object look very designed, that there be a 
quantitative scale of the appearance of design, and that objects at the extreme 
end of that scale are, in fact, designed artifacts.327 The only method that ID 
 322. See DeWolf, Meyer & DeForrest, supra note 87, at 51. 
 323. BEHE, supra note 72.  
 324. BIOSIS search done 14 February 2004 
 325. PENNOCK, supra note 91, at 266.  
 326. Michael Behe, Reply to My Critics: A Response to Reviews of Darwin’s Black Box, 16 
BIOLOGY & PHILOSOPHY 685–709 (2001).  
 327. The success or failure of the modern program rides on this point, for without it only the 
imagery and rhetoric of Paley’s arguments from analogy remain. 
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advocates have devised for identifying these objects is in the form of a 
negative argument by elimination. That is, they rely on the false assertion 
that either some current naturalistic model for the origin of an object is 
correct, or that their “intelligent design” inference is.328 This negative 
argumentation has substantial problems, not least of which is that it relies 
upon a false dichotomy. Even if all currently known mechanisms for an 
object’s origin are not convincing, other undiscovered scenarios are certainly 
possible. 
With what he calls his “explanatory filter,” Dembski claims to have 
provided a methodology for “rigorously” testing design in an object or 
event.329 He proposes that this method is immune to “false positives”; that is, 
if it indicates that something is designed, then it actually is.330 The argument 
is based upon the filtering of an event or object through a hierarchy of 
questions. The first asks if the phenomenon is the product of regularity; that 
is, whether the phenomenon arises as the inevitable outcome of deterministic 
physical laws.331 For example, a phenomenon that meets the “regularity” test 
is a planet’s elliptical orbit around its sun. If the phenomenon is the product 
of regularity, it is not designed. 
Second, if a phenomenon is not the product of the inevitable operation of 
natural laws, might it be the product of stochastic factors, i.e., chance? For 
example, a single die roll coming up with a six would not be a product of 
natural law, but would be considered an event occurring with some 
reasonable probability. That event, the product of chance, would not be 
considered designed. 
Of course, very rare events do happen. This leads to the explanatory 
filter’s third criterion: if an event is “specified” as well as having very low 
probability, then the filter will conclude that the event is the product of 
design.332 By “specification,” Dembski means that object or event has some 
prior determinable characteristic that identifies it as somehow unique among 
all other possible outcomes.333 Although 25 coin flips all coming up heads is 
no less likely than any other particular sequence, there is something unique 
about the outcome. 
There are fundamental technical and conceptual problems with this 
approach to determining the “designedness” of a phenomenon, a few of 
 328. See PENNOCK, supra note 91, at ch.4. 
 329. See DEMBSKI, supra note 305.  
 330. See DEMBSKI, supra note 135, at 25. 
 331. See DEMBSKI, supra note 118, at 134. 
 332. See id. 
 333. See id. 
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which will be addressed here.334 First, there is no objective method of 
evaluating whether it is “specified.” Dembski implies that a biological 
system that has a function analogous to that of a human artifact is specified. 
However, the “functions” of biological systems depend on the context in 
which they are evaluated. Is the “function” of a rainforest to produce oxygen, 
to maintain high levels of global biodiversity, or to provide land and 
employment for impoverished farmers? Furthermore, our understanding of 
“specification” will change with a change in our knowledge. The geological 
formation known as the “face on Mars” looks uncannily like a human face in 
the early Viking orbiter photos.335 More recent photographs show that the 
face-like shape was an illusion.336 Does this mean that the “face on Mars” 
was a “specified” phenomenon until recently? If so, then the “explanatory 
filter” could conceivably have labeled it “designed,” only to reverse that 
judgment when the new photographs arrived. This scenario contradicts the 
“no-false-positives” claim. 
A second problem with the filter is that its concept of design is 
profoundly idiosyncratic and limited. In Dembski’s filter, “design” does not 
have its usual meaning, but rather is defined negatively as “the set-theoretic 
complement of the disjunction of regularity-or-chance.”337 This means that 
design is by default anything that is not the product of either regularity or 
chance. 
This constricted definition is problematic for scientists, for the simple 
reason that it appropriates as “designed” everything that is neither wholly 
random nor completely inevitable.338 More specifically, Dembski’s filter 
 334. For additional criticism, see PENNOCK, supra note 91, at 94–96, 250–63; Brandon Fitelson et 
al., How Not to Detect Design, in INTELLIGENT DESIGN CREATIONISM AND ITS CRITICS 597–615 
(Robert T. Pennock ed., 2001); Peter Godfrey-Smith, Information and the Argument From Design, in 
INTELLIGENT DESIGN CREATIONISM AND ITS CRITICS 575–96 (Robert T. Pennock ed., 2001); Robert 
T. Pennock, Creationism and Intelligent Design, 4 ANN. REV. GENOMICS & HUM. GENETICS 143 
(2003); Robert T. Pennock, Mystery Science Theater: The Case of the Secret Agent, NAT. HIST. 77 
(Apr. 2002); Robert T. Pennock, The Wizards of ID, in INTELLIGENT DESIGN CREATIONISM AND ITS 
CRITICS 645 (Robert T. Pennock ed., 2001); Howard J. Van Till, “Intelligent Design” Theory: Two 
Viewpoints, 34 ZYGON 667 (1999); John S. Wilkins & Wesley R. Elsberry, The Advantages of Theft 
Over Toil: The Design Inference and Arguing from Ignorance, 16 BIOLOGY & PHIL. 709 (2001); 
David Wolpert, William Dembski’s Treatment of the No Free Lunch Theorems is Written in Jello, at 
http://www.talkreason.org/articles/jello.cfm (last visited May 22, 2005). 
 335. See NASA, Unmasking the Face on Mars: New High-resolution Images and 3D Altimery 
from NASA’s Mars Global Surveyor Spacecraft Reveal the Face on Mars for What it Really Is: A 
Mesa, at http://science.nasa.gov/headlines/y2001/ast24may_1.htm (last visited Aug. 2, 2005). 
 336. Id. 
 337. DEMBSKI, supra note 305, at 36. 
 338. The definition is problematic even for other design theorists. Del Ratzsch offers a thorough 
critique of Dembski’s notion of design in the appendix of Nature, Design and Science: the Status of 
Design in Natural Science. See DEL RATZSCH, NATURE, DESIGN AND SCIENCE: THE STATUS OF 
DESIGN IN NATURAL SCIENCE 153–68 (2001). Ratzsch’s criticisms have yet to be substantively 
addressed.  
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classifies as “intentionally designed” every complex phenomenon that is the 
product of interactions between chance and regularity—a set that explicitly 
includes nearly all evolutionary phenomena!339 This is nothing less than 
conceptual sleight-of-hand. Following Dembski’s filter for any complex 
biological system will result in a decision of “designed,” no matter how 
extensive the evidence that the system arose through the interactions of 
mutation, genetic drift, and natural selection.  
Even ignoring these problems, there is another serious problem that arises 
in implementing this method: it is extremely difficult to objectively 
determine the probability that even a relatively simple phenomenon arises by 
chance. For example, suppose one wanted to calculate the probability that 
solar eclipses visible from Earth could occur. In order for us to see a solar 
eclipse, several conditions must be met that relate the sun and moon’s size 
and distance from Earth.340 We might need to calculate the probabilities for: 
1. a moon of some size being formed by some primordial event; 
2. the moon’s moving away from the Earth at some rate; and 
3. our happening to exist at a time, determined by the moon’s size and 
rate of retreat, during which the moon’s apparent size is roughly equal 
to the sun’s apparent size. 
The number and variety of circumstances that need to be considered for even 
this simple, non-biological case are astronomical. And there are many other 
possible scenarios to account for the visibility of solar eclipses from Earth. 
The probability we assign to the phenomenon depends crucially on which of 
these models we choose for its origin. If we are not relatively certain of the 
mechanism by which the phenomenon actually originated, we cannot assign 
a probability to the phenomenon’s origination. 
How does Dembski propose to calculate the probability of a phenomenon 
arising by chance? In his only biological example of the explanatory filter in 
action, he argues that, despite an ignorance of the causal processes leading to 
the bacterial flagellum, the uniform probability distribution is sufficient.341 
 339. Analogously, no psychologist believes that intelligence is due either to nature or to nurture. 
Instead, it is well understood that intelligence is the product of multiple interactions between genetics 
and environment. For a critique (with references) of Dembski on this point, see FORREST & GROSS, 
supra note 88, at 122–41.  
 340. The precise conditions for a solar eclipse will be discussed in any basic college astronomy 
textbook. A good online explanation is Fred Espenak, Solar Eclipse for Beginners, at http:// 
www.mreclipse.com/Special/SEprimer.html (last visited Aug. 2, 2005). 
 341. In the solar eclipse example, this would be equivalent to calculating the probability that the 
diameters of two disks drawn at random would happen to be very close in size.  
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This approach is disturbingly naïve, for it ignores the models evolutionary 
biologists have proposed for the evolutionary origins of such structures. In 
essence, Dembski’s method says, in effect: “Draw random proteins from a 
pool, stick them together, and count how often you get a flagellum.”342 If the 
probability of getting a flagellum from this process is sufficiently low, then 
the flagellum must have been designed.343 But no biologist thinks that this is 
how the flagellum actually evolved! Dembski ignores known processes that 
have been invoked to explain evolutionary complexity. He then demonstrates 
that his own contrived and simplistic model of flagellar evolution is 
unlikely—and hence that the structure must have been designed!344
The methodology of Dembski’s “explanatory filter” is as unworkable for 
adherents to its assumptions as for those who find its arguments specious. 
Tellingly, the “explanatory filter” has been applied to a real-world problem in 
biology precisely once: in Dembski’s book, No Free Lunch. Even very 
simple real-world examples (such as snowflakes or terrain features) have 
proven intractable to analysis by the filter. Dembski has rationalized his 
failure to apply the filter to real problems by claiming that only certain kinds 
of problems are amenable to treatment by the filter.345 This tactic severely 
undermines his claim that the filter will not attribute design where there is 
none (the “no false positives claim”).346 By excluding from analysis any 
phenomenon that is known to be natural but appears designed, ID advocates 
stack the deck in favor of the filter. And, as with the application of the filter 
generally, no objective method is given for determining which phenomena 
are “unsuitable” for the filter. 
DeWolf, Meyer, and DeForrest claim that “[Dembski’s] ‘explanatory 
filter’ constitutes, in effect, a scientific method for detecting the effects of 
intelligence”347 is simply wrong. It cannot be applied with any objectivity or 
precision. And, according to its author, all it “detects” is a phenomenon’s 
placement in a set that excludes the strictly random and the completely 
determined. 
 342. This account is a simplified but fundamentally accurate statement of Dembski’s method of 
calculation. 
 343. See DEMBSKI, supra note 135, at 289. 
 344. Id. 
 345. For example, those problems for which a naturalistic explanation has not yet been 
discovered. 
 346. See RATZSCH, supra note 338, at 153–68. 
 347. See DeWolf, Meyer & DeForrest, supra note 87, at 61. 
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2. Retreat from Rigor: The Vagueness of ID Theories 
If, as ID purports, it is more than just a 200-year-old rehash of Reverend 
Dr. Paley’s design arguments, then it must do more than simply restate in 
info-jargon terms that “if it really looks designed, it probably is.” Yet ID’s 
major intellectual conceits reduce to precisely this vague criterion. 
Examination of the primary “argument from design” shows why 
incorporating the formal propositions of ID into a scientific research program 
will be an exercise in frustration. According to DeWolf, Meyer, and 
DeForrest, a scientific investigator who wants to develop a research program 
within an ID framework should make use of the following sort of argument: 
(1) High information content (or specified complexity) and irreducible 
complexity constitute strong indicators or hallmarks of past intelligent 
design. 
(2) Biological systems have a high information content (or specified 
complexity) and utilize subsystems that manifest irreducible 
complexity. 
(3) Naturalistic mechanisms or undirected causes do not suffice to 
explain the origin of information (specified complexity) or irreducible 
complexity. 
(4) Therefore, [intelligent design] constitutes the best explanation for 
the origin of information and irreducible complexity in biological 
systems.348
However, the would-be ID scientist will find that several terms in this list 
need elucidation: “specified complexity,” which is more or less equivalent to 
“high information content,” and “irreducible complexity,” which is somehow 
related to specified complexity. Unless those neologisms define something 
more specific than the trait “appears designed,” ID distills merely to the 
conjecture that this appearance of design is a reliable metric for evaluating 
actual design. 
The second term, “irreducible complexity” (“IC”), is actually the older 
sibling of “specified complexity.” Although complexity is traditional 
creationist parlance, Michael Behe first described IC at length as applying to 
the molecular level.349 His idea as presented in Darwin’s Black Box was that 
 348. Id. at 95 (citations omitted). 
 349. See BEHE, supra note 72; see also HENRY M. MORRIS, SCIENTIFIC CREATIONISM 59 (1974) 
(a 30-year-old young-earth creationist discussion of irreducible complexity). 
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some complex structures might exhibit a property whereby the removal of 
any of its parts destroys its function.350 Behe’s favorite analogy of this 
property is a mousetrap. Take away any part (spring, latch, or trigger) and the 
mousetrap no longer functions, he claims. If the function of a complex 
molecular structure is sensitive to such a removal, it also shows IC. The idea 
behind IC is that it supposedly prohibits a stepwise accumulation of parts. If 
IC is present at any point in a structure’s development, then by definition the 
structure at an earlier stage can not function. This fact, Behe argues, 
introduces an impenetrable barrier to the evolution of complex biochemical 
structures. If these structures cannot have evolved, they must have been 
designed. 
The concept of IC seems straightforward, but it suffers from fundamental 
misunderstandings of how evolution is thought to occur. In particular, an IC 
function is a problem for evolution only if structures evolve by improving the 
self-same pre-existing function. Most biologists do not think evolution 
operates solely in this simple, direct way.351 Selection acts on the variation 
available at that time, which will typically involve different functions. The 
result is a process that can be exquisitely indirect. Behe concedes that his 
definition of IC precludes only a particular kind of direct evolution.352 He 
responds that indirect evolution is unlikely, so the argument still holds.353 
However, as he has never presented any argument against indirect 
evolutionary pathways, his treatment amounts to two sentences of mere 
assertion. In light of the vast evidence for indirect evolutionary pathways and 
the many plausible models for this process, Behe’s denial seems willfully 
contrarian.354 It also reduces his argument to one of personal incredulity.355
Like Behe, Dembski presents shifting targets to critics and would-be ID 
students alike. The first term in DeWolf, Meyer, and DeForrest’s exposition 
of ID (“specified complexity,” “complex specified information,” or “CSI”) is 
a familiar one: it is the foundation for Dembski’s “explanatory filter.” 
Objects exhibit CSI if they are unlikely to occur by chance (i.e., they are 
 350. See BEHE, supra note 72, at 39. 
 351. See PENNOCK, supra note 91, at 266. 
 352. See Behe, supra note 326. 
 353. Id. 
 354. For reviews and citations of counterexamples, see Richard H. Thornhill & David W. Ussery, 
A Classification of Possible Routes of Darwinian Evolution, 203 J. THEORETICAL BIOLOGY 111 
(2000); Matt Inlay, Evolving Immunity: A Response to Chapter 6 of Darwin’s Black Box, available at 
http://www.talkdesign.org/faqs/Evolving_Immunity.html (last visited May 22, 2005); Nicholas J. 
Matzke, Evolution in (Brownian) Space: A Model for the Origin of the Bacterial Flagellum, available 
at http://www.talkdesign.org/faqs/flagellum.html (last visited May 22, 2005). 
 355. The problems discussed here represent just a few of the many recent criticisms of Behe’s 
contributions to the ID movement by scientists and philosophers of science. See supra note 200 for an 
extensive list of references. 
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improbable according to some distribution function) and if they have some 
“pre-defined” characteristic making them worthy of notice.356 Problems with 
the concept of CSI go beyond the difficulties inherent in trying to use it 
objectively with the “explanatory filter.” Among the most problematic is the 
fact that CSI is not necessarily related to either complexity or information. 
Dembski at times seems uncertain about what he himself means by the term: 
at times he applies it as a quantitative measure, and at others as a discrete 
property.357
Quite frequently, he introduces novel concepts from disparate fields in 
idiosyncratic (and often incorrect) ways. For instance, the title of one of his 
recent books alludes to his assertion that a proof from computer science 
bolsters his claims for the necessity of design in biological systems.358 The 
“No Free Lunch” theorems Dembski appropriates are technical statements 
about specific kinds of heuristic and evolutionary computational searches.359 
They have stringent sets of assumptions that are unlikely to hold in real 
instances of organismal evolution. In his review of Dembski’s book, one of 
the originators of the theorems says this about their applicability: 
Indeed, throughout there is a marked elision of the formal details of 
the biological processes under consideration. Perhaps the most glaring 
example of this is that neo-Darwinian evolution of ecosystems does 
not involve a set of genomes all searching the same, fixed fitness 
function, the situation considered by the NFL theorems. Rather it is a 
co-evolutionary process. Roughly speaking, as each genome changes 
from one generation to the next, it modifies the surfaces that the other 
genomes are searching. And recent results indicate that NFL results do 
not hold in co-evolution.360
Indeed, recent, particularly elegant computational studies demolish 
Dembski’s claims that evolution can do no better than random searches and 
that complex specified information cannot arise by natural processes.361
In another remarkably grandiose argument, Dembski goes so far as to 
claim for himself the discovery of a new physical law: the “Law of 
 356. DEMBSKI, supra note 135, at 142. 
 357. See Elsberry & Shallit, supra note 135; Godfrey-Smith, supra note 334, at 575–96. 
 358. See DEMBSKI, supra note 135.  
 359. See David H. Wolpert & William G. MacReady, No Free Lunch Theorems for Search, 1 
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON EVOLUTIONARY COMPUTATION 67 (1997).  
 360. Wolpert, supra note 334.  
 361. See Richard E. Lenski et al., The Evolutionary Origin of Complex Features, 423 NATURE 
139 (2003). 
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Conservation of Information.”362 In its particulars, this “law” relies upon a 
flawed analogy between the development of biological complexity and 
communications theory, and suffers from the persistent lack of objective 
definitions.363 In general, it merely enshrines that old creationist intuition that 
complexity cannot increase without purposeful intervention.364 Dembski’s 
putative “Law of Conservation of Information,” in contrast to the three laws 
of thermodynamics, has no useful role in developing any productive 
scientific theory. 
DeWolf, Meyer, and DeForrest cite Dembski’s and Behe’s works to 
assert that “the propositional content of design theory differs significantly 
from that of scientific creationism.”365 In this they are correct up to a point, 
but not for the reasons that they might argue. Contrasting their propositions 
of ID with those to which “creation science” is committed is instructive: 
(1) There was a sudden creation of the universe, energy, and life from 
nothing. 
(2) Mutations and natural selection are insufficient to bring about the 
development of all living kinds from a single organism. 
(3) Changes in the originally created kinds of plants and animals occur 
only within fixed limits. 
(4) There is a separate ancestry for humans and apes. 
(5) The earth’s geology can be explained via catastrophism, primarily 
by the occurrence of a worldwide flood. 
(6) The earth and living kinds had a relatively recent origin (on the 
order of ten thousand years ago).366
These propositions do indeed differ in some respects from those advanced by 
ID. However, it is not because the latter has added any substantive content. 
Instead, ID has differentiated itself from “creation science” only by purging 
 362. This trait—proposing new physical laws of one’s own discovery—has been identified by 
some as a hallmark of the crackpot. See Robert L. Park, The Seven Warning Signs of Bogus Science, 
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Jan. 31, 2002, available at http://chronicle.com/prm/weekly/v49/i21/ 
21b02001.htm (last visited May 22, 2005); see also FORREST & GROSS, supra note 88, at 140–41 
(noting Dembski’s citation of a biblical origin for his Law of Conservation of Information).  
 363. See Mark Perakh, A Consistent Inconsistency: How Dr. Dembski Infers Intelligent Design, 
available at http://www.talkreason.org/articles/dembski.cfm (last visited May 22, 2005). 
 364. An alternative view is that all information currently existing in all organisms was placed in 
the universe at the beginning of time. 
 365. DeWolf, Meyer & DeForrest, supra note 87, at 94. 
 366. Id. (quoting RONALD NUMBERS, THE CREATIONISTS, at x (1991)).  
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its propositions (at least overtly) of troubling religious content, leaving only 
the first two points.367
Despite their precise-sounding technical jargon, the modern ID 
movement’s assertions are instead less specific and therefore less subject to 
testing than those of the scientific creationists. And while it can admit many 
features of modern evolutionary theory, the core constituency of ID can just 
as easily admit the entirety of the “creation science” paradigm.368 ID is a thus 
loosening of limits to such an extent that a concept like descent with 
modification is on equal scientific footing with a literal six-day creation. By 
resorting to vagueness, ID becomes merely “creationism lite,” a weaker 
version of its predecessor, young-earth creationism. A theory of origins that 
does not distinguish between an Earth that is 4 billion years old and one that 
is one-millionth of that age does not deserve the label “scientific.”369
3. Retreat from Exposure: How ID Shields Itself from Scientific 
Criticism 
Since the methodological and theoretical content of ID is nil, it should not 
be surprising that scientists associated with the movement are unwilling (or 
unable) to present any kind of research—empirical or otherwise—to the 
broader scientific community. ID researchers’ retreat from the normal venues 
of scientific conversation is by itself damning evidence of ID’s lack of utility 
or scientific credibility. 
This is not to say that ID-friendly scientists have made no substantive 
contributions to the scientific literature, but that their published manuscripts 
in rigorously reviewed scientific journals do not substantially use any ID 
ideas or methods.370 Instead, ID advocates’ peer-reviewed output comprises 
thoroughly standard experiments in biochemistry or cell biology from the 
labs of two or three researchers.371 In a few cases, ID advocates’ publications 
have been claimed as contributing evidence for design. However, closer 
examination (e.g., of papers Jonathan Wells co-authored) reveals no such 
thing.372
 367. DeWolf, Meyer, and DeForrest’s rejection of “naturalistic mechanisms” as insufficient to 
explain the origin of information indirectly invokes a supernatural explanation. See supra note 297.  
 368. See FORREST & GROSS, supra note 88, at 275–87.  
 369. In this regard ID is less scientific than “scientific creationism,” which at least makes specific 
and testable (if wrong) claims such as that of the Earth’s young age. 
 370. For example, the body of Behe’s research—as distinct from his philosophical writings—
contains no reference to Intelligent Design. 
 371. This is due, in part, to the fact that most of the publicly-active ID advocates are not practicing 
scientists. 
 372. See, e.g., Brian A. Rowning et al., Microtubul-mediated Transport of Organelles and 
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ID leaders know the benefits of submitting their work to independent 
review and have established at least two purportedly “peer-reviewed” 
journals for ID articles.373 However, one has languished for want of material 
and quietly ceased publication, while the other has a more overtly 
philosophical orientation. Both journals employ a weak standard of “peer 
review” that amounts to no more than vetting by the editorial board or 
society fellows.374
Dembski and Behe have explicitly declared their intent to avoid the peer-
review process, as the Chronicle of Higher Education relates: 
Mr. [Kenneth] Miller also wonders why Mr. Behe, a member of the 
American Society for Biochemistry and Molecular Biology, has never 
presented his ideas at its annual conference, which is his right. “If I 
thought I had an idea that would completely revolutionize cell biology 
in the same way that Professor Behe thinks he has an idea that would 
revolutionize biochemistry,” he says, “I would be talking about that 
idea at every single meeting of my peers I could possibly get to.” 
Mr. Behe responds that he prefers other venues. “I just don’t think that 
large scientific meetings are effective forums for presenting these 
ideas,” he says. 
Baylor’s Mr. Dembski also has little interest in publicizing his 
research through traditional means. “I’ve just gotten kind of blasé 
about submitting things to journals where you often wait two years to 
get things into print,” he says. “And I find I can actually get the 
turnaround faster by writing a book and getting the ideas expressed 
 
 
Localization of B-catenin to the Future Dorsal Side of Xenopus Eggs, 94 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 
U.S. OF AM. 1224 (1997); Carolyn A. Larabell et al., Confocal Microscopy Analysis of Living Xenopus 
Eggs and the Mechanism of Cortical Rotation, 122 DEV. 1281–89 (1996).  
 373. Other “peer-reviewed,” overtly sectarian journals (such as Creation Research Society 
Quarterly and the Geoscience Research Institute’s Geoscience Reports) are not included here. 
 374. Access Research Network’s online journal, Origins and Design, has had no new issues since 
Spring 2000. See Access Research Network, Origins and Design, at http://www.arn.org/odesign/ 
odesign.htm (last visited May 22, 2005). Progress in Complexity, Information and Design (“PCID”) is 
published by Dembski’s International Society for Complexity, Information, and Design (“ISCID”), 
founded in 2001. ISCID fellows are drawn almost exclusively from ID proponents. Papers are 
submitted through ISCID’s online archive for discussion in its “Brainstorms” forum “for discussing 
novel intuitions, speculations, hypotheses, conjectures, arguments, and data related to complex 
systems that have yet to be developed into full-fledged research projects.” See ISCID, at 
http://www.iscid.org/boards (last visited May 22, 2005). It is open to the public with registration and 
permits pseudonymous discussants. Submissions can be published in PCID on the recommendation of 
only one of ISCID roughly fifty fellows, who comprise the editorial board. See ISCID Forums, at 
http://www.iscid.org/boards (last visited May 22, 2005); see also PCID, at http://www.iscid.org/ 
pcid.php (last visited May 22, 2005).  
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there. My books sell well. I get a royalty. And the material gets read 
more.”375
These attitudes are inimical to the traditional peer-review mechanism of 
scientific publishing, which remains the standard way of communicating 
results within the scientific community. Instead of seeking a source of 
royalties or trying to communicate with a wide general audience, scientists 
publish in professional scientific journals in order to submit their ideas and 
work to scrutiny by other scientists. Often these other scientists are 
competitors, who may be ambivalent or even hostile to the author’s claims. 
This speeds up the progress of science: if a manuscript passes muster with 
scientists outside the author’s circle of friends, chances are improved that 
unintentional bias or wishful thinking will be purged from the work. 
A similar process happens in scientific meetings: the scientist stands 
before an audience of discriminating peers and describes his or her work and 
conclusions. Questions are often fierce and probing. The experience can 
sometimes be unpleasant, but the work is usually improved through such 
interactions with critical audiences. That Dembski, Behe, and others think 
their work is not ready for widespread critical evaluation is not particularly 
surprising. But this hesitance by ID’s leading advocates reveals the 
fundamental weaknesses of their putative scientific program—namely, that it 
does not actually exist. 
Given the practical criteria for good science, how should ID be judged? Is 
there a clear methodology available to those who would practice “ID 
science”? Are ID’s research findings open to criticism and evaluation by 
capable peers who have no stake in the outcome? Have the ideas and 
concepts been thoroughly tested and calibrated against actual, not merely 
hypothetical, empirical cases? Finally, is there coherent, freely available 
literature on ID’s experimental and theoretical results? 
The answer to all of these questions is “no.” In the end ID does not 
measure up to any standard for a scientific theory. It is a conjecture or, more 
precisely, a set of mutually exclusive and incompatible conjectures. The 
closest ID gets to a coherent body of theory are the ideas embodied in the 
terms “irreducible complexity” and “complex specified information.” Even 
here, though, as we have seen, key elements of the concepts are distressingly 
pliable. 
 375. See Beth McMurtrie, Darwinism Under Attack, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Dec. 21, 2001, 
available at http://chronicle.com/free/v48/i17/17a00801.htm (last visited May 22, 2005). The article 
devaluing peer-review that Dembski commissioned Frank Tipler to write is an attempt to evade 
criticism for ID advocates’ failure to publish in mainstream science journals. See supra note 197. 
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C. A Vast Scientific Wasteland 
1. Why teach ID? 
The key ideas and artifices of “Intelligent Design Theory” are all but 
absent in modern scientific literature. The motivating problem for ID, the 
“origins controversy,” likewise can barely be found in scientific journals and 
books. ID’s major proponents are neither seen nor heard at scientific 
conferences where their specialties are discussed and debated. Since ID is a 
no-show at the scientific roundtable, why would any science educator take 
seriously an ID curriculum (if it existed)? Dembski provides his reasons: 
(1) Evolutionary biology has been so hugely unsuccessful as a 
scientific theory in accounting for the origin of life and the emergence 
of biological complexity that it does not deserve a monopoly 
regardless what state of formation ID has reached. 
(2) ID is logically speaking the only alternative to evolutionary 
biology. Either material mechanisms can do all the work in biological 
origins or some telic process is additionally required.  
(3) Why should ID supporters allow the Darwinian establishment to 
indoctrinate students at the high school level, only to divert some of 
the brightest to becoming supporters of a mechanistic account of 
evolution, when by presenting ID at the high school level some of 
these same students would go on to careers trying to develop ID as a 
positive research program . . . [If ID is going to succeed as a research 
program,] it will need workers, and these are best recruited at a young 
age. The Darwinists understand this. So do the ID proponents. There 
is a sociological dimension to science and to the prospering of 
scientific theories, and this cannot be ignored if ID is going to become 
a thriving research program.376  
In this passage, notable for its candor, Dembski admits that the decision to 
teach from ID-based curricula in high school science classes is and should be 
independent of ID’s scientific achievements. But looking beyond Dembski’s 
stated motivations (i.e., using an ID curriculum as an ID indoctrination and 
recruitment tool), one faces the conundrum of how to implement this 
educational plan. If ID cannot yet offer to a high school science curriculum 
even a “thriving research program,” not to mention a body of settled science, 
what can it offer? Dembski’s first two points summarize what is available to 
 376. Dembski, supra note 230; see also Barry, supra note 231.  
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those who would teach ID as science: (1) evolutionary biology is 
unsuccessful; and (2) ID is the only logical alternative to evolutionary 
biology. These points (with minor conceptual frills) constitute the totality of 
the ID research program and, by extension, of the ID science curriculum. 
The first point contains the scientific (though vague and incorrect) claim 
that evolutionary biology has been unsuccessful at explaining biological 
diversity. Dembski’s second point, though, contains a logical fallacy 
frequently committed by ID advocates and other creationists. He equates 
“evolutionary biology” with the sum of all possible naturalistic or 
materialistic explanations. Thus, it is not true that “ID is logically speaking, 
the only alternative to evolutionary biology,” as Dembski claims.377 The 
Darwinian paradigm of natural selection taught in biology class is just one of 
many possible mechanisms by which biological change might occur.378 Prior 
to Darwin, many competing theories of organic change existed.379 In order to 
correct the fallacy, Dembski might have said: “Either natural processes are 
sufficient, or supernatural processes are required.” In the end, this is no 
different than the fallacious “dual-model” argument advanced by classic 
creation science.380 In any case, it is difficult to see how these claims could 
possibly form the foundation of a science curriculum. 
2. How to teach ID? 
Dembski’s insistence that, in ID’s case, a curriculum may precede 
development of the discipline makes teaching ID problematic for even the 
most ardent supporters. The paucity of theoretical content and the outright 
absence of empirical content in the ID research program is reflected in the 
absence of quality teaching materials on which to base a scientific 
curriculum. Dembski recognized this absence in his October 2002 call for 
“basal biology” textbooks and other ID curriculum materials.381 The few 
educational texts available are either religious in nature, riddled with 
scientific error, or so rhetorical or apologetic in stance as to be completely 
inappropriate for high school science students.382 The remainder of this 
 377. See Dembski, supra note 230. 
 378. Examples of these include the unsuccessful—for example, theories of Lamarckian 
inheritance, see MICHAEL RUSE, THE DARWINIAN REVOLUTION 5 (1979)—as well as the successful—
for example, endosymbiosis, see supra note 281. 
 379. See RUSE, supra note 378, at 132–59. 
 380. See PENNOCK, supra note 91, at 181–83. 
 381. See Dembski, Disciplined Science, supra note 199.  
 382. The standard text presented as a model for an ID curriculum is DAVIS & KENYON, supra note 
66. Extensive critiques (some longer than the book itself) are available through the National Center for 
Science Education. See Nat’l Ctr. for Sci. Educ., Resources, at http://www.ncsewelb.org/article.asp? 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss1/1










                                                                                                                        
section examines one of the less overtly religious books that is considered the 
basis for an ID curriculum. 
Jonathan Wells’ Icons of Evolution has been promoted as a possible 
supplement to high school and college biology texts.383 In it Wells claims 
that evolutionary biology depends on a few key examples—the “icons” of his 
title—and that, since these examples are flawed, evolution should not be 
taught as fact. For these icons Wells presents caricatures of actual research 
results, and he frequently misrepresents and misunderstands the research 
findings.384 More disturbingly, he bases much of his analysis on alleged 
errors and simplifications in the treatment of evolutionary topics in—of all 
things—high school and undergraduate textbooks.385 The problems that 
distress Wells are trivial to non-existent, but he uses his invented errors to 
conclude that the presentation of evolution in most textbooks is flawed.386 
From this he further concludes that atheist-materialist conspirators are 
intentionally teaching fraudulent science to students and exhorts his readers 
to political activism.387 The book is a long, negative argument against various 
aspects of evolutionary science. Wells proposes no new models or possible 
means of reconciling observed discrepancies. He makes no attempt at 
synthesis and advances no argument of positive value. 
In addition to its crankish, conspiratorial conclusions, Icons seriously 
distorts the nature of scientific inquiry and evidence. While real science 
integrates evidence into a coherent explanatory model, Wells presents 
science as simply a grouping of unconnected facts that can be challenged 
individually if they become inconvenient to one’s starting assumptions. To 
Wells, there is no need to integrate ideas and evidence in order to perceive 
the whole scope of the model. This is precisely the wrong way to teach 
science. In this way Icons of Evolution is part of an anti-curriculum: the 
effect of this deceptive work on students’ understanding and enjoyment of 
science is wholly negative. 
Teaching scientific controversies can be difficult, even when there is a 
clear paper trail of the development and resolution of the arguments. The 
controversies often require great technical expertise to fully appreciate their 
depth and scope. For this reason, many of the most controversial subjects in 
 
 
category=21 (last visited Aug. 2, 2005). 
 383. See WELLS, supra note 77.  
 384. See James R. Hofmann & Bruce H. Weber, The Fact of Evolution: Implications for Science 
Education, 12 SCI. & EDUC. 729 (2003); Kevin Padian & Alan D. Gishlick, The Talented Mr. Wells, 
77 Q. REV. BIOLOGY 33 (2002); Alan D. Gishlick, Icons of Evolution?: Why Much of What Johnathan 
Wells Writes About Evolution is Wrong, Nat’l Ctr. for Sci. Educ., available at http:// 
www.ncseweb.org/icons/pdfs.html (last visited May 22, 2005). 
 385. See Gishlick, supra note 200. 
 386. See id. 
 387. See id. 
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science are presented to high school (and even lower division college) 
students in their simplest form, if at all.388 The “origins controversy” would 
not be a natural candidate for teaching in the science class. It is vague and 
imprecise. Its theoretical basis is needlessly complicated and subjectively 
applied. It has developed nothing in the way of useful methodology and it 
has no curriculum. Most importantly, the controversy as such has no 
scientific content. 
D. Science in the Subjunctive Mood 
This examination of ID’s scientific relevance opened with a review of 
questions asked by DeWolf, Meyer, and DeForrest389 In that review, the 
authors presented a hypothetical scenario in which a fictional science teacher 
“John Spokes” (a parody of the 1925 trial defendant John Scopes) is 
confronted with the question of how to teach ID. The rhetorical device of an 
imaginary ID proponent is fitting, for it highlights the fact that to virtually all 
practicing scientists, ID is itself an imaginary science. An ID science 
curriculum can be taught only if the ID program produces what other 
scientific disciplines produce. At the minimum, this includes a testable model 
with supporting evidence and substantial peer-review. ID has accomplished 
nothing towards these goals. 
Advocacy groups and legislators in favor of teaching ID imply that it is 
on the verge of a scientific and conceptual breakthrough.390 However, in the 
present real world, no such results have appeared. The scientific literature on 
ID is non-existent, and ID advocates publish almost entirely in the popular 
press and in philosophical and theological publications. The most charitable 
conclusion about ID’s scientific accomplishments is that the field is not ready 
for scientific prime time. This may conceivably change. However, until then, 
the answers to the unasked questions of DeWolf, Meyer, and DeForrest must 
clearly be negative: 
Is there a scientific “origins controversy”? 
Absolutely not. 
 388. See Andrew J. Petto & Laurie R. Godfrey, Why Teach Evolution?, in SCIENTISTS CONFRONT 
CREATIONISM (2004).  
 389. Supra note 275 and accompanying text.  
 390. Consider, for example, Dembski’s repeated claims that “Darwinism” is meeting its Waterloo 
because of the successes of the Intelligent Design program. See, e.g., William A. Dembski, Kansas I—
”Land of the Born Again Boneheads,” UNCOMMON DESCENT, Apr. 28, 2005, at http:// 
www.uncommondescent.com/index.php/archives/27 (last visited Aug. 2, 2005).  
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Is ID equipped to contribute meaningfully to scientific questions about 
biological processes and patterns? 
Again, no. 
Is there any basis for a scientific curriculum that is based on ID? 
None at all. 
Until Mr. Spokes can point to objective, compelling evidence that a body 
of ID-based science exists, he should not be allowed to teach what is still no 
more than a new brand of creationism in his science classroom. 
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL FLAWS OF “INTELLIGENT DESIGN” 
The analysis of intelligent design creationism in the two previous sections 
can be summed up as follows: The theory is religion, not science. In light of 
the Supreme Court’s refusal to permit public schools to incorporate previous 
versions of creationism into the science curriculum, the intelligent design 
variation of creationism has little chance of withstanding constitutional 
scrutiny under the Edwards and Epperson analysis.  
A. Intelligent Design and the Epperson/Edwards Schematic 
Recall that the Court relied upon three factors in its constitutional analysis 
of creationism in Edwards and Epperson: the religious implications of 
creationist theory as an indication of the legislature’s impermissible religious 
intent;391 the conclusion that critiques of evolution were based on the 
government’s desire to prohibit theories perceived as hostile to religion;392 
and the focus on God or a Supreme Being as the central defining 
characteristic of a religious legal mandate.393
As for the first component of the Court’s analysis, although both of the 
Supreme Court’s creationism opinions technically relied on the Court’s 
finding that the states in question had enacted their creationism mandates 
with impermissible religious purposes, it is significant that there was little 
direct evidence of the impermissible purpose in either case.394 In lieu of 
direct evidence of the impermissible intent, the Court relied on its analysis of 
key characteristics of creationist theory itself.395 The Court focused on two 
characteristics in particular. First, the Court concluded that legal mandates to 
 391. See supra notes 25–32 and accompanying text. 
 392. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
 393. See supra notes 61–64 and accompanying text. 
 394. See supra notes 20–44 and accompanying text. 
 395. See supra notes 32–33 and accompanying text. 
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teach creationism did nothing to advance the cause of academic freedom 
because the open and unregulated field of academic science already 
permitted consideration of alternative theories.396 Legal mandates to include 
creationism were not necessary to protect academic freedom because the free 
market in scientific ideas had already considered creationism and rejected it 
on the merits.397 Second, the Court took note of the long history of strong 
links between creationist theory and certain fundamentalist religious sects.398 
These two elements led the Court to conclude that the argument of a secular 
purpose for creationism was a “sham.”399
From this perspective, the theory of intelligent design presents the same 
problem as previous manifestations of creationism. As with the first and 
second-generation versions of creationism at issue in Epperson and Edwards, 
the theory of intelligent design has virtually no standing within the 
mainstream scientific community. Intelligent design proponents lack 
scientific credibility in part because they have failed to articulate their 
affirmative case in the appropriate forums. Aside from sniping at random 
details of evolutionary theory, intelligent design proponents have failed to 
offer testable hypotheses or produce viable methods to demonstrate the 
existence of an Intelligent Designer. The simple fact is that intelligent design 
theory has produced nothing of value to any scientific discipline. The 
absence of peer-reviewed research or journal articles advancing the 
intelligent design cause is just one of many indicators that the theory has 
roughly the same status in the scientific community as previous versions of 
creationism.  
Likewise, as discussed in detail in Section II supra, the strong links 
between evangelical and fundamentalist religious sects and those advancing 
the cause of intelligent design indicate the same religious impetus as the one 
motivating earlier creationist movements. Intelligent design is viewed by 
many of its most prominent advocates as a crucial tool in rebutting scientific 
evidence that in their view contradicts the fundamentalist claim that the 
world was created and organized by a transcendent being according to a 
divine plan. There is nothing wrong with teaching this theory as part of a 
comparative religions course,400 along with other theological perspectives on 
 396. See supra notes 45–47 and accompanying text. 
 397. Id. 
 398. See supra notes 49–60 and accompanying text. 
 399. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 586–87 (1987). 
 400. As Justice Powell wrote in his Edwards concurring opinion: 
As a matter of history, schoolchildren can and should properly be informed of all aspects of this 
Nation’s religious heritage. I would see no constitutional problem if schoolchildren were taught 
the nature of the Founding Father’s religious beliefs and how these beliefs affected the attitudes of 
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human origins; but, intelligent design theory cannot be made part of a public 
school curriculum or state-mandated student assessment scheme because in 
that context the “purpose of the [theory’s] use is to advance a particular 
religious belief.”401 Intelligent design proponents want access to science 
classrooms both to obtain the imprimatur of government-certified science as 
an “objective” validation of their religious views, and as a forum for 
proselytizing impressionable youngsters. This is a direct violation of the 
principles set forth in Epperson and Edwards. 
The second component of the Court’s constitutional analysis in Epperson 
and Edwards is the proposition that the Constitution prohibits negative legal 
mandates in this area as well as positive legal mandates. In other words, the 
Court held that the Constitution not only prohibits the government from 
introducing the religious theory of creation into the public schools; the 
Constitution also prohibits the government from restricting or disparaging 
scientific theories perceived as hostile to a dominant religious doctrine. “[The 
Constitution] forbids alike the preference of a religious doctrine or the 
prohibition of theory which is deemed antagonistic to a particular dogma.”402 
This principle extends even to “equal time” legal mandates such as the one 
held unconstitutional in Edwards. The essence of the Court’s holdings in this 
area is that the Constitution prohibits any attempt to use the legal and 
political process to impose on educational institutions a set of ideas that the 
scientific marketplace has repeatedly and definitively rejected on the merits.  
This principle applies directly to recent efforts to use the political process 
to foist the theory of intelligent design on unwilling educators. As discussed 
below, this principle also applies to arguments recasting intelligent design 
mandates as efforts to protect the free speech rights of teachers and students. 
The flaw in these new arguments is the same as the flaw noted by the Court 
in Edwards: If the scientific community believed intelligent design theory 
had scientific merit, then the theory would already be a primary focus of 
scientific research and education. No government policy prohibits scientists 
from considering intelligent design; the problem for intelligent design 
proponents is that the scientific community has considered the theory and 
found it wanting. As in Edwards, mandating the inclusion of intelligent 
design theory into the public school science curriculum “does not advance 
academic freedom [and] does not grant teachers a flexibility that they did not 
already possess to supplant the present science curriculum with the 
 
 
the times and the structure of our government. Courses in comparative religion of course are 
customary and constitutionally appropriate. 
Id. at 606–07 (Powell, J., concurring). 
 401. Id. at 608. 
 402. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 106–07 (1968). 
Washington University Open Scholarship













presentation of theories, besides evolution, about the origin of life.”403 Using 
the political process to override the considered judgment of specialists in the 
field has nothing to do with protecting the marketplace of ideas; rather, these 
proposals attempt to skew the marketplace in order to favor a set of 
discredited ideas that happen to coincide with a specifically religious agenda. 
This is precisely what the Court in Edwards said the First Amendment 
prohibits.  
The third component of the Court’s constitutional analysis in Epperson 
and Edwards is the most important link between the discredited first- and 
second-generation creationism mandates, and the new intelligent design 
version of the theory. In concluding that earlier generations of creationism 
mandates were impermissibly motivated by religion, the Court focused 
primarily on one key factor: the presence of God at the center of all 
creationist theory.404 As the majority opinion in Edwards noted, the theory of 
creationism advanced by the Louisiana Legislature’s “balanced treatment” 
statute “embodies the religious belief that a supernatural creator was 
responsible for the creation of humankind.”405 Justice Powell’s concurring 
opinion reinforced this conclusion by noting that “[C]oncepts concerning 
God or a supreme being of some sort are manifestly religious . . . . These 
concepts do not shed that religiosity merely because they are presented as a 
philosophy or as a science.”406 Based on this central fact Powell concluded: 
“From the face of the statute, a purpose to advance a religious belief is 
apparent.”407  
For all the other changes in the presentation of creationism through the 
years, the existence of a supernatural creator is a constant theme in every 
variation of the theory, including the latest. The very name “intelligent 
design” indicates that the new version of creationism presents the same 
constitutional dilemma as its predecessors. The new theory is defined by the 
same characteristic identified by the Court in Edwards as quintessentially 
religious: the existence of a supernatural creator of the universe. No matter 
how intelligent design advocates try to finesse the issue, their theory posits 
some form of transcendent intelligence, and “concepts concerning God or a 
supreme being of some sort are manifestly religious.”408  
 403. Edwards, 482 U.S. at 587. 
 404. See supra notes 49–60 and accompanying text. 
 405. Id. at 592. 
 406. Id. at 598–99 (Powell, J., concurring) (citing Malnak v. Yogi, 440 F. Supp. 1284, 1322 
(D.N.J. 1977), aff’d per curiam, 592 F.2d 197 (3d Cir. 1979) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 407. Edwards, 482 U.S. at 598–99. 
 408. Id.  
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When intelligent design theory is analyzed under the constitutional 
framework used by the Court to invalidate earlier creationist mandates, it is 
evident that legal requirements to teach intelligent design cannot satisfy the 
constitutional standard set forth in Epperson and Edwards. Every major 
aspect of intelligent design supports this conclusion: The absence of 
objective scientific support for intelligent design; the strong links between 
intelligent design and an evangelical religious agenda; the use of intelligent 
design to limit the dissemination of scientific theories that are perceived as 
contradicting religious teachings; and the fact that the irreducible core of 
creationist theory is the “manifestly religious” concept of a God or supreme 
being.409 Unless the Supreme Court is willing to abandon its own recent 
precedents and overrule Epperson and Edwards—and there is no evidence 
that a majority of the Court is inclined to do so—the various efforts to legally 
mandate the teaching of intelligent design are doomed from the outset. 
Yet proposals to mandate the teaching of intelligent design theory in 
public schools are, if anything, proliferating at the local, state, and federal 
levels. Intelligent design proponents have proposed various legal arguments 
to avoid the clear implication of Epperson and Edwards that these proposals 
are unconstitutional. These proposals include: attempts to deny the linkage 
between intelligent design and earlier versions of creationism; an outright 
refusal to acknowledge the clear religious underpinnings of the intelligent 
design theory; claims that the Supreme Court has abandoned the 
constitutional basis of Epperson and Edwards; claims that the right to teach 
intelligent design in public schools is a matter of free speech; and attempts to 
articulate a vague legal notion of science into which intelligent design 
allegedly fits. The first two claims are factually disingenuous, and the last 
three are legally wrong. But before turning to the details of these arguments 
in subsection C infra, the next section will outline the different types of legal 
mandates proponents of intelligent design have crafted to advance their 
theory. 
B. The New Legal Battlegrounds Over Intelligent Design Creationism 
Proponents of intelligent design have opened four fronts in the battle to 
advance their theory through legal mandates: (1) efforts to include intelligent 
design in state science standards and achievement tests; (2) the federal 
version of this effort, known as the Santorum Amendment; (3) proposals to 
incorporate or add disclaimers to textbooks that include the theory of 
evolution; and (4) battles at the state and local level to include books 
 409. See id. at 599. 
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promoting the theory of intelligent design on state-approved textbook 
purchasing lists, or to dilute the teaching of evolution in approved textbooks.  
1. Intelligent Design in State Science Standards and Achievement 
Tests 
The most prominent battles over the adoption of state mandates to teach 
intelligent design involve attempts to incorporate the theory into statewide 
science curriculum and achievement test standards. Kansas and Ohio have 
been the sites of the most contentious battles so far, and at present, the 
intelligent design movement has had mixed success in convincing these 
states to adopt its agenda.  
Kansas represented, for a brief period, one of the few major success 
stories for intelligent design advocates.410 In August 1999, the State Board of 
Education voted to eliminate any mention of evolution from the State’s 
recommended science curriculum and science achievement tests.411 The new 
policy immediately became the object of ridicule both inside and outside the 
state. One member of the Board of Education who opposed the changes 
argued that the new standards would make Kansas students “the laughing 
stock of the world,”412 and other leading state politicians—including the 
Republican governor and lieutenant governor—argued that the new 
standards would make the state an economic and educational 
embarrassment.413 The governor called the Board’s action “terrible, tragic, 
embarrassing.”414  
 410. For published academic treatments specifically addressing the Kansas decision, which 
unanimously conclude that the Kansas Board acted unconstitutionally, see Theresa Wilson, Evolution, 
Creation, and Naturally Selecting Intelligent Design Out of the Public Schools, 34 U. TOL. L. REV. 
203 (2003); Marjorie George, Comment, And Then God Created Kansas? The Evolution/Creationism 
Debate in America’s Public Schools, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 843 (2001); Coleen M. McGrath, Note, 
Redefining Science to Accommodate Religious Beliefs: The Constitutionality of the 1999 Kansas 
Science Education Standards, 45 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 297 (2000–01); Deborah A. Reule, Note, The 
New Face of Creationism: The Establishment Clause and the Latest Efforts to Suppress Evolution in 
Public Schools, 54 VAND. L. REV. 2555 (2001); Diana M. Rosenberg, Note, Monkey Business and 
Unnatural Selection: Opening the Schoolhouse Door to Religion by Discrediting the Tenets of 
Darwinism, 9 J.L. & POL’Y 611 (2001); Douglas E. Stewart, Jr., Note, Going Back in Time: How the 
Kansas Board of Education’s Removal of Evolution From the State Curriculum Violates the First 
Amendment’s Establishment Clause, 20 REV. LITIG. 549 (2001). 
 411. See Pam Belluck, Board for Kansas Deletes Evolution From Curriculum, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
12, 1999, at A1. 
 412. Id.  
 413. See Pam Belluck, Necessary Knowledge: Science Expands, Religion Contracts, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 13, 2000, § 4, at 1. Belluck wirtes that 
the idea that Kansas would fall behind academically and economically was one of the principal 
arguments used by evolution proponents in Kansas. Scientists and school board candidates—even 
the governor—said Kansas would seem embarrassingly backward if the new science standards 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss1/1










                                                                                                                        
The Kansas Board’s brief flirtation with intelligent design (and other 
forms of creationism) was doomed in August 2000 when Republican primary 
voters defeated three of the conservative members of the Board of Education 
who had voted in favor of the anti-evolution position.415 On February 14, 
2001, the new Board voted seven-to-three to reinstate the requirement that 
the State’s students be taught and tested on evolution.416 The new science 
standards are thorough and comprehensive, and include broad requirements 
that students learn both the theory and mechanics of evolutionary biological 
change. In one of the benchmarks to the twelfth grade life science standards, 
for example, Kansas now requires students to “understand the major 
concepts of the theory of biological evolution.”417 The standards further 
require that students be taught how evolution is used to explain biodiversity, 
the theory of natural selection, and the proposition “[t]hat evolution is a 
broad, unifying theoretical framework in biology.”418 Although the new 
standards reject the theory of intelligent design, they do contain a statement 
recognizing a distinction between the requirement that students “understand” 
evolutionary theory and the requirement that a student “believe” in the 
conclusions drawn by scientists: 
“Understand” does not mandate “belief.” While students may be 
required to understand some concepts that researchers use to conduct 
research and solve practical problems, they may accept or reject the 
scientific concepts presented. This applies particularly where students’ 
and/or parents’ beliefs may be at odds with current scientific theories 
or concepts.419
These standards have been enforced and unchanged since they were 
adopted. However, this may not be the last word on the subject. In the 2002 
elections, two conservatives won seats in western and southwestern Kansas, 
which has effectively created a five-to-five split on the ten-member Board.420 
 
 
stayed in place. The lieutenant governor, Gary Sherrer, said that businesses considering relocating 
to Kansas had been “scared off” out of concern that their employees’ children would not be 
getting a good education and that the work force would not be competitive. 
Id. 
 414. Scott Stevens, Kansas Town Lighted Fuse of Ohio Feud Over Origins, CLEVELAND PLAIN 
DEALER, Aug. 12, 2002, at A1. 
 415. John W. Fountain, Kansas Puts Evolution Back Into Public Schools, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 
2001, at A1. 
 416. Id. 
 417. KAN. STATE BD. OF EDUC., KANSAS SCIENCE EDUCATION STANDARDS 74 (2001). 
 418. Id. at 76. 
 419. Id. 
 420. Pete Goering, Education Shouldn’t be a Joke, TOPEKA CAPITAL-JOURNAL, Jan. 21, 2003. 
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Depending on how this deadlock is resolved, the Kansas science standards 
may once again be challenged from within the Kansas Board of Education.421  
Soon after Kansas resolved its science standards controversy in favor of 
evolution, the Ohio Board of Education went through a similar process, with 
more ambiguous results. After suffering a bitter defeat in Kansas, intelligent 
design proponents took a more subtle approach with the Ohio Board of 
Education. After an extended battle over the issue, the Board adopted a 
compromise approach in its science academic content standards. On one 
hand, the Ohio state science standards require students to be able to 
“[e]xplain how natural selection and other evolutionary mechanisms account 
for the unity and diversity of past and present life forms.”422 On the other 
hand, in a concession to the intelligent design advocates on the Board, the 
same section of the standards also includes language recognizing implicitly 
the arguments of anti-evolutionists. Thus, the same portion of the standards 
that requires students to learn the mechanisms of natural selection also 
includes an expectation that students “[d]escribe how scientists continue to 
investigate and critically analyze aspects of evolutionary theory.”423 To quell 
the fears of the scientific community that this language would encourage the 
teaching of intelligent design, the following disclaimer appears immediately 
following the “investigate and critically analyze” language: “The intent of 
this benchmark does not mandate the teaching or testing of intelligent 
design.”424  
Despite the Board’s stated intent to avoid the teaching of intelligent 
design, the Board subsequently adopted a lesson plan to implement its 
science standards that was heavily infused with intelligent design concepts. A 
 421. In July 2003, the state’s education commissioner reminded the Board that a review of the 
standards is required by law. Citing both the likely controversy over the treatment of evolution and the 
need for his staff to deal with issues concerning compliance with the No Children Left Behind Act, the 
commissioner recommended less than a full-scale review. The Board deadlocked five-to-five, with the 
members who support evolution education favoring a full-scale review, apparently in the hope that it 
would rally support for moderate candidates in the Republican primaries in the next election. See John 
Hanna, Board’s Darwin Defenders Seek to Revive Evolution Spat, DODGE CITY DAILY GLOBE, July 
14, 2003, available at http://www.dodgeglobe.com/stories/071403/sta_0714030011.shtml (last visited 
May 22, 2005). The Board finally reached a compromise in August, voting seven-to-three to conduct a 
full-scale review of the state’s science standards, but delaying appointing a review committee until 
August 2004, which renders it unlikely that the committee will finish its work until well after the 2004 
general election.. See John Hanna, School Board to Review Evolution, TOPEKA CAPITOL-JOURNAL, 
Aug. 13, 2003, available at http://www.cjonline.com/stories/081303/kan_evolution.shtml (last visited 
May 22, 2005). 
 422. OHIO STATE BD. OF EDUC., ACADEMIC CONTENT STANDARDS K–12 SCIENCE 37 (2002), 
available at http://www.ode.state.oh.us/academic_content_standards/ScienceContentStd/PDF/ 
SCIENCE.pdf (last visited Mar. 24, 2004). 
 423. Id. at 37. 
 424. Id.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss1/1












committee appointed by the Board drafted the lesson plan and guidelines for 
teachers to implement the standards.425 The controversial science section of 
the lesson plan was drafted by a seven-member subcommittee, three of 
whom were intelligent design proponents.426 One of these three 
subcommittee members actually wrote the initial draft of the plan, and had 
also testified at the Board’s prior meetings in favor of inserting intelligent 
design into the curriculum.427 The subcommittee produced a draft plan whose 
structure and substance was drawn substantially from Jonathan Wells’ book, 
Icons of Evolution. Early drafts of the plan specifically cited Wells’ book and 
even included suggested links to intelligent design websites.428 Subsequent 
versions omitted the explicit intelligent design references, but left the 
substance of the intelligent design critique intact.429 Among other things, the 
Ohio Board’s lesson plan provides sample answers that challenge evolution 
by suggesting that genetically related species may not have a common 
ancestry, and that examples of evolutionary change prove “microevolution” 
(i.e., relatively minor changes within species) but not “the ability of natural 
selection to produce new forms of life.”430  
In essence, the Ohio Board of Education science standards and lesson 
plan may simply have created a system in which the battle over evolution 
will be carried on interminably in localized skirmishes throughout the State. 
“[These standards] would appear to leave intelligent-design proponents free 
to lobby each of the 600 Ohio school districts to include intelligent design in 
the science classroom.”431 Ohio science teachers, meanwhile, are in the 
position once occupied by Susan Epperson: “cring[ing] at the thought of 
encouraging theories that are based more on religion than science.”432  
Kansas and Ohio are not the only states debating evolution in the context 
of state science standards. In Pennsylvania, the State Board of Education 
adopted recently science standards that expressly require comprehensive 
education in the theory of evolution.433 The Board adopted a strong stance in 
 425. Scott Stevens, Science Standards Set, But the Teaching is Still Evolving, CLEVELAND PLAIN 
DEALER, Dec. 29, 2002, at B1. 
 426. Scott Stephens, How State Board Thinking Evolved on Biology Lesson, CLEVELAND PLAIN 
DEALER, Mar. 14, 2004, at B1. 
 427. Id. 
 428. See OHIO BD. OF EDUC., CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF EVOLUTION—GRADE 10 (December draft) 
(copy on file with author). 
 429. See OHIO BD. OF EDUC., CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF EVOLUTION—GRADE 10 (final version) 
(copy on file with author). 
 430. Id. at Attachment A, Aspects 1 & 3. 
 431. Devolving Standards; Curriculum Guidelines Give Evolution’s Foes Unfortunate Opening, 
COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Dec. 12, 2002, at 18A; see also Forrest & Gross, supra note 88, at 227–39 
(providing a detailed account of the debate over the Ohio standards). 
 432. Crystal Harden, Science Teachers Wary, CINCINNATI POST, Mar. 15, 2004, at A1. 
 433. See PA. DEP’T OF EDUC., ACADEMIC STANDARDS FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY (2002), 
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favor of education about evolution after scientists objected to an earlier draft 
of the standards. The earlier standards “contained language requiring that 
students evaluate data that ‘supports and does not support’ the theory of 
evolution,” which was viewed by the objecting scientists as opening the 
classroom door to creationist and intelligent design theory.434 Other states are 
also grappling with these issues. In Michigan, state legislators are attempting 
to bypass the usual debate over comprehensive science standards by 
introducing legislation that either permits or requires public school science 
teachers to teach the “theory [of] intelligent design hypothesis” alongside 
evolution.435 In Minnesota, the state legislature recently approved state 
science standards that include the teaching of evolution, after defeating an 
amendment proposed by the state House of Representatives that was 
perceived “as an effort to discredit evolution and open the door to the 
teaching of religious creationism.”436 In Darby, Montana, a minister 
convinced a majority of the local school board to initially approve an 
objective origins science policy, a euphemism for intelligent design.437 After 
much controversy,438 the Board never adopted the final version of the 
proposal, and the proposal may now die after two proponents of teaching 
evolution were elected to the School Board.439 Other anti-evolution proposals 
have been considered during the last year by state legislatures in Alabama440 
and Missouri.441 Meanwhile, all the state debates on this subject are being 
informed (and sometimes misinformed) by the strange legacy of an 
 
 
available at http://www.pde.state.pa.us/k12/lib/k12/scitech.pdf (last visited Aug. 10, 2003). Among 
other things, the Pennsylvania standards require tenth-grade students to “[e]xplain the mechanisms of 
the theory of evolution” and “analyze data from fossil records, similarities in anatomy and physiology, 
embryological studies and DNA studies that are relevant to the theory of evolution,” and require 
twelfth-grade students to “[a]nalyze the theory of evolution”; “[e]xamine human history by describing 
the progression from early hominids to modern humans”; and “apply the concept of natural selection 
as a central concept in illustrating evolution theory.” Id. at 13. 
 434. See Pamela R. Winnick, Board Passes Teaching Standards; Evolution Focus of Science 
Classes, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, July 13, 2001, at C4. 
 435. H.B. 4946, 92 Legis., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2003) (requiring the teaching of intelligent design); 
see also H.B. 5005, 92 Legis., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2003) (permitting the teaching of intelligent design). 
 436. Norman Draper, Education Bill Awaits Governor, MINNEAPOLIS STAR-TRIB., May 18, 2004, 
at B1. 
 437. See Michael Moore, Darby Schools OK “Objective Origins”, MISSOULIAN, Feb. 3, 2004, at 
1, available at http://www.missoulan.com/articles/2004/02/03/news/top/news01.prt (last visited May 
22, 2005). 
 438. See James Glanz, Montana Creationism Bid Evolves Into an Unusual Fight, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 26, 2004, at 22. 
 439. See Jim Robbins, Montana: A Victory for Darwin, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2004, at 31. 
 440. See Jannell McGrew, “Pledge” Bill, Others Out of Time, MONTGOMERY ADVERTISER, May 
18, 2004, at A1. 
 441. See James Goodwin, Intelligent Design Bill Unlikely to be an Easy Sell, SPRINGFIELD NEWS-
LEADER, Mar. 14, 2004, at A1. 
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unsuccessful proposal to add an intelligent design mandate to federal 
educational legislation. 
2. The Defeat of the Santorum Amendment and its Aftermath 
The Santorum Amendment was proposed by Senator Rick Santorum of 
Pennsylvania as an amendment442 to what would become the No Child Left 
Behind Act of 2001.443 The original amendment was entitled “Sense of the 
Senate Regarding Science Education,” and contained the following two 
provisions: 
(1) good science education should prepare students to distinguish the 
data or testable theories of science from philosophical or religious 
claims that are made in the name of science; and 
(2) where biological evolution is taught, the curriculum should help 
students to understand why this subject generates so much continuing 
controversy, and should prepare the students to be informed 
participants in public discussions regarding the subject.444  
Intelligent design proponent Philip Johnson later took credit for crafting 
this language.445 Although the Senate approved the language as an 
 442. See H.R. 1, 107th Cong. (2001). 
 443. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2001). For a good, 
detailed discussion of the educational and constitutional implications of the Santorum Amendment, see 
Jay D. Wexler, Darwin, Design, and Disestablishment: Teaching the Evolution Controversy in Public 
Schools, 56 VAND. L. REV. 751 (2003). 
 444. 147 CONG. REC. S6147-48 (daily ed. June 13, 2001) (reading Senator Santorum’s proposed 
Senate amendment no. 358). 
 445. Steve Benen, Insidious Design: Disguising Dogma as Science, Religious Right Activists Have 
Created a New Scheme to Wedge Religion into Public Schools, CHURCH & ST., May 1, 2002, at 8. 
Phillip Johnson discussed the strategy behind the Santorum amendment in an article for BreakPoint 
Worldview, the publication of Charles Colson’s Prison Fellowship Ministries. See Phillip E. Johnson, 
Intelligent Design, Freedom, and Education, BREAKPOINT WORLDVIEW, available at http:// 
www.pfm.org/AM/Template.cfm?section=BreakPoint1&template=/CM/HTMLDisplay.cfm&content 
ID=11922 (last visited May 24, 2005). According to Johnson, “[t]he conference report is not itself part 
of the ‘No Child Left Behind’ Act signed by the president, but it is the primary resource a court would 
consider when it has to ascertain the intent of the Congress in order to interpret words like science and 
education, which are in the act.” Id. Johnson went on to chide creationists who sought to be more open 
about their motives in debates over the inclusion of creationist ideas in public school curriculums:  
When citizens tell me that they want to present a proposal to administrators or school boards 
asking for more unbiased teaching of evolution, I advise them to use the precise language of the 
Santorum amendment and not add anything to it. Well-meaning citizens sometimes think that this 
language does not go far enough, and so they insist on petitioning the authorities to give classroom 
time to some theory other than evolution. This is a mistake, because whatever they say just gives 
biased journalists something to ridicule and distort.  
 The Santorum amendment gives advocates for truth all we really need to get started, and its 
language is difficult to distort or ridicule because of the huge bipartisan majority that approved it 
in the Senate and because it appeals so directly to liberal values of freedom of thought in 
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amendment to the proposed statute, the provision was later excised and 
nothing relating to evolution education or intelligent design appears in the 
final statute.446 The conference committee did include a version of the 
Santorum Amendment language in the conference report to the final statute; 
the full text of the conference report states: 
The Conferees recognize that a quality science education should 
prepare students to distinguish the data and testable theories of science 
from religious or philosophical claims that are made in the name of 
science. Where topics are taught that may generate controversy (such 
as biological evolution), the curriculum should help students to 
understand the full range of scientific views that exist, why such topics 
may generate controversy, and how scientific discoveries can 
profoundly affect society.447  
After he failed to get his amendment attached to the final statute, Senator 
Santorum took the unusual tack of treating the conference report language as 
if it were law. He introduced into the Congressional Record a statement 
asserting that by voting for the statute and adopting the conference report, 
Congress had in essence enacted his anti-evolution language into law: 
I am very gratified that the House and Senate conferees included in the 
conference report of the elementary and secondary education bill the 
language of a resolution I introduced during the earlier Senate debate. 
That resolution concerned the teaching of controversies in science. It 
was adopted 91–8 by the Senate. By passing it we were showing our 
desire that students studying controversial issues in science, such as 
biological evolution, should be allowed to learn about competing 
scientific interpretations of evidence. As a result of our vote today that 
position is about to become a position of the Congress as a whole.448
Other intelligent design advocates quickly adopted Santorum’s strange 
notion that a vote for a nonexistent provision of a bill can make that 
provision law. The same proposition was promptly incorporated into a letter 
two members of the House of Representatives sent to members of the Ohio 
Board of Education in conjunction with that Board’s consideration of 




education and open public discussion of controversial subjects.  
 446. See supra note 443. 
 447. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 107-334, at 703 (2001), reprinted in 2001 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1230, 1249. 
 448. 147 CONG. REC. S13377 (2001) (statement of Senator Santorum). 
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curriculum.449 The letter asserts that “the Santorum language is now part of 
the law. The Santorum language clarifies that public school students are 
entitled to learn that there are differing scientific views on issues such as 
biological evolution.”450  
The tactic embodied in the final version of the Santorum Amendment is 
the notion that science educators should “teach the controversy” about 
evolution. This tactic attempts to skirt the constitutional difficulties with 
mandating the teaching of intelligent design as science, given the absence of 
any mainstream academic support for the theory. The tactic, as described by 
a representative of the anti-evolution Discovery Institute, is to teach science 
as one would teach contestable political values in social studies classes: 
When two groups of experts disagree about a controversial subject that 
intersects the public school curriculum students should learn about 
both perspectives. In such cases teachers should not teach as true only 
one competing view, just the Republican or Democratic view of the 
New Deal in a history class, for example. Instead, teachers should 
describe competing views to students and explain the arguments for 
and against these views as made by their chief proponents. Educators 
call this “teaching the controversy.”451
The problem with this tactic is that it treats an empirical science as if it 
involved essentially unprovable conclusions based on little more than 
personal predilection. In a social sciences class it is impossible to reach a 
definitive conclusion about whether the Republican or Democratic 
perspectives on any given issue is “correct.” On the other hand, in a science 
class certain conclusions are widely accepted as true because they conform to 
the empirical data assembled by experts in the field. We cannot see black 
holes, for example, but we know that they exist because astronomers have 
detected, in certain galaxies, compact, dark objects with a large mass 
concentrated in a small volume, and because the existence of such bodies 
conforms to what Einstein’s general theory of relativity tells us about 
gravity.452 In the biological sciences, proponents of intelligent design have 
the same standing as those who would deny the existence of black holes, and 
“teaching the controversy” about either dispute would not only waste 
 449. Letter from Rep. John A. Boehner and Steve Chabot to Jennifer L. Sheets and Cyrus B. 
Richardson, Jr. (Mar. 15, 2002), available at http://www.discovery.org/news/BoehnerChabotLetter 
ToOhio.html (last visited Aug. 8, 2003). 
 450. Id. 
 451. Stephen C. Meyer, Teach the Controversy, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Mar. 30, 2002. Meyer is 
the director of the Discovery Institute’s Center for Science and Culture.  
 452. See KIP S. THORNE, BLACK HOLES AND TIME WARPS: EINSTEIN’S OUTRAGEOUS LEGACY 
(1995). 
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precious time that could be devoted to education about real scientific issues, 
but would threaten to confuse naïve students for the sole purpose of making 
the students receptive to a particular religious agenda of groups that feel 
threatened by objective science.453  
The “teach the controversy” tactic succeeded in Ohio, where the Board of 
Education based its evolution lesson plan on precisely this approach.454 
Although the Ohio lesson plan omits any reference to an intelligent designer, 
the details of the lesson plan (which were drawn, as noted above, from 
Jonathan Wells’ intelligent design tome Icons of Evolution) cannot be 
understood outside the context of their intelligent design roots. The lesson 
plan includes, among other things, sample answers challenging evolution that 
contain assertions completely unsubstantiated by the mainstream scientific 
literature (such as the key intelligent design contentions that speciation 
cannot occur through natural processes, and that chimps and humans do not 
share a common ancestor).455 These contentions are motivated by religion to 
the same extent as the explicit claim that an intelligent designer intervened in 
the natural order, and, in fact, track many of the details of earlier versions of 
creationism.456 Thus, a government educational policy that is heavily infused 
with intelligent design and anti-evolution ideas, but omits reference to a 
creator or intelligent designer, still cannot survive constitutional scrutiny 
because: (1) the unscientific claims are unintelligible in the absence of the 
religious agenda; (2) the claims are a reaction to scientific theory that is 
perceived as hostile to religion; and (3) the claims are part of a larger body of 
theory that leads inevitably to the manifestly religious conclusion that a 
supernatural entity created the world in its present basic form. 
 453. For an explanation of why it is “scientifically inappropriate and pedagogically irresponsible 
to teach that scientists seriously debate the validity of evolution,” see Eugenie C. Scott & Glenn 
Branch, Evolution: What’s Wrong with “Teaching the Controversy”, 18 TRENDS ECOLOGY & 
EVOLUTION 499 (2003). 
 454. See supra notes 422–32 and accompanying text. 
 455. See OHIO BD. OF EDUC., CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF EVOLUTION—GRADE 10, supra note 429, at 
Attachment A (copy on file with author). 
 456. Compare the details of the intelligent design claims in the Ohio lesson plan with the details of 
creationism identified by the Supreme Court in Edwards. See supra note 67 and accompanying text. 
Three of the six identifying factors cited in Edwards are present in the Ohio lesson plan: the 
insufficiency of natural selection to explain the distribution of species; the insistence on changes only 
within originally created kinds of plants and animals; and separate ancestry of man and apes. See OHIO 
BD. OF EDUC., CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF EVOLUTION—GRADE 10, supra note 429, at Attachment A 
(copy on file with author). A fourth factor—the sudden creation of the earth from nothing (presumably 
by a supernatural creator)—is implicit in the premise that natural processes cannot explain the 
development of natural species in the world. The Ohio plan (and other “teach the controversy” 
schemes) thus omits only the two most inflammatory claims: that the world was created only 6,000 
years ago and that the world’s geological structure can be explained entirely by a single divine flood.  
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For this reason, the “teaching the controversy” tactic of including 
intelligent design in the public school curriculum alongside empirical science 
poses just as many constitutional problems as efforts to inject intelligent 
design theory into the classroom in a more overt way. Despite its 
questionable pedigree, the “teach the controversy” tactic seems to have 
caught on in states such as Ohio as a politically expedient compromise. This 
may have the unfortunate effect of pushing the real fight over the teaching of 
intelligent design down to the local school board level, where the local 
authorities may not always be well qualified to distinguish fact from fantasy. 
3. Textbook Disclaimers 
Instead of battling to include, in the public school curriculum, intelligent 
design or a more explicit version of creationism, some public educational 
authorities have chosen simply to cast unwarranted doubts in students’ minds 
about the theory of evolution by placing disclaimers in the standard 
textbooks distributed to students. The state of Alabama has placed 
disclaimers in all biology textbooks used by the public schools since 1996.457 
In November 2001, the Alabama State Board of Education voted to retain the 
disclaimer in books purchased for use during the next six-year textbook 
cycle.458 The Alabama disclaimer warns students: “The theory of evolution 
by natural selection is a controversial theory that is included in this textbook. 
It is controversial because it states that natural selection provides the basis for 
the modern scientific explanation for the diversity of living things.”459 After 
casting doubt on the notion that empirically observed minor evolutionary 
changes imply that larger evolutionary changes also occur, the disclaimer 
further admonishes students that “[i]nstructional material associated with 
controversy should be approached with an open mind, studied carefully, and 
critically considered.”460
No other state has adopted a statewide disclaimer, although the Oklahoma 
State Senate recently came within two votes of passing legislation that would 
have required public schools in that state to place an Alabama-style 
disclaimer in all science textbooks.461 In the absence of state mandates, at 
least one local jurisdiction has adopted a disclaimer on its own. In Cobb 
County, Georgia, the school board voted to place a disclaimer in new science 
 457. See Alabama Retains Disclaimer on Evolution, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2001, at A24. 
 458. Id. 
 459. ALABAMA ST. BD. OF EDUC., RESOLUTION (Nov. 8, 2001), available at http://www.alsde. 
edu/html/boe_resolutions2.asp?id=309 (last visited May 24, 2005).  
 460. Id. 
 461. John Greiner, Bill Rejected for Educational Disclaimer, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, May 7, 2003, 
at 9-A. 
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books stating: “This textbook contains material on evolution. Evolution is a 
theory, not a fact, regarding the origin of living things. This material should 
be approached with an open mind, studied carefully, and critically 
considered.”462 The Cobb County school board did not stop at disclaimers. In 
August 2002, the school board took a Santorum-style “teach the controversy” 
approach to science education when it adopted a policy asserting the Board's 
belief “that discussion of disputed views of academic subjects is a necessary 
element of providing a balanced education, including the study of the origin 
of the species.”463 Although the school board denied that it was advancing a 
religious agenda, one board member inadvertently underscored the problem 
with the new policy’s tone when he led his colleagues in prayer immediately 
after adopting the policy.464 Disclaimer policies are one of the few 
manifestations of intelligent design mandates that have been fully litigated. 
Most other intelligent design mandates have either been rejected politically 
(such as the excision of the Santorum Amendment from the No Child Left 
Behind Act and the overturning of the Kansas anti-evolution science policy), 
or are still early in the implementation process (for example, the ambiguous 
Ohio science standards policy). In Freiler v. Tangipahoa Parish Board of 
Education, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the disclaimer in that 
case had the unconstitutional effect of advancing a particular religious 
viewpoint.465 The disclaimer in question (which teachers were required to 
read aloud) informed students and teachers that instruction in the “Scientific 
Theory of Evolution”: 
should be presented to inform students of the scientific concept and 
not intended to influence or dissuade the Biblical version of Creation 
or any other concept. 
 462. Mary MacDonald, The Origins of Life: A Textbook Case in Cobb County, ATLANTA J.-
CONST., Apr. 14, 2002, at 1F. 
 463. See Cobb County School District, Theories of Origin (Aug. 26, 2002), available at 
http://www.cobbk12.org/centraloffice/adminrules/I_Rules/Rule%2OIDBD.htm (last visited May 24, 
2005). 
 464. Kate Zernike, Georgia School Board Requires Balance of Evolution and Bible, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 23, 2002, at A10. In response to complaints, the Board later issued guidelines that clarified its 
policy and essentially nullified the policy’s original anti-evolutionary implications. “The guidelines 
advise teachers to moderate class discussion carefully and if conflicts arise, ‘to promote a sense of 
scientific inquiry and understanding of scientific methods, and to distinguish between scientific and 
philosophical or religious issues.’” Mary MacDonald, Cobb Issues Evolution Guidelines to Teachers, 
ATLANTA J.-CONST., Jan. 9, 2003, at 1B. The Board chairman “shrugged off the criticism that the 
guidelines will not encourage discussion of alternate views of evolution, saying, ‘Encouraging 
discussion of that might be illegal.’” Id. 
 465. Freiler v. Tangipahoa Parish Bd. of Educ., 185 F.3d 337 (5th Cir. 1999), aff’d en banc, 201 
F.3d 602 (5th Cir.) (en banc). 
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 It is further recognized by the Board of Education that it is the 
basic right and privilege of each student to form his/her own opinion 
and maintain beliefs taught by parents on this very important matter of 
the origin of life and matter. Students are urged to exercise critical 
thinking and gather all information possible and closely examine each 
alternative toward forming an opinion.466
Applying the three-part Lemon test, the court held that this disclaimer had 
the secular purposes of disclaiming any orthodoxy of belief and reducing 
offense to students caused by instruction in evolution.467 The court went on 
to hold, however, that the disclaimer had the impermissible nonsecular effect 
of “protect[ing] and maintain[ing] a particular religious viewpoint, namely 
belief in the Biblical version of creation.”468 The court was careful to note 
that “[w]e do not confront the broader issue of whether the reading of any 
disclaimer before the teaching of evolution would amount to an 
unconstitutional establishment of religion.”469 Instead, the court focused on 
“the interplay of three factors”: 
(1) the juxtaposition of the disavowal of endorsement of evolution 
with an urging that students contemplate alternative theories of the 
origin of life; (2) the reminder that students have the right to maintain 
beliefs taught by their parents regarding the origin of life; and (3) the 
“Biblical version of Creation” as the only alternative theory explicitly 
referenced in the disclaimer.470
Although the Tangipahoa Parish disclaimer was slightly more explicit than 
the ones in Alabama and Cobb County (particularly in that it mentioned the 
Bible), it is unclear how any disclaimer could avoid a similar fate. All 
disclaimers have the same basic objective: to cast doubt on the scientific 
theory of evolution in order to bolster the alternative theory that at some 
point a Supreme Being created distinctive classes of living organisms and 
arranged them in essentially the same categories into which they fall today. 
The fact that a disclaimer does not specifically mention the Bible does not 
detract from the quintessentially religious nature of the ideas advanced by the 
disclaimer. Salvaging anti-evolution disclaimers therefore will require more 
than simply omitting an explicit reference to the religious source of the ideas 
protected by the disclaimer; salvaging disclaimers (and the other anti-
evolution mechanisms discussed in this section) will require attacking the 
 466. Id. at 341. 
 467. Id. at 345. 
 468. Id. at 346. 
 469. Id. at 342. 
 470. Id. at 346. 
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basic constitutional doctrine itself. The next section will address these 
constitutional arguments. 
4. Textbook Adoption Controversies 
The final tactic of those seeking to challenge the theory of evolution in 
the classroom involves the selection of the textbooks themselves. In one 
sense, school boards that merely attach anti-evolution disclaimers to science 
textbooks are implicitly acknowledging that the theory of evolution 
permeates modern science. If the theory of evolution did not permeate 
science books, the disclaimers would serve no purpose. The disclaimers send 
a strange message to students, however. School boards are essentially telling 
students: We are going to teach you about this theory, but you really don’t 
have to believe any of it if you don’t want to. The clever student may come 
away with little more than an abiding skepticism about the whole educational 
process and the common sense of those who run it. From the anti-evolution 
perspective it would be far more effective to alter the curriculum by replacing 
the standard emphasis on evolutionary theory with a more theocentric 
approach. One way of accomplishing this is to change the curriculum as a 
whole, as creationists attempted to do in Kansas, Ohio, and through the 
federal Santorum Amendment. Another way of accomplishing the same goal 
is to alter the textbooks teachers use in the classroom by inserting material 
that advances alternative theories of biological origins and development, or 
by weakening the treatment of the mainstream scientific theory of evolution. 
Intelligent design proponents recently used the latter approach in Texas. 
The Texas State Board of Education voted to reject an aggressive effort by 
intelligent design proponents to require publishers of science texts purchased 
by the state to dilute their emphasis on evolution and include criticism of the 
theory.471 Because Texas is one of the biggest bulk purchasers of these 
books,472 this debate has implications beyond the borders of Texas. If one of 
the largest purchasers were to demand changes to major science texts, those 
same expurgated texts would be marketed to other states as well—even if the 
 471. The Board of Education voted 11–4 to approve science textbooks that contained no 
references to intelligent design and retained extensive references to the scientific consensus supporting 
evolution. Janet Elliott, Biology Book Battle Abates; Debate over Evolution Calms as 11 Texts get Go-
ahead, HOUS. CHRON., Nov. 7, 2003, at A29. The support for the science texts may have become a bit 
more tenuous since the vote. In the Republican primary a few months following the Board decision a 
fifth vote was added to the self-described group of social conservatives on the Board. See Jo Ann 
Zuniga, Board of Education’s Social Conservatives Gain Ground, HOUS. CHRON., Mar. 15, 2004, at 
A11.  
 472. See Elliott, supra note 471. 
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local population in those other states would prefer to have their children 
taught mainstream science.473  
The constitutional issues raised by textbook purchasing disputes are 
identical to the issues raised by the attempt to include creationist approaches 
in state science standards. The issues are also identical to those raised at the 
local school board level when local boards attempt to adopt creationist 
textbooks as alternatives to standard texts.474 The constitutional issue in each 
of these situations is whether it is permissible for a governmental body to 
condition the expenditure of public funds on compliance with a particular 
religious doctrine. Cast in this way, the answer to this constitutional question 
is largely spelled out in Epperson and Edwards. Buying books because the 
books state that God (in some guise) created the world is no different than 
introducing the Supreme Being into the curriculum via teachers or 
curriculum standards. Incorporating religious ideas into the curriculum is 
forbidden no matter what the mechanism. 
In sum, as indicated in Section IV.A. supra, the intelligent design 
variation of creationism fails the Epperson/Edwards analysis to the same 
extent as previous versions of creationism, and each of the four methods 
recently employed to inject intelligent design theory into the public school 
curriculum is subject to the same analysis. Whether any of these methods can 
pass constitutional muster, therefore, turns on the question of whether the 
constitutional analysis used in Epperson and Edwards can still command a 
majority of the Supreme Court. Intelligent design proponents understand this, 
and have spent a great deal of energy crafting legal arguments to undermine 
or circumvent the Court’s present Establishment Clause jurisprudence 
concerning creationism. The next section addresses these arguments. 
 473. Id. For an instructive description of how textbook publishers respond to institutional 
censorship of this sort, and how the evisceration of textbooks affects the educational process in 
general, see DIANE RAVITCH, THE LANGUAGE POLICE: HOW PRESSURE GROUPS RESTRICT WHAT 
STUDENTS LEARN (2003). Religious objections to secular science education are only one aspect of this 
problem, of course. Other pressures imposed on textbook publishers include left-wing objections to 
literary texts perceived as racist or sexist, patriotic objections to depictions of less honorable aspects of 
American history, and the general squeamishness of educational politicians about any material that 
may be deemed controversial or upsetting to any child, parent, or community group. All of these 
disparate objections get filtered through what Ravitch calls the “[m]ad, [m]ad, [m]ad [w]orld of 
[t]extbook [a]doptions.” Id. at 97. At the moment, the particular form of madness that has gripped 
Texas pertains to evolution and its adversaries. 
 474. See Wexler, supra note 66 (recounting the battle in Plano, Texas over the adoption of the 
early intelligent design text Of Pandas and People).  
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C. The Intelligent Design Plan for Circumventing Edwards and Epperson 
As noted in Section IV.A. supra, the plan to incorporate the intelligent 
design version of creationism into the public school science curriculum has 
little chance of surviving scrutiny under a routine application of Edwards and 
Epperson. The only hope for intelligent design proponents, therefore, is to 
argue that for some reason Edwards and Epperson do not apply to intelligent 
design. Intelligent design proponents have crafted several arguments to reach 
this conclusion. These arguments can be divided into three categories: (1) the 
argument that intelligent design is not religion and therefore does not violate 
the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment; (2) the argument that 
teaching intelligent design is free speech, and therefore is protected by the 
Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment; and (3) the argument that 
intelligent design is “science” to the same extent as the more generally 
accepted theory of evolution, and therefore should be included in science 
classes on the same terms. Despite their best efforts, the intelligent design 
proponents’ case for avoiding Epperson and Edwards is very weak. Their 
first argument is premised on a disingenuous presentation of intelligent 
design theory; their second argument is premised on a serious 
misunderstanding of First Amendment free speech jurisprudence; and their 
third argument does not address the constitutional claim at all, and even so is 
contradicted by the nonconstitutional precedents they cite in support of their 
position.  
1. If It Isn’t Religion, Then What Is It? 
The Establishment Clause prohibition of governmental endorsement of 
religion in the public schools is the primary constitutional obstacle 
preventing state and local governments from including intelligent design in 
the public school science curriculum and state science standards. The 
Supreme Court has routinely enforced this prohibition since it first 
invalidated the New York Regents Prayer in the 1962 decision Engel v. 
Vitale.475 One year after Engel the Court extended this prohibition to student 
Bible reading in public schools.476 In subsequent years the Court extended 
the principle of these cases even further to cover everything from moments 
of silence,477 to the posting of the Ten Commandments in public schools,478 
 475. 370 U.S. 421 (1962). 
 476. Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963). 
 477. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985). 
 478. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980). 
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to graduation prayer,479 and, only three years ago, to prayer at public school 
extracurricular events such as football games.480 The Court’s Epperson and 
Edwards creationism decisions are part of this tradition.  
To overcome the obstacle represented by this dense body of 
jurisprudence, intelligent design proponents have no choice but to argue that 
their theory is not religious. Their main tactic is to emphasize the differences 
between intelligent design and earlier versions of creationism. They focus 
especially on the absence of specific detail in intelligent design theory, in 
contrast to the explicit claims in earlier versions of creationism about such 
things as the age of the earth and the occurrence of a worldwide flood.481 
Similarly, unlike earlier creationists, intelligent design theorists are careful to 
avoid identifying their intelligent designer by name as God or even a 
Supreme Being. Having refrained from naming their designer, the intelligent 
design theorists then argue that none of the definitions of religion used by the 
courts in Establishment Clause cases apply to their theory.482 Ergo, the 
argument goes, although Epperson and Edwards bar government from 
embracing earlier versions of creationism,483 the new, streamlined version of 
the theory survives Establishment Clause scrutiny unscathed and may be 
included in the state science curriculum. 
The problem with this approach is that it is premised on a deeply 
disingenuous presentation of intelligent design theory.484 Although intelligent 
design proponents repeatedly disavow the most scientifically foolish claims 
characterizing earlier versions of creationism (such as the theory of the 
young earth), they are also unspecific about important parts of their own 
version.485 They return repeatedly to their one real affirmative claim—that 
nature is so “irreducibly complex” that it could not have happened by 
 479. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992). 
 480. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000). 
 481. See, e.g., DeWolf, Meyer & DeForrest, supra note 87, at 94. 
 482. Id. at 80–87. 
 483. Intelligent design proponents specifically limit Edwards to statutes containing the details of 
earlier generations of creationism: “The Court reached this decision [in Edwards] in large part because 
the propositional content of scientific creationism closely mirrors the creation narrative in the book of 
Genesis.” Id. at 93. 
 484. As detailed in Section II, supra, intelligent design proponents are disingenuous only when 
they are presenting their theory to the uninitiated. When talking to fellow advocates, they are much 
more forthcoming about “how the Wedge program fits into the specific Christian gospel . . . and how 
and where questions of biblical authority enter the picture.” Johnson, supra note 73, at 16–17. Robert 
Pennock discusses intelligent design’s deep religious roots in examining the writings of intelligent 
design advocate Stephen C. Meyer. See Pennock, supra note 117. Pennock highlights the 
disingenuousness of intelligent design strategy by noting that although they aim “to bring death to 
materialism by reasserting the necessity of the God hypothesis . . . their political strategy leads them to 
deny God in the public square more often than Peter did.” Id.  
 485. See supra note 70. 
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accident and therefore must have been intentionally designed486—but they 
are notably silent about the identity and nature of the intelligent designer. It is 
a very odd theory that posits an intelligent designer, and then expresses no 
interest in the identity of the designer, the extent of its power, the degree to 
which it controls the actions of its creations as well as their physical 
manifestations, and so on. The intelligent designer is the seven-ton elephant 
sitting in the middle of the room, which intelligent design proponents barely 
acknowledge and steadfastly refuse to discuss. Yet without this creative 
intelligent designer, the theory of intelligent design would have no substance 
whatsoever. The entire intelligent design theory is predicated on the central 
claim that an active supernatural entity intentionally created the world 
according to a predefined plan.  
The specific issues in what creationists tend to call the “debate over 
origins” are clear-cut: The biological world either arrived at its present 
composition through natural evolutionary processes, or the whole system was 
planned from the outset and is subject to creative intervention by a designer. 
Likewise, interspecies transmutation either occurs through evolutionary 
change or it does not happen at all because some creative entity designed 
species with finite and unchangeable boundaries. (Intelligent design 
proponents accept only “microevolution,” change within species boundaries, 
but not “macroevolution,” the evolution of a new species from an existing 
one.) For scientists, the successful description and explanation of observed 
natural evolutionary processes provide the ultimate measure of their guiding 
theory. The data and explanations produced under this theory are the 
mainstay of mainstream scholarly journals and conferences. To be 
considered a genuine scientific alternative to evolutionary theory, on the 
other hand, intelligent design proponents must explain the precise nature and 
degree of active participation by a Supreme Being capable of designing the 
world. Otherwise, there is little way of assessing the underlying 
characteristics of the intelligent design model of biology. The failure of 
intelligent design proponents to describe their intelligent designer robs the 
central feature of their theory of any real scientific substance, resulting in 
what Robert Pennock calls a “featureless hypothesis.”487
The problem, of course, is that the intelligent design proponents have 
not—and as time passes it seems increasingly clear that they cannot—present 
 486. See, e.g., DeWolf, Meyer & DeForrest, supra note 87, at 95. 
 487. See Pennock’s discussion of the explanatory deficiencies of a transcendent designer in 
Robert T. Pennock, God of the Gaps: The Argument from Ignorance and the Limits of Methodological 
Naturalism, in SCIENTISTS CONFRONT CREATIONISM (Andrew J. Petto & Laurie R. Godfrey eds., 
forthcoming 2004). 
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empirical evidence that their intelligent designer exists and has done its work 
in constructing the world in a particular way. In the absence of an empirically 
verifiable affirmative case, intelligent design proponents are left with a 
purely negative analysis of evolution, from which they then try to 
manufacture affirmative inferences about reality. These inferences, however, 
are little more than an unfortunate combination of a failure of scientific 
imagination and a theological leap of faith. Reduced to its essence, intelligent 
design theory essentially proceeds via a three-step analysis. Step one (the 
purely negative scientific analysis) is represented by the various intelligent 
design critiques of alleged mistakes and gaps in the evolutionary literature.488 
Step two (the failure of scientific imagination) is an affirmative claim that the 
mistakes in evolutionary theory are inevitable due to the “irreducibly 
complex” nature of certain biological systems, which cannot be adequately 
described or explained by reference to natural processes. Step three (the leap 
of faith) is the claim that if natural selection is incapable of producing 
irreducible complexity (as William Dembski argues), then some transcendent 
being must be responsible.489  
Once the government starts down this road, it has entered the land of 
religion, and once it has entered this territory, Edwards applies with full 
force: “‘[C]oncepts concerning God or a supreme being of some sort are 
manifestly religious . . . . These concepts do not shed that religiosity merely 
because they are presented as a philosophy or as a science.’”490 The holdings 
of Epperson and Edwards cannot be limited by the details of earlier 
generations of creationism statutes. The empirically disproven specifics of 
young-earth creationism were not the main constitutional problem with the 
effort to incorporate those theories into the public school curriculum, 
although these absurd details did highlight the underlying problem with the 
theory. The real problem with earlier versions of creationist theory is that 
they replaced empirical analysis of the natural world with conclusions drawn 
from religious doctrine and based on faith in the actions of a Supreme Being 
who created the world according to His precise design. Although intelligent 
design theorists may have stripped away explicit references to most other 
aspects of early creationist theory, they cannot dispense with the one part of 
the theory that renders it “manifestly religious”—the final reliance on the 
 488. As the material in Section III, supra, demonstrates, many of these assertions are overblown 
or inaccurate, but at least they are assertions that can be tested in the real world and verified or 
falsified. 
 489. “High information content (or specified complexity) and irreducible complexity constitute 
strong indicators or hallmarks of past intelligent design.” DeWolf, Meyer & DeForrest, supra note 86, 
at 95. 
 490. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 598–99 (Powell, J., concurring) (citing Malnak v. Yogi, 
440 F. Supp. 1284, 1322 (D.N.J. 1977)). 
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actions of a Supreme Being rather than natural processes to explain life on 
earth. 
In addition to emphasizing the lack of Biblical detail in their theory, 
intelligent design theorists also attempt to manipulate the legal definition of 
“religion” in a way that would deem their endorsement of a Supreme Being 
nonreligious. The argument is that having distanced themselves from earlier 
versions of creationism by denuding their theory of all details except the 
designer, then what is left of the theory is so general that the prevailing 
definitions of religion used by the courts do not apply.  
Intelligent design theorists acknowledge that neither the Supreme Court 
nor the lower courts have ever adopted a universal definition of “religion.”491 
They also acknowledge that as a practical matter the courts are willing to 
recognize a broader range of beliefs as religious when a private individual’s 
free exercise of religion is at issue than when a case involves Establishment 
Clause concerns that the government is advancing religion.492 Thus, in the 
famous conscientious objection cases beginning with United States v. Seeger, 
the Court interpreted the statutory definition of religion so broadly as to 
embrace even the views of agnostics and atheists.493 The case involved the 
portion of the Selective Service Act that granted conscientious objector status 
to individuals who objected to participation in war based on their “religious 
training and belief,” which the statute defined as “an individual’s belief in a 
relation to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to those arising from 
any human relation, but [not including] essentially political, sociological, or 
philosophical views or a merely personal moral code.”494 The Court 
interpreted this language to apply to individuals whose pacifism was 
premised on a “belief that is sincere and meaningful [and] occupies a place in 
the life of its possessor parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in God of 
one who clearly qualifies for the exemption.”495 The Court later applied this 
interpretation even to individuals who denied that their views were religious 
at all.496 This interpretation distorted the literal meaning of the statutory 
language beyond recognition, but was necessary to protect the free exercise 
 491. See DeWolf, Meyer & DeForrest, supra note 87, at 82. 
 492. Id. at 81. 
 493. See Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 
(1965). 
 494. 50 U.S.C. § 456 (j) (1958). 
 495. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 166. 
 496. See Welsh, 398 U.S. at 343 (granting conscientious objector status to an applicant who denied 
that his beliefs were religious in any way). 
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interest in avoiding discrimination against anyone based on that person’s 
religious beliefs (or lack of religious beliefs).497  
When the analysis shifts to the Establishment Clause context, on the other 
hand, very different problems present themselves. In this context it is 
impossible to apply a broad free exercise-style definition of religion because 
such a definition can potentially convert virtually any set of beliefs into 
“religion.” If a very broad definition of religion were combined with the 
Establishment Clause, then any deep commitment to a comprehensive social 
agenda—such as environmentalism, racial justice, or economic equality—
could potentially be “religious” and therefore off-limits for government 
officials. Again, intelligent design proponents recognize this, and indeed 
attempt to use the courts’ narrower Establishment Clause definition of 
religion to characterize intelligent design theory as “nonreligious.” In one 
article, for example, intelligent design proponents employ “the three-part 
test” of religion used in several cases by the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals.498 The three parts of the “test” are: 
First, a religion addresses fundamental and ultimate questions having 
to do with deep and imponderable matters. Second, a religion is 
comprehensive in nature; it consists of a belief-system as opposed to 
an isolated teaching. Third, a religion often can be recognized by the 
presence of certain formal and external signs.499
Intelligent design proponents argue that under this “test” their theory is 
not “religion” because (1) intelligent design does not address “fundamental 
and ultimate questions” such as the “the characteristics and identity of the 
designing intelligence”500; (2) intelligent design does not offer a theory of 
morality or metaphysics or an afterlife501; and (3) intelligent design does not 
have a formal liturgy, clergy, or holidays.502 Intelligent design proponents 
argue that since their theory does not constitute “religion” under this “three-
part test,” Edwards and other Establishment Clause decisions relating to 
 497. See Seeger, 380 U.S. at 188 (Douglas, J., concurring) (“If I read the statute differently from 
the Court, I would have difficulties. For then those who embraced one religious faith rather than 
another would be subject to penalties; and that kind of discrimination . . . would violate the Free 
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.”). 
 498. See DeWolf, Meyer & DeForrest, supra note 87, at 84–85, (citing Alvarado v. City of San 
Jose, 94 F.3d 1223 (9th Cir. 1996); Peloza v. Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist., 37 F.3d 517 (9th Cir. 
1994)). 
 499. Alvarado, 94 F.3d at 1229 (quoting Africa v. Pennsylvania, 662 F.2d 1025, 1032 (3d Cir. 
1981)). 
 500. DeWolf, Meyer & DeForrest, supra note 87, at 85. 
 501. Id. at 86. 
 502. Id. For Francis Beckwith’s rendition of these same three points, see Beckwith, supra note 
136, at 494–96. 
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earlier forms of creationism cannot extend to the new streamlined variation 
on the creationist theme.  
The intelligent design proponents are wrong on several aspects of this 
analysis, including the status of the “three-part test” supposedly adopted by 
the Ninth Circuit. Actually, the intelligent design rendition mischaracterizes 
the Ninth Circuit opinions in two respects. First, the Ninth Circuit does not 
refer to a formal “test” of religion, but rather to “three useful indicia” of 
religion,503 and second, the three factors in question are actually developed in 
two opinions by Judge Arlen Adams of the Third Circuit Court of 
Appeals.504 The Third Circuit opinions are instructive, because they provide a 
much deeper context for the “three useful indicia” of religion and explain 
why neither Judge Adams’ “indicia” nor the Ninth Circuit’s use of those 
indicia help the intelligent design cause.  
Judge Adams devised his three indicia of religion in a case involving an 
Establishment Clause challenge to the use of a form of transcendental 
meditation in a public school. The school claimed that the particular form of 
transcendental meditation it used was not religious, in particular because it 
was not traditionally theist in the manner of traditional Western religions.505 
Because the court was considering an unusual set of beliefs, Judge Adams 
found that many of the existing precedents did not apply directly to the 
particular facts of the case. Therefore, Judge Adams assembled various 
“indicia” to identify those traits in a non-theist set of beliefs that would 
render that set of beliefs analogous to a traditional, Western theist belief 
system. 
The significant thing about this analysis for purposes of analyzing the 
theory of intelligent design is that the analysis of religious “indicia” starts 
from the proposition that a traditional theist beliefs were by definition 
religious. The central feature of intelligent design theory is identical to the 
key factor used by the Supreme Court in defining the traditional definition of 
religion: i.e., belief in a Supreme Being. As Judge Adams noted, “[t]he 
 503. See Alvarado, 94 F.3d at 1229 (quoting Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 210 (3d Cir. 1979) 
(Adams, J., concurring)). The quoted phrase comes from the Third Circuit source of the “test.” The 
Ninth Circuit also notes the original author’s warning that “the indicia should not be regarded as a final 
‘test’ for religion.” Id. at 1229 n.3 (quoting Malnak, supra, at 210). In contrast to the court’s 
qualifications and clear statement that the three factors are not a formal test of religion, the intelligent 
design proponents present the case as if the court arrived at the opposite conclusion: “Though the 
courts have generally resisted formulating definitions of religion, the Ninth Circuit test articulated in 
[Peloza] and [Alvarado] stands as a clear exception to that rule.” DeWolf, Meyer & DeForrest, supra 
note 87, at 85. 
 504. See Africa, 662 F.2d at 1032; Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 208–10 (3d Cir. 1979) (Adams, 
J., concurring).  
 505. Malnak, 592 F.2d at 213–14 (Adams, J., concurring). 
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original definition of religion prevalent in this country was closely tied to a 
belief in God.”506 Judge Adams’ “indicia” come into play in assessing how 
far away from a traditional belief in God the constitutional definition of 
“religion” can extend. These indicia are not necessary to assess the religious 
status of intelligent design because the assertion of a belief in a Supreme 
Being is by definition a religious proposition.507  
The fact that an asserted belief in a Supreme Being renders a set of beliefs 
religious is evident from the beginning of the Supreme Court’s religion-in-
school jurisprudence, of which the creationism cases are but one part. As 
Judge Adams notes in Malnak: “Both the prayer in Engel and the Bible 
readings in Schempp are unquestionably and uncompromisingly Theist. Even 
under the most narrow and traditional definition of religion, prayers to a 
Supreme Being and readings from the Bible would be considered 
‘religious.’”508 In both of these early cases (as in the later school religion 
cases), there was little comprehensive theology expressed to the students. 
The brief religious exercises involved little more than the recognition of 
God’s existence and humanity’s dependence on him, which was enough to 
 506. Id. at 201. 
 507. Francis Beckwith attempts to avoid this conclusion by arguing that God is not an inherently 
religious concept. “‘God’ need not always be a religious concept, for ‘God’ can be employed as a 
theoretical postulate without being an object of worship.” Beckwith, supra note 136, at 517. It is 
unclear what Beckwith means here. If he means that a public school does not engage in forbidden 
religious practices when it stops short of forcing students to worship the government’s chosen religion, 
then Beckwith simply has the law wrong. None of the Court’s public school/religious endorsement 
cases involved forcible worship. In every case—including Engel—students could opt out of the 
religious activity and not participate at all. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 423 (1962). All of these 
cases involved very mild and usually ecumenical overtures to God and religion. See Lee v. Weisman, 
505 U.S. 577, 581 (1992) (noting the school’s “nonsectarian” prayer composed under guidelines 
requiring “inclusiveness and sensitivity”) (internal quotations omitted). The Court nevertheless held 
that the government violated the Establishment Clause in each case simply by requiring the students to 
make the public choice not to participate. Thus, a formal requirement of worship is not a necessary 
component of Establishment Clause limits on the government’s endorsement of God as a religious 
figure.  
 If, on the other hand, Beckwith means that God may be a legitimate topic of discussion in some 
academic contexts in public schools, then he is clearly correct, but not in the way he suggests. Students 
at a public school may discuss the various religious traditions of the world, different cultures’ 
conflicting perspectives on deities, and even traditional philosophical proofs of God’s existence, but 
only in classes where it is clear the government is not putting forth a set of religious ideas as true. 
Thus, these concepts may be relevant to history, philosophy, or comparative religion courses in a 
public school and may be taught in these contexts without running afoul of the Constitution. But 
teaching intelligent design in a science class is different; in that context students are presented with a 
package of conclusions that has at its core the notion that God created the world in more or less its 
present form. In this context God is not being presented as a “theoretical postulate”; rather, He is being 
presented as the Lord your God, who created the world and presumably still controls it and is therefore 
worthy of deference. See 10 Deuteronomy 14 (“Behold, to the Lord your God belong heaven and the 
heaven of heavens, the earth with all that is in it.”). If this is not a religious concept, it is difficult to 
imagine what would be. 
 508. Malnak, 592 F.2d at 203. 
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render the exercises unconstitutional. The absence of a full-blown worship 
service, or for that matter a specific mention of a particular faith, did not 
render the generic references to God nonreligious. From a constitutional 
perspective, there is no such thing as a secular God. The application of this 
recognition to various manifestations of creationism is unavoidable. As one 
of the Ninth Circuit decisions cited by intelligent design proponents bluntly 
concludes: “The Supreme Court has held unequivocally that while the belief 
in a divine creator of the universe is a religious belief, the scientific theory 
that higher forms of life evolved from lower forms is not.”509  
The intelligent design proponents’ final point about the definition of 
religion asserts that evolutionary doctrine itself is “religious” to the same 
extent as intelligent design theory. “Contrary to the popular just-the-facts 
stereotype of science, many scientific theories have larger ideological and 
religious implications. . . . Theories about where the universe, life, and 
humanity came from invariably affect our perspectives about human nature, 
morality, and ultimate reality.”510 This may be true, but only in the most 
general sense that any new knowledge may alter a person’s existing beliefs. 
The real question is not whether knowledge of evolutionary change will 
“invariably affect our perspectives,” but rather whether evolutionary theory is 
incompatible with a belief in God. If it were incompatible, then teaching 
evolution would be just as unconstitutional as teaching that God created 
humanity in His own image. But the overwhelming evidence is that 
evolutionary theory is not incompatible with deeply held religious beliefs. No 
less a religious authority than Pope John Paul II has attested in a formal 
statement to the Pontifical Academy of Sciences that “Fresh knowledge leads 
to recognition of the theory of evolution as more than just a hypothesis.”511 
The Catholic Church has no problem endorsing evolution because, in 
essence, science and religion operate in different spheres. In the Pope’s 
words, “If the human body has its origin in living material which pre-exists 
it, the spiritual soul is immediately created by God.”512 Evolutionary theory 
can describe how natural processes work, but it cannot describe—and does 
not seek to, since it is not part of the theory’s concern—whether those 
processes were created or by whom, why the processes exist, or whether they 
are part of a larger metaphysical reality. Evolutionary theory leaves the latter 
questions to each individual’s own personal, religious, and philosophical 
 509. Peloza, 37 F.3d at 521. 
 510. DeWolf, Meyer & DeForrest, supra note 87, at 88. 
 511. John Tagliabue, Pope Bolsters Church’s Support for Scientific View of Evolution, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 25, 1996, at A1. 
 512. Id.  
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preferences. This describes what Stephen Gould labeled the “nonoverlapping 
magisteria” of science and religion.513  
In contrast to the evident compatibility between evolutionary theory and a 
diversity of religious thought, intelligent design theory is compatible with 
one, and only one approach to religion—i.e., the approach that depends on a 
Supreme Being who takes an active hand in shaping the world. Intelligent 
design theory is incompatible with the views of agnostics and atheists, 
obviously, but apparently also with Hindus, Buddhists, and at least since 
1996, Catholics. Although intelligent design proponents are generally silent 
about their evolution-friendly co-religionists, they tend to lump evolutionary 
theory with atheism. Intelligent design proponents freely admit that the battle 
against philosophical naturalism provides much of their motivation for taking 
up the battle against the theory of evolution.514 For intelligent design 
proponents, the conflict between evolutionary theory and intelligent design is 
a religious conflict.  
Thus, an ID statute could be justified on the basis of neutrality by 
arguing that to teach only one theory of origins (evolution)--that 
presupposes a controversial epistemology (methodological 
naturalism), entails a controversial metaphysics (ontological 
materialism), and is antithetical to traditional religious belief—the 
state is in fact advocating, aiding, fostering, and promoting irreligion, 
which it is constitutionally forbidden from doing. The state is not 
merely teaching what some religious people find antagonistic or 
offensive to their faith, which would not be unconstitutional. Rather, it 
is promoting a point of view—a metaphysical perspective—that 
“occupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled by” 
traditional belief in God.515
In what they view as the battle between religion and irreligion, intelligent 
design becomes a way of using the science classroom to secure the devotion 
of the faithful and proselytize to those who are not yet part of the flock. 
Students who believe in a creator God may, therefore, find support for 
their faith from the evidence that supports design theory and may 
identify the designing intelligence allegedly responsible for biological 
 513. Stephen Jay Gould, Nonoverlapping Magisteria, in INTELLIGENT DESIGN CREATIONISM AND 
ITS CRITICS 737 (Robert T. Pennock ed., 2001). 
 514. See Beckwith, supra note 136, at 467 (“This is why ID proponents maintain that 
[methodological naturalism] is a necessary presupposition for the veracity of the evolutionary edifice 
and entails ontological materialism as a worldview, but is arguably not necessary for the practice of 
science qua science.”) (internal footnote omitted). 
 515. Id. at 503 (internal footnote omitted). 
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complexity with the God of their religious belief. Alternatively, 
students with no religious convictions may find that evidence of 
design leads them to ask theological questions and to inquire into the 
identity of such a designing intelligence.516  
At least in candid statements like these, intelligent design proponents drop 
the guise that they are merely proposing a new theory to advance the 
empirical discipline of science. Religion, not science, is their primary 
concern, and proselytizing is the object of the exercise. Religious revivals 
serving this function are a longstanding part of the local culture in portions of 
this country; but they usually occur in tents, not science classes. 
2. Intelligent Design and the Problem of Religious Speech by the 
Government 
Intelligent design proponents do not stop at the argument that the 
Establishment Clause permits their theory to be presented to students in 
public school classrooms. They go on to argue that intelligent design must be 
introduced into public school classrooms because the theory is protected by 
the Free Speech Clause and barring it from public school classrooms would 
constitute impermissible viewpoint discrimination.517 They make this free 
speech argument on three levels: First, they argue that the First Amendment 
gives school boards and state boards of education the discretion to define the 
public school curriculum in a way that includes intelligent design 
creationism. Second, they argue (inconsistently in light of their first 
argument) that under the First Amendment school boards do not have 
discretion to define the curriculum in a way that excludes from the public 
school curriculum or classrooms arguments relating to intelligent design. 
Third, they argue (again inconsistently with their first argument) that 
individual teachers have a First Amendment right to introduce the theory into 
the classroom even if the school board has defined the local science 
curriculum in a way that emphasizes only evolutionary theory. The 
intelligent design proponents’ legal arguments for these propositions are 
surprisingly weak—even weaker than the intelligent design claims about the 
Establishment Clause. Indeed, all three versions of the intelligent design free 
speech claims are based on a serious misunderstanding of basic First 
Amendment free speech doctrine.  
 516. DeWolf, Meyer & DeForrest, supra note 87, at 87. 
 517. See Jeffrey F. Addicott, Storm Clouds on the Horizon of Darwinism: Teaching the Anthropic 
Principle and Intelligent Design in the Public Schools, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 1507, 1560–62 (2002); 
DeWolf, Meyer & DeForrest, supra note 87, at 97–109. 
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The foundation of the intelligent design proponents’ free speech claim is 
that there has been a “revolution”518 in First Amendment doctrine relating to 
religious speech due to the Supreme Court’s decision in Rosenberger v. 
Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia.519 Intelligent design 
proponents argue that Rosenberger in effect supercedes Edwards by 
changing “the constitutional standard for deciding the permissibility of 
religiously-motivated speech.”520 They note that in Rosenberger the Supreme 
Court holds that “the First Amendment prohibits the government from 
regulating speech ‘based on its substantive content or the message it 
conveys,’ even where the content of the speech is religious.”521 They view 
this holding as fundamentally changing the landscape of religious speech in 
public schools:  
[I]f the Court has ruled [in Rosenberger] that the constitution allows 
funding religiously motivated speech—indeed speech of an explicitly 
religious character—in order to prevent viewpoint discrimination, then 
clearly the constitution must permit other forms of religiously-
motivated expression, especially those forms of expression that 
address scientific evidence and are (at most) only religious in their 
implications. Thus, a teacher or school board that chooses to include 
presentations about design theory in the curriculum in order to prevent 
an imbalance in the presentation of scientific perspectives on 
biological origins, would enact a secular purpose every bit as 
compelling as the one the state university was required to demonstrate 
in Rosenberger.522
Intelligent design proponents are not quite sure where they want to go 
with this new principle of government-sponsored religious speech they 
attribute to Rosenberger. As noted above, they have three conflicting claims. 
On one hand, they often speak of a free speech right of public school boards 
to control their curriculum (by permitting the presentation of intelligent 
design to students). On the other hand, they assert that school boards cannot 
bar the inclusion of intelligent design in the public school science curriculum. 
Similarly, they argue in favor of free speech protection for individual public 
 518. DeWolf, Meyer & DeForrest, supra note 87, at 103; see also Addicott, supra note 517, at 
1561. 
 519. 515 U.S. 819 (1995).  
 520. DeWolf, Meyer & DeForrest, supra note 87, at 97. 
 521. Id. at 103 (internal footnote omitted). 
 522. Id. at 97; see also Beckwith, supra note 136, at 489 (citing Rosenberger for the proposition 
that “forbidding the teaching of ID (or legitimate criticisms of evolution) in public schools because it 
lends support to a religion, while exclusively permitting or requiring the teaching of evolution, might 
be construed by a court as viewpoint discrimination”). 
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school teachers who want to present the intelligent design “alternative” in the 
face of school board opposition. Thus, although they are in favor of school 
board curricular control by school boards friendly to their cause, intelligent 
design proponents argue that a school board oriented toward evolution does 
not have the right to control the local science curriculum. These contradictory 
claims are sometimes presented in adjacent sentences. In one article 
presenting the intelligent design free speech claims, for example, the authors 
assert that “the law not only permits [a teacher advocating intelligent design] 
to present alternatives, but it now forbids publicly funded viewpoint 
discrimination,” thus implying that a school board cannot prevent a teacher 
from presenting intelligent design to the teacher’s public school science 
class.523 In the very next sentence, however, the authors assert that “recent 
cases have provided a strong reaffirmation of the primary responsibility and 
authority reposed in school boards to decide upon their own curriculum,” a 
proposition the authors support with a citation to a case in which the Fourth 
Circuit Court of Appeals rejected a teacher’s First Amendment claim after 
she was sanctioned for introducing into her classroom material that the 
school board did not endorse.524  
The intelligent design free speech argument can be reduced to the 
tendentious proposition that a school board has a First Amendment right to 
control its curriculum if it wants to include intelligent design, but is subject to 
a First Amendment challenge if it instructs teachers to limit class discussions 
to evolutionary theory. The only way to make sense of this confusion is to 
read it as sending a message to school boards and their lawyers that 
intelligent design activists intend to sue them if they do not include intelligent 
design in their classrooms. The authors say this several times. At one point 
they note pointedly: “Such rulings suggest that school boards that allow 
teachers (or their libraries) to present only one side of a controversial issue 
expose themselves to risk of litigation, especially if their decision to do so is 
‘intended . . . to deny . . . access to ideas with which [they] disagreed.’”525 At 
another point they reiterate that “Rosenberger suggests that a school board 
would face far more exposure to litigation by preventing [a teacher favoring 
intelligent design creationism] from implementing his changes than by 
allowing him to do so.”526  
 523. Id. at 100. 
 524. Id. at 101 (citing Boring v. Buncombe County Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 364, 371 (4th Cir. 
1998)). 
 525. Id. at 102. 
 526. Id. at 108. 
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School boards are understandably averse to litigation, but these warnings 
should not strike fear into even the most litigation-averse board. There is 
little chance that any litigation based on the free speech claims set forth in 
intelligent design articles would survive a motion to dismiss. The problem 
with the intelligent design free speech argument is that it is based on a 
fundamental misunderstanding of Rosenberger and the longstanding free 
speech doctrine that Rosenberger applies.  
The argument that excluding intelligent design from public school science 
classrooms would constitute viewpoint discrimination in violation of the First 
Amendment is premised on the most basic kind of interpretive mistake. 
Specifically, intelligent design proponents fail to recognize the difference 
between state and private action. Intelligent design proponents badly misread 
Rosenberger, and ignore repeated caveats in that decision emphasizing that 
the rule against viewpoint discrimination—which the Court applied to the 
private speech in that case—does not apply to internal curriculum decisions 
made by public educational authorities. The reason for these caveats is 
obvious: State action—that is, speech by the government—is governed by 
one set of First Amendment rules, and private action—that is, speech by 
private persons—is governed by a completely different set of First 
Amendment rules. The Rosenberger rules regarding viewpoint 
discrimination against speech (including religious speech) are applicable only 
to government regulation of speech by private actors—not to speech by the 
government itself. It is difficult to understand how intelligent design 
proponents could have missed this point, since Rosenberger states it 
explicitly: “A holding that the University may not discriminate based on the 
viewpoint of private persons whose speech it facilitates does not restrict the 
University’s own speech, which is controlled by different principles.”527  
The principle that the government may advance its own ideas without 
violating the First Amendment free speech rights of private persons is not a 
new concept. The principle and its rationale were set forth at length in Rust v. 
Sullivan,528 a case cited several times in Rosenberger: 
To hold that the Government unconstitutionally discriminates on the 
basis of viewpoint when it chooses to fund a program dedicated to 
advance certain permissible goals because the program, in advancing 
those goals, necessarily discourages alternate goals would render 
numerous government programs constitutionally suspect. When 
Congress established a National Endowment for Democracy to 
encourage other countries to adopt democratic principles, it was not 
 527. Rosenberger v. Rectors & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 834 (1995). 
 528. 500 U.S. 173 (1991). 
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constitutionally required to fund a program to encourage competing 
lines of political philosophy such as Communism and Fascism. 
Petitioners’ assertions ultimately boil down to the position that, if the 
government chooses to subsidize one protected right, it must subsidize 
analogous counterpart rights. But the Court has soundly rejected that 
proposition. Within far broader limits than petitioners are willing to 
concede, when the Government appropriates public funds to establish 
a program, it is entitled to define the limits of that program.529
When applied to the current controversy, this implies that the government 
is permitted to emphasize education in evolutionary theory without 
subsidizing the scientifically unsubstantiated claims of those who do not 
favor evolution.  
The distinction between private and government speech is at the very 
heart of Rosenberger. Indeed, the Rosenberger majority emphasized that it 
rejected the dissent’s Establishment Clause argument precisely because the 
religious speakers in Rosenberger were private individuals, rather than the 
government. “The distinction between the University’s own favored message 
and the private speech of students is evident in the case before us.”530 After 
noting previous decisions upholding private student speech on public 
university property, the Court noted that these cases had nothing to do with 
public schools’ decisions to decide for themselves the nature of their own 
curriculum. After noting its previous recognition of the “right of the 
University to make academic judgments as to how best to allocate scarce 
resources,”531 the Court elaborated on the relevance of this to the curriculum-
setting decisions of public educational authorities: 
The quoted language . . . was but a proper recognition of the principle 
that when the State is the speaker, it may make content-based choices. 
When the University determines the content of the education it 
provides, it is the University speaking, and we have permitted the 
government to regulate the content of what is or is not expressed when 
it is the speaker or when it enlists private entities to convey its own 
message. In the same vein, in Rust v. Sullivan, we upheld the 
government’s prohibition on abortion-related advice applicable to 
recipients of federal funds for family planning counseling. There, the 
government did not create a program to encourage private speech but 
instead used private speakers to transmit specific information 
 529. Id. at 194 (internal citations omitted). 
 530. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 834. 
 531. Id. at 833 (quoting Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 276 (1981)). 
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pertaining to its own program. We recognized that when the 
government appropriates public funds to promote a particular policy 
of its own it is entitled to say what it wishes. When the government 
disburses public funds to private entities to convey a governmental 
message, it may take legitimate and appropriate steps to ensure that its 
message is neither garbled nor distorted by the grantee.532  
In light of these extensive statements in Rosenberger, there is nothing in 
the First Amendment that prevents public school authorities from seeing to it 
that their science classes are not “garbled or distorted” by the unsubstantiated 
claims of intelligent design creationism. The ominous suggestion of litigation 
against school boards “that allow teachers (or their libraries) to present only 
one side of a controversial issue”533 is therefore nothing more than an empty 
threat.  
Rosenberger also illustrates a second way in which the state/private 
distinction applies to the decisions by school boards whether or not to permit 
intelligent design in public school classrooms. It is clear from the structure of 
the theory534 and from the statements of its proponents535 that intelligent 
design is a religious theory. As such, the Establishment Clause prohibits any 
public institution, including schools, from endorsing or advancing that 
theory. This is the holding of Epperson and Edwards, which, as described in 
the previous subsection, applies directly to intelligent design creationism. 
Therefore, public school boards barring the inclusion of intelligent design 
from their classrooms do not violate the Free Speech Clause of the First 
Amendment because they are simply complying with the Establishment 
Clause of the First Amendment. The program funding religious speech in 
Rosenberger was upheld by the Court because it “respect[ed] the critical 
difference ‘between government speech endorsing religion, which the 
Establishment Clause forbids, and private speech endorsing religion, which 
the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses protect.’”536 In Rosenberger, the 
Court emphasized that “‘the government has not fostered or encouraged’ any 
mistaken impression that the [religious] student[s] . . . speak for the 
University.”537 A school board endorsement of intelligent design, on the 
other hand, would convey just the opposite impression—that is, that religious 
ideas are being presented on behalf of the government. It is hard to 
 532. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 533. DeWolf, Meyer & DeForrest, supra note 87, at 102. 
 534. See supra notes 475–516 and accompanying text. 
 535. See supra notes 84–271 and accompanying text. 
 536. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 841 (quoting Bd of Educ. of Westside Cmty. Sch. v. Mergens, 496 
U.S. 226, 250 (1990) (opinion of O’Connor, J.). 
 537. Id. (quoting Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 766 (1995)). 
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understand why intelligent design proponents emphasize Rosenberger so 
heavily, because not only does Rosenberger not support their position, it 
specifically precludes the result they are trying to achieve. 
The short answer to the intelligent design First Amendment claims 
regarding school boards is that the government is not obligated to balance 
secular theory with religious doctrine in public classrooms because the 
government is not permitted to present religious doctrine in public school 
classrooms at all. Schools may not discriminate against the free speech rights 
of students who meet on school premises after hours to discuss religious 
doctrines in private groups or clubs,538 but free speech does not come into 
play when the school respects the boundary between secular and religious 
governmental action imposed by the First Amendment. 
The final variation of the intelligent design free speech claim is the 
argument that teachers have an individual free speech right to teach 
intelligent design as science even if their school boards specifically prohibit 
them from doing so. This variation on the free speech theme combines the 
viewpoint discrimination point from Rosenberger with a vaguely defined 
notion of academic freedom to produce the conclusion that school boards 
may not require their science teachers to adhere to a defined curriculum 
organized around the scientific community’s widely accepted understanding 
of evolutionary theory. Instead, intelligent design proponents argue that 
teachers have the right to introduce their own views of scientific theory, even 
if their views are rejected by virtually the entire mainstream scientific 
community. According to this argument: “If [a teacher] had offered to his 
students an alternative point of view, such as [intelligent design], and if his 
employer had then prohibited him from engaging in such speech during class 
time, he surely would have had a case with law in his favor.”539 If some 
teachers are allowed to teach evolution, the argument goes, then it would 
violate the First Amendment rule against viewpoint discrimination to prohibit 
other teachers from teaching intelligent design. “The same freedoms that 
allow teachers to present Darwinian evolutionary theory would seem to allow 
teachers to teach students about the theory of intelligent design, even if their 
school boards oppose their pedagogy.”540 And of course the specter of 
litigation is raised once again: “school boards that allow teachers (or their 
libraries) to present only one side of a controversial issue expose themselves 
 538. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981); Mergens, 496 U.S. 226. 
 539. Francis J. Beckwith, A Liberty Not Fully Evolved?: The Case of Rodney LeVake and the 
Right of Public School Teachers to Criticize Darwinism, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1311, 1321 (2002). 
 540. DeWolf, Meyer & DeForrest, supra note 87, at 106. 
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to risk of litigation, especially if their decision to do so is ‘intended . . . to 
deny . . . access to ideas with which [they] disagreed.’”541
The intelligent design proponents’ argument on behalf of individual 
teachers illustrates once again the weakness of their First Amendment 
analysis. Like the intelligent design proponents’ free speech arguments 
regarding the authority of school boards, their free speech arguments 
regarding individual teachers rests on an incomplete and deeply flawed 
rendition of current First Amendment doctrine. Also like their arguments 
regarding school boards, their conclusions regarding individual teachers’ free 
speech rights are stated at such a high level of generality that they fail even to 
address many important details of the very complex First Amendment 
jurisprudence pertaining to their claims.  
Five problem areas are immediately evident in this variation of the 
intelligent design argument: First, intelligent design proponents rely on the 
concept of academic freedom, but the current status of academic freedom as 
a First Amendment right is by no means clear—and in some circuits has been 
rejected altogether. Second, even if the concept of academic freedom does 
exist as an independent First Amendment concept, it is doubtful that courts 
would apply that concept to protect public school teachers below the 
university level who seek to deviate from the school district’s standard 
curriculum. Third, on-the-job speech by public school teachers is usually 
analyzed under a category of First Amendment doctrine governing 
government employee speech generally, which intelligent design proponents 
address only incompletely and inaccurately. Fourth, even if public school 
teachers below the university level possess First Amendment academic 
freedom or employee speech rights, no conception of either right would 
protect a teacher presenting to his or her class theories that are rejected by 
virtually all qualified scholars in a particular field. Fifth, even if public school 
teachers below the university level possess free speech rights generally, those 
rights in no way undercut Establishment Clause rules restricting teachers 
from introducing religion into the classroom. Each of these issues is worthy 
of a full article unto itself, but even a brief review of these issues will reveal 
the serious inadequacy of the intelligent design free speech argument for 
teacher civil disobedience.  
As for the concept of academic freedom, proponents of intelligent design 
repeatedly appeal to a vaguely defined notion of academic freedom to 
support their claim that renegade teachers can ignore school board 
instructions not to teach intelligent design as science.542 Articles presenting 
 541. Id. at 102. 
 542. See Beckwith, supra note 136, at 507–14; Beckwith, supra note 539, at 1316–25; DeWolf, 
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this claim quote broad paeans to academic freedom from older Supreme 
Court cases,543 but fail to note that the Supreme Court has actually never held 
that an independent First Amendment right of academic freedom exists even 
at the university level, much less in elementary and secondary schools, where 
administrative control of curriculum and teaching is much more extensive.544 
Moreover, at least one federal appellate court has held explicitly that “we do 
not find support to conclude that academic freedom is an independent First 
Amendment right.”545 Another court of appeals has held that to the extent 
any First Amendment right of academic freedom exists, it is merely a 
recognition of “an institutional right of self-governance in academic 
affairs,”546 not an individual right of professors at public universities “to 
determine for themselves the content of their courses and scholarship.”547  
Even opinions that accept for the sake of argument that academic freedom 
at the university level has some First Amendment value are far less willing to 
grant such rights to teachers below the university level. On this score lower 
courts have followed the Supreme Court’s lead. Intelligent design proponents 
cite Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District548 in support of their 
academic freedom claim, but do not seem to realize that in its more recent 
school speech cases the Supreme Court has restricted Tinker to the point that 
some now argue that much of Tinker has been effectively overruled.549 In 
 
 
Meyer & DeForrest, supra note 87, at 100–09. 
 543. See, e.g., DeWolf, Meyer & DeForrest, supra note 87, at 101–02 (quoting Bd. of Educ., 
Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. 
Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969)). 
 544. The three early cases that are most frequently cited as supporting a First Amendment right of 
academic freedom do indeed have broad statements supporting that principle, but each case ultimately 
was decided on much narrower due process grounds. See Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 
(1967); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957); Weiman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952). 
Nothing said here should be taken as an endorsement of the Supreme Court’s failure to explicitly 
recognize a First Amendment right of academic freedom; the point is simply that intelligent design 
proponents have enlisted in their cause statements of legal rights that go far beyond what the courts 
have thus far been willing to recognize. 
 545. Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066, 1075 (11th Cir. 1991). 
 546. Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401, 412 (4th Cir. 2000). 
 547. Id. at 414. 
 548. 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). For the use of Tinker by intelligent design proponents, see 
Beckwith, supra note 539, at 1324; DeWolf, Meyer & DeForrest, supra note 87, at 101. 
 549. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Students Do Leave Their First Amendment Rights at the 
Schoolhouse Gates: What’s Left of Tinker?, 48 DRAKE L. REV. 527, 535 (2000). Chemerinsky writes: 
Tinker never has been expressly overruled or even openly questioned in later Supreme Court 
opinions. But its approach has also never been followed in cases involving elementary, middle 
school, and high school students. Indeed, the Supreme Court rulings subsequent to Tinker have 
almost all sided with school officials and appear to have followed an approach much closer to 
Justice Black’s [Tinker dissent] than the [Tinker] majority. 
Id.; see also Nadine Strossen, Students’ Rights and How They Are Wronged, 32 U. RICH. L. REV. 457, 
458 (1998) (noting the Court’s “back-sliding” on Tinker); S. Elizabeth Wilborn, Teaching the New 
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Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier550 and Bethel School Dist. No. 403 
v. Fraser551 the Court significantly limited the scope of the free speech 
principles articulated in Tinker. Hazelwood is especially important, because 
in that case the Court describes the extensive leeway granted to school 
administrators in dictating the limits of speech undertaken in conjunction 
with the school’s defined curriculum. In Hazelwood the school’s principal 
censored student articles written for the school newspaper. In upholding the 
principal’s authority to suppress the students’ work, the Court referred to the 
“special characteristics of the school environment”552 and concluded bluntly 
that “[a] school need not tolerate student speech that is inconsistent with its 
‘basic educational mission,’ . . . even though the government could not 
censor similar speech outside the school.”553 Although these cases all 
involved student speech, several appellate courts have applied this analysis to 
in-class speech by teachers as well.554
One alternative to the academic freedom defense of teacher speech is to 
apply the First Amendment standard for government employee speech 
generally. The problem with this approach is that the intelligent design 
proponents get this standard wrong, too. Francis Beckwith relies on this line 
of cases in developing one of his free speech arguments for individual 
teachers seeking to inject intelligent design into their classes. He focuses 
especially on the Supreme Court’s decision in Pickering v. Board of 
Education,555 and therefore treats the standard as a pure balancing test, in 
which courts must balance the free speech interests of the teacher against the 
school’s interest in operating an efficient and productive school system.556 
Pickering is indeed part of the First Amendment standard applicable to 
government employee speech, but Beckwith does not seem to realize that 
Pickering is only the second part of the standard. The first part of the 
standard is derived from the post-Pickering decision Connick v. Myers.557 
Connick holds that a court should not apply the Pickering balancing test 
unless the court first finds that the government employee claiming free 
speech rights was speaking on a matter of public concern, defined by the 
 
 
Three Rs—Repression, Rights, and Respect: A Primer of Student Speech Activities, 37 B.C. L. REV. 
119, 130–37 (1995) (describing the Court’s “inexplicable retreat” from Tinker). 
 550. 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
 551. 478 U.S. 675 (1986). 
 552. Id. at at 266 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)). 
 553. Id. at 266. 
 554. See Silano v. Sag Harbor Union Free Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 42 F.3d 719, 723 (2d Cir. 
1994); Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448, 453 (1st Cir. 1993); Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066, 1074 
(11th Cir. 1991); Miles v. Denver Pub. Schs., 944 F.2d 773, 777 (10th Cir. 1991). 
 555. 391 U.S. 563 (1968). 
 556. See Beckwith, supra note 539, at 1318–19. 
 557. 461 U.S. 138 (1983). 
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Court as speech “fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, 
social, or other concern to the community.”558 Connick is problematic for the 
intelligent design case because appellate courts in two different federal 
circuits have held that a teacher’s decision to supplement the school board’s 
curriculum is not a matter of public concern and therefore is not subject to 
the Pickering balancing test.559 This approach undermines the intelligent 
design argument that teachers have a First Amendment right to personally 
add intelligent design materials to counteract a school board’s science 
curriculum that is devoted exclusively to evolutionary theory. The analysis of 
one circuit court addresses this sort of claim directly: 
[P]ublic school teachers are not free, under the first amendment, to 
arrogate control of curricula. Parents, administrators, and elected 
officials also have a legitimate role in the process of selecting material 
that will advance educational goals, a role that cannot lightly be 
 558. Id. at 146. 
 559. See Boring v. Buncombe County Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 364, 368–69 (4th Cir. 1998) (en 
banc); Kirkland v. Northside Indep. Sch. Dist., 890 F.2d 794, 797–99 (5th Cir. 1989).  
 There is only one significant decision in which a court of appeals found that a teacher’s in-class 
speech constituted a matter of public concern. See Cockrel v. Shelby County Sch. Dist., 270 F.3d 1036 
(6th Cir. 2001). In that decision, however, the school authorities had initially given the teacher 
permission to present controversial material on industrial hemp production to the teacher’s fifth-grade 
class. Id. at 1042. Then, after media coverage of the incident produced parental protests, the school 
authorities initiated a vigorous review of the teacher’s performance, which led to the teacher being 
fired. Id. at 1043. The court of appeals held that the teacher’s speech was protected by the First 
Amendment, and that she was fired in retaliation for exercising those rights. Id. at 1060. The key factor 
in the court’s decision, however, was that the school authorities had themselves authorized the 
teacher’s controversial presentation: 
While ordinarily we would give substantial weight to the government employer’s concerns of 
workplace efficiency, harmony, and discipline in conducting our balancing of the employee’s and 
employer’s competing interests, we cannot allow these concerns to tilt the Pickering scale in favor 
of the government, absent other evidence, when the disruptive consequences of the employee 
speech can be traced back to the government’s express decision permitting the employee to 
engage in that speech. 
Id. at 1054–55. The holding in Cockrel will not help teachers in acting out the scenarios presented by 
intelligent design proponents. In these scenarios teachers are encouraged to present intelligent design 
theory even if “his employer had then prohibited him from engaging in such speech during class 
time. . . .” Beckwith, supra note 539, at 1321. Even if teachers in such situations advance beyond the 
Connick public concern analysis, the Pickering balancing test will be governed by the court’s 
willingness to give “substantial weight to the government employer’s concerns of workplace 
efficiency, harmony, and discipline.” Cockrel, 270 F.3d at 1054. Note also that the deference to school 
administrators announced by the Supreme Court in Hazelwood will also tilt the balance in favor of the 
administrators once a court engages in a Pickering balancing analysis of a teacher’s unauthorized 
speech. “The concern addressed in Pickering—the right of an employee to participate as other citizens 
in debate on public matters—is simply less forceful when considered ‘in light of the special 
characteristics of the school environment.’” Miles v. Denver Pub. Schs., 944 F.2d 773, 777 (10th Cir. 
1991) (quoting Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988); Tinker v. Des Moines 
Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist. 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss1/1












assumed by teachers alone. Thus, when an administrative process is 
established to compile and amend officially approved material with 
input from parents, administrators, and educators, teachers must 
respect that process . . . . In summary, we conclude that [the teacher’s 
supplemental] reading list does not present a matter of public concern 
and that this case presents nothing more than an ordinary employment 
dispute. Accordingly, [the teacher’s] conduct in disregarding [the 
school’s] administrative process does not constitute protected speech, 
and any inquiry into the reasons for the nonrenewal of his employment 
contract is unnecessary.560
In this legal atmosphere teachers who insist on inserting intelligent design 
into their class presentations against the contrary instructions of their school 
district are not likely to last long in the public school system. Articles by 
intelligent design proponents containing advice to the contrary disserve 
sympathetic teachers who may place their very livelihood at stake if they act 
on the unsound counsel. 
The basic problem is that intelligent design proponents have simply 
misjudged the magnitude of First Amendment protection afforded public 
school teachers below the university level. As an abstract matter, there are 
many reasons to join intelligent design proponents in lamenting the courts’ 
meager protection of free speech in the classroom. In the concrete context of 
the debate between intelligent design and evolution, on the other hand, even 
the strongest protection of academic freedom would not permit intelligent 
design proponents to introduce their theory into public school science 
classes. Even the strongest protection of academic freedom would not protect 
teachers who present material that is substantively inaccurate, or public 
school teachers who present material of a religious nature in class. Both of 
these characteristics rob efforts to introduce intelligent design of even 
hypothetical First Amendment protection. 
Even the strongest advocate of academic freedom would not assert that 
the First Amendment protects a teacher who insists on presenting his or her 
class inaccurate information and outlandish theories. A teacher who insists 
that the sun revolves around the earth should not be allowed to remain at the 
head of an astronomy class. Academic freedom has never meant that anyone 
can say anything in any classroom without professional ramifications. The 
core meaning of the concept of academic freedom is that sanctions cannot be 
imposed on academic personnel whose work offends the ideological 
sensibilities of those outside the academy—primarily politicians and 
 560. Kirkland, 890 F.2d at 802. 
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government officials and the bureaucrats who do their bidding. Academic 
freedom does not mean that teachers are exempt from the normal standards 
of professional oversight. This formulation of academic freedom is the 
cornerstone of the American Association of University Professors’ 1915 
General Declaration of Principles,561 which has been called “the single most 
important document relating to American academic freedom.”562 Under this 
conception of academic freedom: 
Academic speakers can be held within the strictures of discourse 
established by their discipline; departure from the scientific model can 
be punished. Indeed, the Committee never argued that speech should 
be immune from adverse consequences. It contended only that the 
consequences be determined by competent professionals within the 
same discipline.563  
Or, to put the matter more bluntly: “Error is tolerable; incompetence is 
not.”564  
The significance of this for the intelligent design movement is that the 
mainstream scientific community has judged their theory lacking on every 
score. It is not accepted as part of the governing model in any of the major 
sciences, while in contrast evolutionary theory provides a starting point and 
framework for any serious discussion in a range of different scientific 
disciplines. Section III supra discusses this point in great detail. Until 
intelligent design proponents can convince someone other than fellow 
intelligent design activists that their work is valid and important, the 
presentation of their work in a public school science class will not be 
protected by the principles of academic freedom. 
The second reason free speech claims will not help the intelligent design 
case is the religious nature of intelligent design creationism. The religious 
nature of the theory has been detailed at length in Section II supra, and the 
legal implications of intelligent design as religion are discussed earlier in this 
section. At this point the only thing left to add is that free speech claims will 
not trump the Establishment Clause limits on teachers who seek to introduce 
religion into public school classrooms. There are many cases in which public 
school teachers have been sanctioned by school authorities for inserting 
 561. See Am. Ass’n of Univ. Professors, General Declaration of Principles, reprinted in 2 
AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 860 (R. Hofstadter & W. Smith eds., 
1961). 
 562. J. Peter Byrne, Academic Freedom: A “Special Concern of the First Amendment,” 99 YALE 
L.J. 251, 276 (1989). 
 563. Id. at 277–78. 
 564. Id. at 276. 
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religious views into their classrooms during class time, and the courts have 
routinely held that these sanctions do not violate the teachers’ First 
Amendment free speech or free exercise rights.565 A number of these cases 
involve teachers inserting creationism into the classroom, and the decisions 
in these cases have uniformly held that the teacher has no First Amendment 
claim.566 The reason for this uniform rejection of free speech claims goes 
back to the same distinction intelligent design proponents had such 
difficulties with in analyzing Rosenberger: the distinction between 
government speech and private speech. When serving in their capacities as 
instructional personnel in a public school system, teachers are engaging in 
speech on behalf of the government. “[A] teacher’s [religious] speech can be 
taken as directly and deliberately representative of the school.”567 The 
teachers may still engage in religious speech after hours or off the school 
premises, where their status as private individuals is clear to all concerned.568 
In the classroom, on the other hand, they represent the state, and all the 
limitations that apply to state advancement of religion apply in full force to 
the teacher as well.  
 565. See, e.g., Marchi v. Bd. of Coop. Educ. Servs. of Albany, 173 F.3d 469 (2d Cir. 1999) 
(upholding school board’s cease and desist order against a teacher who converted to Christianity and 
then modified his instructional program to discuss topics such as forgiveness, reconciliation, and God); 
Doe v. Duncanville Indep. Sch. Dist., 70 F.3d 402 (5th Cir. 1995) (upholding injunction prohibiting 
public school teachers from participating in student-led religious exercises before, during, or after 
school-related sporting events); Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066 (11th Cir. 1991) (upholding 
university action requiring professor to refrain from injecting his religious views into an exercise 
psychology class, and also to refrain from holding “optional” classes to discuss the Christian 
perspective on academic matters); Roberts v. Madigan, 921 F.2d 1047 (10th Cir. 1990) (upholding 
school district directive prohibiting teacher from silently reading his Bible in a classroom during 
student reading time); Downing v. West Haven Bd. of Educ., 162 F. Supp. 2d 19 (D. Conn. 2001) 
(rejecting a free speech challenge to a public school’s action prohibiting a teacher from wearing in 
class during instructional time a t-shirt with the inscription “JESUS 2000-J2K”). 
 566. See, e.g., Helland v. S. Bend Cmty. Sch. Corp., 93 F.3d 327 (7th Cir. 1996) (upholding 
school district decision to remove teacher from substitute teacher list for discussing religion in class, 
including expressing his belief in creationism); Peloza v. Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist., 37 F.3d 517 
(9th Cir. 1994) (upholding school requirement that teacher teach evolution in biology class and avoid 
talking with students during the school day about creationism and other religious topics); Webster v. 
New Lenox Sch. Dist. No. 122, 917 F.2d 1004 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that public school teacher has 
no First Amendment right to teach creationism); LeVake v. Independent School Dist. No. 656, 625 
N.W.2d 502 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001) (upholding school board decision to reassign teacher who refused 
to teach evolution to a tenth-grade biology class).  
 567. Bishop, 926 F.2d at 1073. 
 568. See, e.g., Wigg v. Sioux Falls Sch. Dist. 49-5, 274 F. Supp. 2d 1084 (D.S.D. 2003) 
(upholding school district policy prohibiting teacher from attending after-hours religious meeting on 
the premises of the school where she taught, but overturning the part of the policy prohibiting the 
teacher from attending private religious meetings at other schools). 
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3. Is it Science Yet? 
Much of what proponents write about the legal issues surrounding the 
theory of intelligent design is based on the assumption that if the theory can 
be denominated “science,” then no legal barrier can be erected to including 
the theory in public school classrooms.569 In part this is a response to a 
section of the Arkansas creationism decision McLean v. Arkansas,570 which 
intelligent design proponents routinely denounce.571 McLean contains the 
most thorough substantive consideration of creationist theory yet to appear in 
any judicial opinion and therefore continues to influence the debate about 
various anti-evolution efforts, including intelligent design. As discussed in 
Section I supra, McLean held unconstitutional an Arkansas statute that 
required “balanced treatment to creation-science and evolution-science.”572 
One portion of the statute described the details of each theory to be given 
balanced treatment, and included in the definition of “creation-science” a 
number of specifically Biblical references to phenomena such as the 
occurrence of a world-wide flood and the “relatively recent inception of the 
earth.”573 In the course of holding that the statute violated the Establishment 
Clause by injecting religion into public school classrooms, the court noted 
that creation science as defined by the statute “is simply not science.”574 The 
court then set forth five criteria that, it said, typically define a scientific 
theory: 
(1)  It is guided by natural law; 
(2)  It has to be explanatory by reference to nature law; 
(3)  It is testable against the empirical world; 
 569. “[I]f, arguably, design theory has both a theoretical basis and evidential support, and if it 
meets abstract definitional criteria of scientific status equally as well as its main theoretical rivals, then 
it seems natural to ask: on what grounds can design theory now be excluded from public school 
science curriculum?” DeWolf, Meyer & DeForrest, supra note 87, at 74. 
 570. 529 F. Supp. 1255 (D. Ark. 1982). 
 571. See Addicott, supra note 517, at 1568 (concluding that “Judge Overton’s simplistic definition 
of science has been soundly refuted by numerous legal and scientific commentators as woefully 
inadequate and unrealistic”); Francis J. Beckwith, Science and Religion Twenty Years After McLean v. 
Virginia: Evolution, Public Education, and the New Challenge of Intelligent Design, 26 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 455, 494 (2003) (criticizing McLean and arguing that “Judge Overton’s criteria, at least as 
applied to creation-science, are seriously flawed”); DeWolf, Meyer & DeForrest, supra note 87, at 66–
78 (critiquing McLean and concluding that its definition of science is “questionable”). 
 572. McLean, 529 F. Supp. at 1256. 
 573. Id. at 1264. 
 574. Id. at 1267. 
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(4)  Its conclusions are tentative, i.e. are not necessarily the final word; 
and 
(5)  It is falsifiable.575  
Intelligent design proponents have several inconsistent responses to this 
list of criteria. On one hand, they argue that the entire effort to define 
“science” is impossible because “many philosophers of science have 
generally abandoned attempts to define science by reference to abstract 
demarcation criteria.”576 On the other hand, they cite some of the same 
criteria to argue that a definitive category called “science” does exist and 
creationism fits the definition as well as evolutionary theory. “[N]aturalistic 
and non-naturalistic origins theories (including both Darwinism and design 
theory) are ‘methodologically equivalent,’ both in their ability to meet 
various demarcation criteria and as historical theories of origin.”577 When 
these conflicting claims are reduced to their essence, the basic intelligent 
design argument is that no one has the ability to assess the scientific validity 
of their theory—especially experts in particular scientific fields who are not 
aligned with the intelligent design movement. To put it bluntly, they assert 
that the simple pretense of scientific validity should be enough to satisfy the 
legal standard for including the theory in the public school curriculum.  
Since . . . no ruling body in science can determine when a minority 
scientific interpretation has attracted sufficient support to warrant 
discussion in the science classroom, the pedagogical debate will 
necessarily, and properly, devolve to individual teachers and local 
school boards. In any case, defining permissible science as co-
extensive with majority scientific opinion erects a more restrictive 
standard than the law itself now recognizes in deciding the 
admissibility of expert scientific opinion.578
Political assessments of scientific validity, in other words, should trump 
assessments by the scientific community itself. 
Intelligent design advocates have no choice but to take this odd route to 
academic acceptance. As the quote above indicates, intelligent design 
advocates implicitly acknowledge that their theory has virtually no standing 
among mainstream scholars. Their only option, therefore, is to argue that the 
 575. Id. at 1267. 
 576. DeWolf, Meyer & DeForrest, supra note 87, at 69; see also Addicott, supra note 517, at 1568 
(arguing that the McLean definition has been “refuted by numerous legal and scientific 
commentators”); Beckwith, supra note 571, at 492–93 (describing McLean definition of science as 
“anachronistic” and “self-refuting”). 
 577. DeWolf, Meyer & DeForrest, supra note 87, at 72. 
 578. Id. at 75. 
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conclusions of a fringe movement is just as valid as the conclusions of the 
overwhelming majority of scholars in the field. They argue, in effect, that so 
long as a handful of advocates with plausible academic credentials announce 
their support for the theory, then that theory is sufficiently “scientific” to be 
granted access to public school classrooms. All science is created equal, they 
argue, so let students hear both sides.  
There are serious flaws in this argument, and these flaws illustrate how 
intelligent design proponents mischaracterize McLean and other cases 
dealing with scientific matters. The central problem is that intelligent design 
proponents greatly overstate the extent to which the law is willing to 
recognize any theory—no matter how implausible—as “science.” It may be 
true that there is no infallible and universally applicable test for when a 
particular theory constitutes “science.” But it is also true that some theories 
are so inconsistent with current scientific understandings of the world that 
they cannot be reasonably construed as scientifically valid. It is irrelevant 
whether one calls such theories unscientific or merely “bad science.”579 
There is simply no legitimate reason to include them in scientific discussions.  
The very cases intelligent design proponents use to bolster their position 
in fact demonstrate why their theory should not be given the credibility they 
demand. Intelligent design proponents are fond of quoting in support of their 
position Daubert v. Merrell Pharmaceuticals, Inc.580—the Supreme Court’s 
recent decision regarding the standard for admitting scientific and other 
expert testimony.581 In Daubert the Court modified its previous rules 
regarding the admissibility of scientific evidence under the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure. The Court interpreted the standard of Rule 401—“All 
relevant evidence is admissible”582—as liberalizing the prevailing standard 
prior to the adoption of the Rule. The pre-Daubert rule required scientific 
evidence introduced at trial to be “sufficiently established to have gained 
general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.”583 Intelligent 
 579. See id. at 73–74. 
[E]ven many of those who previously wielded demarcation arguments as a way of protecting the 
Darwinist hegemony in public education, including the most prominent advocates of these 
arguments, have either abandoned or repudiated them. For example, Eugenie Scott of The 
National Center for Science Education (an advocacy group for an exclusively Darwinist 
curriculum) no longer seeks to dismiss creation science as pseudoscience or as unscientific; 
instead, she argues that it constitutes “bad science.”  
Id. 
 580. 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 581. See Addicott, supra note 517, at 1569–70; Beckwith, supra note 571, at 491; DeWolf, Meyer 
& DeForrest, supra note 87, at 75. 
 582. FED. R. EVID. 402. 
 583. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Ct. App. 1923). 
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design proponents argue that Daubert casts doubt on McLean because in 
Daubert the Court adopted a kind of anything-goes approach to accepting 
any theory that can claim any empirical basis: 
This trend makes reliance upon the demarcation criteria in McLean v. 
Arkansas even more questionable. Since Daubert has made the 
question of scientific legitimacy turn on “evidentiary reliability,” the 
courtroom should be hospitable to competing theories provided each 
theory has an empirical basis. To exclude an interpretation simply 
because it has not yet achieved majority support usurps the function 
that juries ought to serve. By analogy, the debate over origins theory 
should not exclude a viewpoint at the outset because of the inability to 
command a majority of scientists; it should be the function of 
scientific inquiry itself to permit competing theories to argue, on the 
basis of empirical data, for wider acceptance.584 
However, this badly misreads the Court’s holding in Daubert. The Court 
emphasized in Daubert that its opinion “does not mean . . . that the Rules 
themselves place no limits on the admissibility of purportedly scientific 
evidence. Nor is the trial judge disabled from screening such evidence. To 
the contrary, under the Rules, the trial judge must ensure that any and all 
scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but 
reliable.”585 The Court emphasized that expert testimony must relate to 
“scientific knowledge,” which the Court emphasized “connotes more than 
subjective belief or unsupported speculation.”586 The Court then listed a 
series of pertinent considerations for judges to keep in mind when 
considering the proffer of scientific evidence. None of these should make 
intelligent design proponents comfortable. One “key question,” the Court 
noted, “will be whether [a theory] can be (and has been) tested.”587 Like the 
judge in McLean, the Daubert Court emphasized the critical element of 
falsification.588 Intelligent design proponents should keep this “key question” 
 584. DeWolf, Meyer & DeForrest, supra note 87, at 77–78; see also Addicott, supra note 517, at 
1569–70 (“Under Daubert, the test for scientific legitimacy will be evaluated not on a bandwagon 
approach or by the fulfillment of a McLean-style set of arbitrary criteria. Instead, the Court will now 
evaluate the legitimacy of a new theory—even if a minority view—on the basis of a variety of factors, 
with emphasis on the actual empirical research.”); Beckwith, supra note 571, at 491 (“[The test of 
scientific legitimacy] is, very simply, now a matter of arguments and their soundness, not a matter of 
popularity.”). 
 585. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589 (internal footnote omitted). 
 586. Id. at 589–90. 
 587. Id. at 593. 
 588. See id. at 593 (quoting KARL POPPER, CONJECTURES AND REFUTATIONS: THE GROWTH OF 
SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE 37 (5th ed. 1989) (“[T]he criterion of the scientific status of a theory is its 
falsifiability, or refutability, or testability.”)). 
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in mind when devising the methodology for testing their central thesis that a 
Supreme Being created the world in more or less its present form. A second 
consideration noted by the Court is “whether the theory or technique has 
been subjected to peer review and publication.”589 The Court found the 
reason for relying on peer review obvious:  
[S]ubmission to the scrutiny of the scientific community is a 
component of “good science,” in part because it increases the 
likelihood that substantive flaws in methodology will be detected . . . . 
The fact of publication (or lack thereof) in a peer reviewed journal 
thus will be a relevant, though not dispositive, consideration in 
assessing the scientific validity of a particular technique or 
methodology on which an opinion is premised.590
Finally, the Court emphasized that “general acceptance” is still very 
important in assessing the reliability of a scientific theory: “Widespread 
acceptance can be an important factor in ruling particular evidence 
admissible, and ‘a known technique which has been able to attract only 
minimal support within the community,’ may properly be viewed with 
skepticism.”591  
Daubert presents proponents of intelligent design creationism with a 
major dilemma: They advocate a theory whose central precept cannot be 
tested or falsified; they seldom if ever have their theoretical papers accepted 
for publication in peer-reviewed science journals; and their theory is rejected 
by virtually the entire scientific community. As science, therefore, their 
theory—in the words of a case they themselves frequently cite—“may 
properly be viewed with skepticism.”592 For what it is worth, this is precisely 
the point made by the district court in McLean. During its discussion of the 
definition of science and descriptions of “what scientists do,” the McLean 
court noted: “The obvious implication of this description is that, in a free 
society, knowledge does not require the imprimatur of legislation in order to 
become science.”593 Or to put the matter another way, intelligent design 
creationism cannot use the political process to overcome its failures as 
science.  
 589. Id. at 593. 
 590. Id. at 593–94 (internal citations omitted). 
 591. Id. at 594 (quoting United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1238 (3d Cir. 1985)). 
 592. Id. 
 593. McLean v. Ark. Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1267 (E.D. Ark. 1982). 
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Much of the new battle between intelligent design and evolutionary 
theory is reminiscent of the old battle between creationism and evolution. 
This is not surprising, since intelligent design is merely a stripped-down 
version of its more explicitly Biblical predecessors. God is at the center of all 
versions of the theory, whether He is denominated as such, or is identified 
merely as the Supreme Being or intelligent designer. Given the similarities 
between all versions of the theory, the demarcation lines of the battle are 
already well drawn, and the conclusion to the legal aspect of the conflict is 
not in serious doubt. In sum, the proposal to incorporate intelligent design 
theory into the public school science curriculum cannot be reconciled with a 
consistent application of relevant Supreme Court precedents on the subject of 
creationism, and none of the alternative First Amendment theories intelligent 
design proponents offer in response can withstand even cursory analysis.  
There is little question that intelligent design proponents have a serious 
dispute with the scientific community’s virtually unanimous support for the 
proposition that evolution happens—in both micro and macro forms. But this 
dispute is at bottom a religious, not a scientific dispute. Both scientists and 
the government must respect the rights of private individuals to reject 
scientific conclusions on religious grounds in favor of intelligent design and 
other theocentric approaches to humanity’s origins. But at the same time 
scientists must be allowed to do science and science teachers must be 
allowed to teach it—unconstrained by the objections of those who find 
science inconsistent with their religious beliefs. As Bertolt Brecht’s Galileo 
noted, “the sum total of the angles in a triangle can’t be changed to suit the 
requirements of the curia.”594 The Court’s Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence makes it clear that modern governments can’t alter basic 
scientific conclusions to suit the requirements of politically powerful 
religious groups, either. 
 594. Bertolt Brecht, Life of Galileo, in 5 COLLECTED PLAYS 58 (1972). 
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